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Abstract  
This dissertation is an attempt to map out the production process 
of graphic design within contemporary circuits of capitalist 
production. I will argue that understanding the production process 
of design today is assisted by Deleuze and Guattari’s 
understandings of capitalism as both a deterritorializing and 
reterritorializing force. I will argue that the generative power for 
graphic design is drawn from a level that Deleuze and Guattari 
describe as the body without organs, which is affective in 
composition. As affect, this raw material for design is a generative, 
non-conscious, non-representative, and unstructured milieu 
associated with what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the virtual. 
On the other hand, I will argue that design labor also mobilizes a 
more structured and hierarchical level of discipline and control 
against these novel proliferations. This second level is associated 
with what Deleuze and Guattari call the plane of organization or 
actual plane of existence. I will ultimately locate this latter 
controlling side of capital within what Marx (1976) associated with 
the labor process of design labor. I will argue that the labor process 
of design is a technique that reterritorializes, manipulates, 
channels and ultimately de-radicalizes the creative affective energy 
that designers drawn from the body without organs. Once design 
work is understood in this way, I argue that we can then recognize 
the occupation as a strategic point through which capital both 
expropriates value from affective flows, while simultaneously 
serving as disciplinary mechanism to control the possibilities for 
subjective becomings.  
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Introduction: Strange Resonances 
 
In this dissertation, I wish to provide a novel way in which one 
can both understand the work done within what has been 
recently referred to as the “cultural” or “creative” industries, 
while simultaneously situating these occupations within the 
wider circuits of capitalist accumualtion and control.  This 
work seeks to offer a way to view contemporary capitalism as 
encompassing two types of production according to the theory 
of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. The first is what I will call 
the production of affect, which, drawing upon Deleuze and 
Guattari occurs outside of, and in many ways unincorporated 
within tradition notions of the labor process as outlined by 
Karl Marx in Capital. As an affective form of production, this 
process is largely unstructured, non-signifying, intensive, and 
forms the basis for any novel creation.  
I will argue that this generative power is what propels forms of 
cultural labor; it is the generative power which furnishes the 
creative industries with the ability to create new commodities. 
As such, these forms of affective production, which circulate 
throughout the general social body, are fundamental to the 
work that creative workers like designers must seek out.  
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In addition to this first layer of production, I wish to identify a 
second layer of production that seeks to delimit, direct, and 
manipulate this first form of affective production. Drawing 
upon Deleuze and Guattari, I refer to this second layer as a sort 
of “plane of organization”, related to the labor process of 
creative workers. Within the labor process of cultural labor, 
affects are translated into intelligable, and signifying forms of 
culture directed by managers and clients.  
Through identifying these two layers, I will argue that 
production has both increasingly seeped out of the traditional 
boundaries of work, invoking theories of the “social factory” 
put forth by autonomist authors, while simultaneously calling 
for an analytic disticition between two forms of production and 
the specificity of the labor process as a form of translation and 
control. In doing so, I will replace both the narrow assumptions 
of labor bound up with orthodox Marxism, and the very broad 
and undiferentiated theories of labor introduced by 
autonomist Marxism with an argument that theories of cultural 
labor should instead re-engage with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
understandings of capitalism and its relationship to affect.  
Introducing the Cultural and Creative Industries 
 
Over the last several years we have witnessed an explosion of 
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concern in what have come to be defined as the ‘cultural’ or 
‘creative industries’ and those who work within them. 
Entrepreneurs resound with the defining trope of the moment: 
create, creativity, be creative! Marketing and advertising 
employees have—sometimes reluctantly, sometimes not—
traded in their tired titles of ‘worker’ for the more appealing 
noun of ‘creative’, and Richard Florida has anointed them as 
members of a ‘creative class’. Government policy has promoted 
occupations associated with these so-called ‘creative 
industries’ as central to urban and national economic growth. 
Creativity with respect to the current economy has become a 
cliché, but like most clichés it is demonstrative of something 
very real, though often misunderstood. Social theorists, too, 
have speculated on this increasing centrality of creativity in the 
capitalist circuits of production. While vehemently opposing 
the overly optimistic business and policy accounts of the 
creative industries, theorists on the Left like Franco Berardi 
agree on the premise that ‘creativity’ makes up one of the 
‘primary tools for the production of value’ (Berardi, 2009: 21). 
Moulier Boutang (2011) echoes this sentiment, writing, ‘we 
can say that most of the exchange value or market value 
derives from the value of the brand, and thus from a factor 
which is immaterial or intangible’ (2011: 32). Within the 
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emergence of such concepts as ‘immaterial labour’ (Lazzarato, 
1996; Hardt and Negri, 2000), ‘cognitive capitalism’ (Berardi, 
2012; Moulier Boutang, 2011), and ‘semio- capitalism’ 
(Berardi, 2009) that try to make sense of these new productive 
relations, creativity and workers’ subjectivity have come to the 
fore as means of production that are instrumental for value 
extraction.  
The so-called creative industries that are associated with this 
shift in production have moved to the centre of policy debates 
surrounding global economic growth, especially since the mid-
1990s. Illustrative of this is the preoccupation with the creative 
industries in the policies of New Labour under Tony Blair, 
which championed such efforts as the Creative Industries Task 
Force in an effort to promote growth in many of those 
artistically oriented occupations (DCMS, 1998/2001; Ross, 
2007: 19). By the late 1990s, fascination over the creative 
industries had reached its peak with governments around the 
world promoting creative occupations as the key for 
postmodernizing domestic economies (Ross, 2007: 20). The 
creative industries have since become synonymous with urban 
economic prosperity as journalist and business gurus alike 
argue that cities must vie to attract a young, hip, demographic 
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that is commonly associated with them or else risk ‘[going] the 
way of Detroit’ (Dreher,2002:1). Perhaps the most famous 
promoter of this rhetoric is Richard Florida (2002), who 
suggests that the emerging ‘creative class’ is primary for urban 
regeneration and building a strong municipal economy. The 
infatuation with creative industries and those who work within 
them is eloquently summarised by the Sociologist Andrew 
Ross, who writes:  
“As paradigms of entrepreneurial selfhood, ‘creatives’, as 
they are now labelled, are the apple of the policymaker’s 
eye, and are recipients of the kind of lip service usually 
bestowed by national managers on high-tech engineers as 
generators of value. Art products are the object of intense 
financial speculation; cultural productions are top hit-
makers in the jackpot end of the economy; ‘cultural 
districts’ are posited as the key to urban New Prosperity; 
and creative industries policy is embraced as the anchor 
of regional development by governments around the 
world on the lookout for a catch-up industrial plan. In the 
business world, creativity is viewed as a wonderstuff for 
transforming workplaces into powerhouses of value, 
while intellectual property – the lucrative prize of 
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creative endeavour – is increasingly regarded as the ‘oil of 
the 21st century’” (Ross, 2007:32).  
Meanwhile, social scientists have focused their attention on the 
workers within those blossoming occupations most 
characteristic of the creative economy. Empirical accounts 
have highlighted some of the positive and negative realities of 
workers who find themselves in the industries most closely 
associated with the drive for creative input. Studies have noted 
that many workers in these industries gain a strong sense of 
pleasure from their work (Banks and Milestone, 2011; Gill, 
2002; 2007; McRobbie, 2002; Neff, et al., 2005; Ursell, 2000); 
that the ability for self expression in these occupations leads to 
strong attachment to the work and the ability for self 
realization through work (McRobbie, 2002; Gill, 2002; Ross, 
2003; Ursell, 2000); that many organizations have open and 
flat organizational structure, with workers being able to self-
govern, or work without rigid regulations (de Peuter and Dyer-
Witheford, 2005; Gill, 2007; Leadbetter and Oakley, 1999; Neff, 
et al., 2005). On the other hand, a number of more negative 
traits have also been uncovered, including workers having to 
work long hours that leak out of the traditional nine-to-five 
schedule (Gill, 2007; Jaarvis and Pratt, 2006; Perrons, 2003; 
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Dyer-Witheford, 2005); sporadic hours, with extreme ups and 
downs in workloads (de Peuter and Dyer- Witheford, 2005; 
Ursell, 2000); constantly being required to spend time and 
money updating skills or creating self-promotional material 
(Christopherson, et al, 1999; Batt et al. 2001; Kotamaraju, 
2002; Neff, et al., 2005; Sennet, 2006); and low pay (de Peuter 
and Dyer- Witheford, 2005; Gill, 2000).  
The Culture Industry and the Frankfurt School of Social Theory 
 
Discussions of the ‘creative industries’ are nested within a 
much larger historical trajectory that begins with the shifting 
modes of production from feudalism to capitalism. It is at this 
point, in the nineteenth century, that cultural products began 
to be commercialized and enter into capitalist production 
(Hesmondalgh and Pratt, 2005). It isn’t until the early to mid-
twentieth century, however, that this process begins to happen 
on a much larger scale and becomes much more significant in 
the discourses surrounding the economy. At this time the 
analyses of what would be later be considered ‘creative 
industries’ focused on the mass production of art from a 
critical perspective, largely associated with the neo-Marxist 
Frankfurt School. 
It is in Adorno and Horkheimer’s (1944/1989) text, The 
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Dialectic of Enlightenment, that the ‘culture industry’ emerged 
as a critique to what was seen as the increasing 
commodification of art and culture in monopoly capitalism. 
Here Adorno and Horkheimer argue that art and culture had 
been commodified by capital to the point that any sense of 
authenticity that they once carried had been supplanted by a 
system whereby art and culture emerge as a homogenized and 
meaningless. They further argue that the process is one by 
which the forms of art and culture--whether it be television, 
film, radio--were now the means through which capital 
subjugated dissent and produced a new, passive subject. 
Emerging around the same time, and also tied with the 
Frankfurt School, Walter Benjamin’s (1955/1978) ‘The Work 
of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ touches on 
similar themes. Benjamin argues that through reproducing art, 
the original work of art’s qualities of ‘time and space’, or the 
‘aura’ that are marks of authenticity, are lost. Ultimately, these 
early analyses affirm a sort of dichotomy in artistic production 
that associates the emergent forms of mass-produced art as 
inferior to those pieces of ‘authentic’ art that predated the shift.  
These emerging understandings of the culture industry were 
integrally tied to the hegemonic capitalist mode of of mass 
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reproduction and large scale consumption at the time. This 
form of monopoly capitalism operated by a logic in which 
initial investments in labour and materials could yield high 
profits if commodities could be produced in a large volume. 
While the reproduction of art has long been a possibility 
throughout history, the age of mechanical reproduction, 
brought along by shifts in capitalism, ‘represents something 
new’ (Benjamin, 1978: 218). This sheer scale through which 
art could be detached from it’s original ‘tradition’, or authentic 
space and time was unseen (ibid). The scale of this process is, 
for Adorno and Benjamin, tied to the emerging technologies 
that allow for mass reproduction. The detriment to ‘authentic’ 
art arrives in a climate in which mechanized technologies come 
to dominate the labour process.The new technologies 
insinuated in this shift (the printing press, photography, wax 
discs) were seen as integral to the mass reproduction model 
and the lack of authenticity that it promoted. 
While Adorno and Benjamin affirmed a problematic dichotomy 
between high and low culture (particularly evident in Adorno’s 
analysis of jazz and pop music (1932, 1936, 1938)) , they 
simultaneously critiqued what they saw as an increasingly 
diminishing dichotomy between art and capitalism. If nothing 
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else, their analysis points to a process in which the previously 
assumed autonomous domains of art and capitalism become 
enmeshed in one another, ‘as the independent artist gave way 
to the culture factory’ (O’Connor, 2010: 14). We should be 
careful, however, to assume that before this shift that the artist 
was completely independant of commerce. If we look deeper 
into the history of art it becomes clear that the artist has 
always been implicated in commercial relations, and art and 
the artist have never really stood completely autonomous from 
production. As Bayly (2004 O) argues, even in the era of 
mercantilism, the artist was dependant on markets for 
subsistence.   What was particular for Adorno and Benjamin, 
however, was the degree to which art had entered into the 
domain of capitalist relations of mass production.  
Beyond the Frankfurt School: New Appraisals of The Culture 
Industry in British Cultural Studies 
 
In the decades after Adorno and Horkheimer's analysis of the 
‘culture industry’, the adequacy and validity of their account of 
the culture industry became questioned by a number of 
academics, particularly those associated with the Birmingham 
Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS). This current 
tended to reject the Frankfurt School’s thesis that popular 
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forms of culture lacked any potential to be critical of capitalist 
relations. We might attribute this first critique as initially 
originating from Raymond Williams’ text, Culture and Society 
(1958/1960). It is here that Williams offers a historical account 
of culture as coming to mean something quite different in the 
period starting in the late 18th century. Before this shift, 
culture, Williams writes, ‘had meant, primarily, the “tending of 
natural growth”’ (Williams, 1960: xiv). After this time, it begins 
to signify ‘the whole way of life, material, intellectual and 
spiritual’ (ibid). This shift was a response to both capitalist 
industrialization and the emerging discourse on democracy. 
Within this emerging material and social milieu, art and culture 
begins to offer a separate domain of reflection and means of 
challenging Industrial capitalist relations; it becomes a 
‘recognition of a separate body of moral and intellectual 
activities, and the offering of a court of human appeal, 
which comprise the early meanings of the word, are 
joined, and in themselves changed, by the growing 
assertion of a whole way of life, not only as a scale of 
integrity, but as a mode of interpreting all our common 
experience, and, in this new interpretation, changing it’ 
(1960: xvi). 
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Thus, culture, in emerging within Industrial capitalism, was not 
simply conceptualized as meaningless consumption through 
which capitalism produced uncritical subjects, as Adorno had 
suggested; but is understood as the primary field in which 
interrogation and praxis unfolds. In other words, culture had 
not completely merged with capitalism, but still offered a space 
of autonomous reflection and scrutiny contra to capitalism. In 
the following decades, those associated with the CCCS, such as 
Stuart Hall, developed this understanding further. They argued 
that resistance and critique to the hegemonic order was visible 
in youth and popular cultures, manifested in cultural 
commodities like music and clothing styles (Hall and Jefferson, 
1975; Hebdige, 2005 O).  
But the leading intellectuals emerging out of this school did not 
deny that forms of cultural production were imbued with 
capitalist relations. By focusing on a more textual reading of 
consumer goods--tying (post)structualist analysis with the 
work of neo-Marxists like Althusser--they simultaneously 
argued that cultural mediums like television were mechanisms 
to disseminate capitalist ideology, but gave more merit to the 
consumer, or ‘decoder’ in constructing meaning in this process 
(Hall, 1973). Viewed this way, their work can be seen not only 
 21
a critique of figures like Adorno, but also as an extension.   
The Political Economy of Culture 
 
Alongside these analyses of culture, the ‘political economy of 
culture’ (PEC) school developed in Britain, critiquing the 
CCCS’s emphasis on the production of culture read primarily as 
texts. Leading figures of this movement, such as Garnham 
(1990), were critical of the the structuralist underpinnings of 
the CCCS, which focused their analysis on the 
ideological/Althusserian reading of culture (Milner, 2002: 
130). Instead, they focused on ‘how this culture got produced, 
by whom, and under what conditions’, built around the 
scholarly work on Marx in the 1960s and 1970s (O’Connor, 
2010: 23). The PEC school, according Garnham (2005: 18), was 
‘influenced by information economics, the special features of 
the economic structure and dynamics of symbolic production, 
distribution and consumption.’ Like CCCS, however, they were 
critical of Adorno’s approach to culture. O’Connor (2010) 
underlines four ways in which Adorno’s account was critiqued 
by the political economy school: 
1. Adorno’s analysis focused on how culture had become 
homogenized through mass reproduction to the point that it 
becomes meaningless. Against this, those associated with PEC 
 22
argue that the desire for new commodities is a fundamental 
human quality. Ultimately, they make a distinction between the 
fundamentally human necessity for new use-values manifest in 
commodities on the one hand, and the exchange-value of 
commodities that is governed capitalist reproduction on the 
other. As humans yearn for new use-values and new 
commodities, it limits the degree to which commodities can be 
reproduced on a mass scale. Capital must not only allow for, 
but seek new commodities in order to keep up with this 
fundamental desire for new products (Garnham, 1983).  
2. It is impossible to know the degree to which the audience as 
consumers will respond to the mass production of a specific 
commodity. Adorno’s emphasis on the culture commodity as a 
means of subjugating critical reflection is questioned when one 
acknowledges that certain consumers do not respond well to 
commodities. The consumer product may or may not be a hit. 
The unpredictability of demand and the inherent need for new 
use-values complicates an ideological programme that works 
through the production of commodities.  
3.  Adorno’s historical argument that the individual artist has 
for the most part, and will be completely, absorbed into the 
mode of mass production, whereby any sense of individuality 
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will be exterminated, is brought into question (Garnham, 
1983). The political economy school argued that this process 
had not been completely realised, and that the artisanal quality 
of autonomy continues to persist in the sectors concerned with 
cultural production. 
4. The idea that there is one ‘culture industry’ is problematised 
when looking at the particularities in different types of 
industry distributing culture. In this regard, Miege (1979; 
1987; 1989) provides a basis for reflecting on some of these 
differences in the realisation of cultural exchange value 
(Garnham, 1983). As O’ Connor (2010: 24) summarises, there 
are four different ways in which exchange value is extracted: 
‘First, physical objects carrying cultural content were sold 
as commodities to individuals – books, records, videos 
etc. Second, television and radio broadcasting were (apart 
from what was then a limited subscription audience) 
available free to consumers and made money out of 
advertising and sponsorship. Here there were strong 
interventions by the State, often taking broadcasting 
completely out of private ownership and providing it as a 
public service financed by taxation. In most States some 
mix of public service and commercial stations was in 
 24
place. Newspapers and magazines occupied an 
intermediary position, where individual copies were paid 
for but advertising brought in the bulk of the revenue. 
Thirdly, those forms associated with public performance 
– music, theatre, and especially cinema - depended on 
restricted viewing and charging an admission fee.’ 
The importance here is that there are variations and 
differences in how and by whom culture gets produced, 
commodified, and managed depending on the specific cultural 
commodity. For this reason, many later theorists prefer the the 
plural signifier of the cultural industries, rather than the 
singular ‘culture industry’, in order to reflect those differences.   
From Culture to Creativity: Culture and Economic Policy 
 
By the 1980s, interest in the cultural industries had escaped 
the confines of academia and was picked up by politicians and 
economists. One of the earliest examples of this on an 
international scale is reflected in a publication by UNESCO, 
addressing concerns over public access to culture and the arts. 
In the UNESCO published document of 1982, Girard argues that 
access to cultural goods is better advanced by moving ‘away 
from the antithesis of business and culture, or art and industry, 
which is as false as it is facile’ (1982: 25). Policy, according to 
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Girard, should concern itself with marketized ways of 
promoting the cultural industries, instead of public spending 
on culture and the arts. He argues that while public spending 
had increased over the previous years, access had still been 
relatively restricted to the higher classes. In an ironic twist of 
argument, marketizing culture through the emerging cultural 
industries and informational technologies like television was 
seen as a way to democratize and open up culture.   
Around the same time, the cultural industries emerged as a key 
concern in the local economic strategy of the Greater London 
Council (GLC) under the control of the Labour Party in Britain. 
With the appointment of Ken Livingstone as its leader, the GLC 
attempted to build an alternative to a centralised economic 
model focusing on national politics (Bianchini, 1987). In the 
political climate of Thatcherism on a national scale and the 
tarnished credibility of the top-down economic programmes in 
Soviet communism, Labour looked for more decentralised and 
localised means in which they could achieve their economic 
agenda. Moreover, with an increasing amount of 
manufacturing jobs being lost to overseas competition,  the 
GLC saw the emerging cultural sectors of advertising, 
television, film, music, and newspapers as areas that could 
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potentially alleviate the growing unemployment problem 
(Hartley, cited in Garnham, 1983). While most of the cultural 
sectors were centred in London, and thus could be affected on 
a local scale, their scope and significance included the whole of 
the country (Hartley, cited in Garnham, 1983). This put them in 
a critical position for mounting a large policy initiative that 
could be done within the confines of the Labour controlled 
London County Hall. 
The GLC’s growing concern with the cultural industries was in 
a large part influenced by two main figures. First was Tony 
Banks, acting as the chair of the GLC’s Arts and Recreation 
Committee (Bianchini, 1987). Banks was integral in shifting 
discourse and conceptualization of culture away from its a 
relatively traditional understanding, restricted to the 
individual as artist, ‘towards a redefinition which focused on 
popular culture and media’ (Hartely, 2007). Second, and 
perhaps most importantly, was the influence of Nicholas 
Garnham. Garnham had been an acting consultant to the GLC, 
authoring an influential document that would later be 
published as a pamphlet by the GLC, Concepts of Culture 
(1983) (see Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005). Similar to 
Girard’s (1982) published article by UNESCO, Garnham saw the 
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market as an efficient and useful way to instigate a more 
democratic view of culture that would reflect consumer choice 
(O’Connor, 2010: 27).  
Cultural Industries and Urban Economic Development 
 
In 1986  the GLC was abolished by the Conservative 
government of Thatcher, preventing many of the cultural 
industries policies to ever become realised (Biachini, 1987). In 
a related way, however, one can see a continuation of some of 
the GLC’s concerns in the municipal policies outside of London 
in the late 1980s (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005; O’Connor, 
2010). It is at this time that the cultural industries become 
tethered to the concerns of urban regeneration, with local 
authorities focusing development on ‘cultural quarters’, a 
process that would continue to the present time (see Bell and 
Jayne 2004 in Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005). In the UK this 
trend has been associated with the weakening of local 
authorities’ power over taxation and planning under the 
Thatcher leadership of the late 1980s, apparent with the 
dissolution of the GLC (O’Connor, 2010). The central 
government, while restricting power, simultaneously 
demanded local economic planning initiatives that would focus 
economic policy away from industrial manufacturing. With a 
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limited amount of resources and power, local authorities 
looked towards arts and culture as a vehicle for urban 
economic regeneration. In this context, the city policy of 
Sheffield, through the Department of Employment Economic 
Development (DEED), is one of the earliest examples of ways in 
which the arts and culture played an integral part in post-
industrial city development (see Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 
2005). While DEED was not specifically a cultural programme, 
but rather an economic development programme, 
strengthening cultural institutions and the cultural industries 
was seen as a viable component to reversing unemployment 
and building an economic alternative to an industrial economy 
(Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005).  
Soon, culture-led initiatives to economic development spread 
throughout the UK and western Europe. Local governments 
started to funnel money into projects that ‘sometimes centred 
on museums and other building projects, but sometimes 
around cultural industries- related initiatives’ (Hesmondhalgh 
and Pratt, 2005: 5). A number of these policy initiatives are 
evaluated through case-studies in Biachini and Parkinson’s 
edited volume (1993 in Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005). Local 
municipalities were keen to demonstrate how their public 
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spending on the arts had a much more robust effect on the 
broader economy. At this time Myerscough (1988) developed a 
framework for measuring not only the amount of money 
generated by the arts themselves, but also the indirect impact 
of these projects in generating capital and employment in the 
surrounding cafes, restaurants, and other tourist amenities 
within the city. The idea was that the municipally funded arts 
and culture projects produced a ‘multiplier effect’, whereby 
arts and cultural investment would impact the wider economic 
vitality of the city as well. It is in this context that art and 
culture began to emerge as the object of city development, and 
a whole slew of local policy initiatives began to focus on 
creating cultural quarters, and promoting cultural tourism. 
The Postmodernization of Capital 
 
From the late 1980s through the mid1990s, more cities around 
the world began to adopt policies that centred on fostering 
culture and the cultural industries. The sought image of the city 
became tied to a process of building small and medium sized 
enterprise (SME) ‘clusters’  seen as a means to transform de-
industrialised urban cores. Around this time, economists and 
cultural geographers began to associate this process with a 
broader shift in capitalism towards a ‘postmodernization’ of 
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the economy, giving rise to an era of ‘post-fordism’ (Lash and 
Urry, 1987; Scott, 1988; Harvey,  O). These figures argued that 
the era of mass production and consumption that the Frankfurt 
school spoke of had largely been replaced by a configuration of 
smaller markets where niche production and consumption 
proliferated. In this new terrain, the consumption of symbolic 
goods and services became aligned with identity formation, 
tending to shift away from the mass culture of Fordism (Lash 
and Urry, 1994). In responding to these new, unpredictable 
markets, these figures argued that production had to become 
more flexible to change, and quicker in reading the shifts in 
consumption. Ultimately, this meant that information flows 
between consumer markets and producers had to be sped up; 
production had to be more closely synced to changes in the 
market. 
Academics thus became interested in the way that these new 
shifts in capitalist accumulation were redefining the city, 
labour, and society.  In particular, Marxist geographer David 
Harvey (1989) spoke of the postmodernization of society, 
related to the increasingly mobile nature of capital and labour 
and ‘flexible specialisation’. For Harvey, the contemporary 
moment of capitalism was defined by its emphasis on the 
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production and consumption of symbolic and cultural goods in 
what he termed a ‘cultural fix’. In the emerging mode he spoke 
of, he argued that the city was transforming based upon the 
logic of cultural consumption, planned around the creation of 
spectacles, shopping districts, and cultural quarters, replacing 
the old crumbling urban cores that were associated with 
industrial flight. Here, Harvey tied many of the changes being 
implemented through urban economic policy spoke about 
above to a larger shift in capitalist development. 
From Culture to Creativity 
 
Beginning in the 1990’s occupations that had been previously 
discussed in relation to the cultural industry or cultural 
industries was recast under the umbrella of the creative 
industries. This definition coincides with a renewed interest in 
how culture is increasingly central to municipal and national 
economic development under New Labor. Following the 
elections of 1997 that put Labour into power, the Creative 
Industries Task Force (CITF) was set up in an effort to map and 
evaluate the cultural industries. It was at this point that the 
cultural industries were rebranded by Labour as the ‘creative 
industries’ (see Garnham, 2005). In 1998, the CITF, as a body of 
the broader Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), 
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published the Creative Industries Mapping Document wherein 
those industries associated with the cultural industry became 
know as the “creative industry”(1998). Pratt (2005) speculates 
this renaming was for two reasons. First, in attempt to distance 
itself from traditional leftists ideology associated with the 
history outlined above, and second as a way to heighten the 
focus on intellectual property. The second reason relates to 
New Labour recasting the creative industries as ‘Those 
activities that have their origin in individual creativity, skill 
and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job 
creation through the general exploitation of intellectual 
property’(DCMS 1998).  
 
There are a number of problems that have been pointed out 
with this definition put forth by the DCMS (see Pratt and 
Jeffcut, 2009), including the tendency to blur “the destinction 
between the cultural economy and ‘the rest’ of the economy” 
(n:p). In other words, as Pratt describes, under the definition it 
is “difficult to identify a non-creative industry or activity (Pratt, 
2005: 6). Because of some of these difficulties, following Pratt, 
when I refer to the “creative” or “cultural” industries, I refer to 
the United Nations’ definition (UNCTAD, 2008) of “any 
economic activityproducing symbolic products with a heavy 
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reliance on intellectual property and for as wide a market as 
possible”. In order to outline exactly what occupations are 
covered under the creative industries banner, I refer to their 
classification of four groups (UNCTAD, 2008:13): 
 
1. Heritage. Cultural heritage is identified as the origin of 
all forms of arts and the soul of cultural and creative 
industries. It is the starting point of this classification. 
It is heritage that brings together cultural aspects from 
the historical, anthropological, ethnic, aesthetic and 
societal viewpoints, influences creativity and is the 
origin of a number of heritage goods and services as 
well as cultural activities. Associated with heritage is 
the concept of “traditional knowledge and cultural 
expressions” embedded in the creation of arts and 
crafts as well as in folklore and traditional cultural 
festivities.  
2. Arts. This group includes creative industries based 
purely on art and culture. Artwork is inspired by 
heritage, identity values and symbolic meaning. This 
group is divided into two large subgroups: Visual arts: 
painting, sculpture, photography and antiques; and 
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Performing arts: live music, theatre, dance, opera, 
circus, puppetry, etc. 
3. Media. This group covers two subgroups of media that 
produce creative content with the purpose of 
communicating with large audiences (“new media” is 
classified separately): Publishing and printed media: 
books, press and other publications; and Audiovisuals: 
film, television, radio and other broadcasting. 
4. Functional creations. This group comprises more 
demand-driven and services-oriented industries 
creating goods and services with functional purposes. 
It is divided into the following subgroups: Design: 
interior, graphic, fashion, jewellery, toys; New media: 
software, video games, and digitalized creative content; 
and Creative services: architectural, advertising, 
cultural and recreational, creative research and 
development (R&D), digital and other related creative 
services. 
 
Within this dissertation, I will focus primarily on the 4th 
dimension under this defintion—functional creactions.  
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Towards a Deleuzoguattarian approach to cultural labor 
 
Without a doubt, many of these existing theoretical and 
empirical appraisals are very useful for understanding the 
creative industries, their organizational structure and those 
who work within them. And to be clear from the outset, I do 
not in any way mean to color existing approaches inept, nor do 
I wish to claim that what I will presenting is the approach to 
creative production while theirs is not. The following is not a 
dialectic negation of current critiques of cultural production in 
order to arrive at something new. What I seek to do, instead, is 
to resonate existing literature attending to cultural production 
with the somewhat separate—though not always—discussions 
on affect, and Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts relating to the 
schizophrenic productions of capitalism in order to open up 
novel ways of understanding contemporary capitalist 
production and the forms of discipline within it.  
The idea of resonance as a method of inquiry is one I take from 
the late Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari who, most notably—
though not exclusively—employ it throughout their joint 
works falling under the project Capitalism and Schizophrenia, a 
project that serves as a great inspiration for what follows. Here 
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they introduce and actively demonstrate the notion that 
certain discourses can be made to interfere with one another in 
a way that produces something novel. It is a process by which, 
to take the example of A Thousand Plateaus, various 
productions such as art, literature, geology, geography, and 
linguistics come together to create new philosophical concepts. 
In connecting these somewhat desperate literatures, the sum 
of what is created in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical 
concepts are not reducible to the parts that make them up. 
Discourse is deterritorialized, made to become, opening up 
new existential territiories. There is, as Ian Buchanin explains 
in regards to Deleuze’s relationship to his literary inspirations, 
something gained through his conversion of this material into 
his thought. In a similar fashion, by resonating the different 
influences of this project that I will introduce more fully below, 
I hope to open up new ways of perceiving current 
configurations of post-Fordist capitalism.  
As I compile this thesis, putting different literature together, 
making them, as I refer to it, resonate, I want to underline that 
this method is not to be misunderstood as a simple re-
presentation of ideas. In the process of translating various 
inspirations, there is an accompanied layer of distortion or 
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bastardization, and it is this activity that differentiates this 
method from replication; it is what makes the thoughts 
irreducible their inspirations. These gestures, then, are more 
consistent with how Deleuze describes his own modus 
operandi, of engaging in a ‘sort of buggery’ with different 
figures, creating an offspring that is composed of the original’s 
ideas, but whose ideas become strange, new, or ‘monstrous’ in 
the production of new concepts. In buggery there is a certain 
misalignment with the object of inspiration; through buggery 
something is added, but also, in parallel, taken away. Ian 
Buchanan highlights this process within the work of Deleuze, 
insisting that if one refers to many of his cited influences, there 
are important inconsistencies and omissions that prevent a 
reader from tracing any straightforward relationship with his 
work. This is because Deleuze is often selective in which 
fragments of work he chooses to develop and which ones he 
ignores. With regards to one of Deleuze’s literary inspirations, 
D.H. Lawerence, Buchanin notes: ‘Deleuze is simultaneously a 
close, careful, and obviously knowledgeable reader of 
Lawrence as well as highly selective, subtly distorting and even 
a negligent reader’ (Buchanan, 2009: 6.01). Indeed, in the 
introduction to what is widely considered Deleuze and 
Guattari’s magnum opus, A Thousand Plateaus, Brian Massumi 
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encourages readers to approach it in the same way, focusing on 
parts that strike the reader while ignoring the parts that don’t. 
Not only should the reading of the text be open to this sort of 
distortion, but also the application:  
“Most of all, the reader is invited to lift a dynamism out of 
the book entirely, and incarnate it in a foreign medium, 
whether it be painting or politics. The authors steal from 
other disciplines with glee, but they are more than happy 
to return the favor. Deleuze’s own image for a concept is 
not a brick, but a ‘tool box’” (Massumi in Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004: xv-xvi).  
If Deleuze and Guattari’s method of philosophical production is 
not one of copy it is because they prefer to map instead of trace 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 13). Maps and traces are 
distinguished in that the later seek to replicate the same over 
and over, to find the hidden meaning in art, language, or 
sociality, while the former seek to open up, to create new and 
novel configurations that produce new ways of seeing. Maps 
are experimental and constantly susceptible to revisions; they 
produce new understandings instead of trying to overcode 
everything with a predetermined transcendental signifier. 
Instead of asking what things mean or say, maps suggest we 
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seek out what things do, what gets produced—what does this 
do when it is put in this assemblage? What does it do when it is 
inverted or skewed in this way? What if it is combined with 
this instead of that?  
In this thesis I take these ideas to heart. In presenting an 
assemblage of different ideas, thoughts, and concepts I am not 
worried with properly or fully representing the original 
author’s intentions or meanings. At best I am an amateur in all 
the scholarly fields that I will present, at worst I am a fraud. 
This is not to say that there have not been countless hours of 
work put into this project, wrestling with trying to grasp at 
something. Nor does it mean that this is necessarily a bad place 
from which to create something new. For many worthwhile 
ideas are never fully grasped but nonetheless leave a certain 
impression on you that you can then mobilize in the 
production of something new. Furthermore, I am less 
interested in fully representing the works of certain authors 
because I find more importance in plugging in different 
fragments of their work into an assemblage with other 
fragments in order to see what new understandings might 
arise. As such, this project is better described as an experiment 
with arranging and mal-aligning parts rather than identifying 
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the ‘gaps’ in research that need to be filled, as if finding the gap 
will fulfill the complete image of what there is to know. 
Deleuze teaches us that the need to produce or generate 
knowledge does not come from lack, nor does it come from a 
full survey and understanding of the world. We produce at the 
edges of our knowledge while at the same time in a ‘cramped 
space’ of overabundance (Deleuze, 1994: xxi; Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1986: 16). Ignorance is a precursor to novel ideas, but 
so is impasse and suffocation. Production of novelty takes 
place in flows, not gaps. The water that wets you and leaves 
impressions cannot be turned off, but it can be siphoned, 
diverted and cut into. There is no space of solitude to build up 
an idea, only an endless torrent that will force one to develop 
tools in order to float.  
Lines of Resonation  
 
The primary lines that will be resonated, bastardized, and 
fragmented throughout the following chapters in order 
produce this doctoral assemblage are: (1) theories of ‘affect’ 
and ‘affectivity’ within contemporary social theory; (2) the 
theoretical legacy of Deleuze and Guattari, particularly their 
work falling under the umbrella of Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, but also their writings related to the first and 
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third points; (3) theoretical configurations of labor, 
organization and capitalism within the era of ‘post-Fordism’, 
such as those related to the Italian Marxists tradition of 
operaismo and post-operaismo, but also those related to the 
wider fields of organizational studies, sociology of work, and 
critical management studies; and (4) empirical data focusing 
on the work of graphic designers.  
Neither one of these layers forms a basis or primary 
problematic from which the others are built upon. At times 
different layers might be more in focus than others, but that 
does not mean that they presuppose or are ultimate to any 
other layer. The architecture of this project did not develop like 
the building of a house, starting with the foundation working 
upwards, but like a rhizome of circulating ideas that had to be 
puzzled together, siphoned, attached, detached, and broken. As 
a rhizome, there are multiple entrances and each point of the 
rhizome connects with every other point (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1986: 3; 1987: 7). It isn’t that I am seeking to find the 
answer to a question around creative labor within the field of 
affect, for instance, but that I begin in a jumble of all sorts of 
literature and the specific lines that become primary were the 
ones that resonated best with one another to create a new 
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‘topography’ or ‘mapping’ of capitalist production and 
discipline. These lines are co-constitutive in the process of 
producing this text, in line with the way Deleuze and Guattari 
describe different milieus coming together in a refrain 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 344-45).  
It is important to note that the intellectual milieus or lines that 
I present are not exclusive from one another and that there are 
many shared overlaps, which is precisely the points of 
resonation that I will be exploring. Following Deleuze and 
Guattari, these millieus are ‘not unitary...but they pass into one 
another; they are essentially communicating’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987: 345). That said, in order to analytically lay out 
my ideas in a more linear fashion required by a thesis 
introduction, I have made my best attempts to parcel them out. 
Furthermore, the list I present isn’t exhaustive. I have left out 
many of the more minor theoretical figures that do crop up 
within the following chapters and plug into the assemblages 
that I produce here.  
The General Topography  
 
The specific lines I will forward in this thesis make up what I 
will refer to as a topography of capitalist production and 
discipline that centers on the need to both promote and 
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contain creative energies. This topography is bound by the 
premise that creativity is both fundamental to the ongoing 
capitalist production of novelty tethered to the need to 
produce ever more commodities, but also that it poses serious 
risks for capitalism in that it is the also basis for new forms of 
life that can and do become contentious to its demands and, 
therefore, must be disciplined.  
Capitalism is schizophrenic, decoding and deterritorializing 
flows, precisely because it is these flows of creative 
displacement that are ‘both its primary determinant and its 
fundamental raw material’ and, because of this, it ‘deliberately 
perpetuates it’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 33). But there is 
always a limit to this, a fine line that capital must walk in the 
process of unleashing these creative capacities, for it risks, as 
Deleuze and Guattari comment, ‘[unleashing] itself to the 
moon’ (1983: 34). This is where the paranoia of capitalism is 
deployed, as a second pole to limit the schizophrenic 
dimension from which it’s value production is perpetuated. It 
is where the disciplining mechanisms of capitalism temper its 
capacity to spin off out of its reach. Capital must allow for a 
certain level of creativity to flourish, a certain amount of 
deterritorialization from its grasp; it doesn’t completely 
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control, for that would induce a sort of entropy, but it must 
also discipline that creativity to ensure it ‘falls back on’ or 
becomes consistent with capitalism’s laws of value:  
“Capitalism, throught its process of production, produces an 
awesome schizophrenic accumulation of energy or charge, 
against which it brings all of its vast powers of repression to 
bear, but which nonetheless continues to act as capitalism’s 
limit. For capitalism constant counteracts, constantly inhibits 
this inherent tendency while at the same time allowing it free 
reign; it continually seeks to avoid reaching its limit while 
simultaneously tending toward that limit” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1983: 34).  
Thus, there is a ‘two-fold movement’ (1983: 34) of 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization that make up the 
basic topos of capitalist development, and it is this relationship 
that will be considered when approaching creativity in relation 
to capitalism.  
What I wish to make clear in the following parts is that in this 
process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, it is not 
capital that produces creativity. The deterritorializing creative 
forces on which capital is built are produced somewhat outside 
of its immediate and direct control. Capital is a ‘recording body’ 
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with respect to the production of subjectivity, a ‘body without 
organs’ that ‘attracts [production], and appropriates it for its 
own’, falling back on it (‘su rabat sur’) in such a way that it 
appears as though it emanates from it (1983: 11). Capitalism in 
this way is a ‘production of production’ that does not produce 
its initial creative raw material but produces recordings, 
coordinates and grids (1983: 12).  
This does not mean that in allowing for this creativity to 
flourish somewhat outside if it’s immediate reach that it does 
not constantly re-fold it into its structures of discipline and 
command and keep it within an arm's distance. It must, both in 
order to extract value from these novel productions, to 
reterritorialize them into value, but also in order to guarantee, 
as I said before, that they do not spin off and find a different 
body and produce subjectivities that might be contentious to it. 
This is why the capitalist body also includes a ‘strata’ involved 
with ‘accumulation, coagulation and sedimentation, that, in 
order to extract useful labor...imposes upon it forms, functions, 
bonds, dominant and hierarchized organizations...’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1987: 176). It is forever creating new techniques 
of discipline and organization in order to direct the flows of 
creativity it unleashes and requires back into itself in a 
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constant, infinite manner. It develops endless ‘axioms’ that 
stack on top of one another so that capitalism never reaches a 
terminal state. Capital has an “infinite ability to push past and 
reset its limits; it can just add a new axiom” (Beck, 2009). 
Indeed, part of this project is to understand some of the 
current axioms that capital deploys in order to reign in the 
productive powers it depends on.  
At this point one could say that capitalism is in many ways 
reactive in its confrontations with deterritorialized flows of 
creativity. As I tried to dispel earlier, it doesn’t create the 
power that propels it forward but attaches or territorializes 
that power into itself. Its power is, as Michel Foucault might 
describe it, ‘an action over the action of people’. Like Foucault’s 
analysis of biopower, deterritorialization is allowed a little bit 
of play: “[it] is not that life has been totally integrated into 
techniques that govern and administer it; it constantly escapes 
them’ (Foucault, 1978/1998: 143). As in the descriptions of 
biopower, on one level capital must say ‘yes’—it intensifies 
knowledge, requires it, even demands it— but at the same time 
it distributes productions around certain apparatuses of 
power, around a specific norm. But capital’s disciplinary 
mechanisms, it’s reterritorializing powers come after the 
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deterritorializing energy that it harnesses and reclaims. As 
Judith Revel comments, “power is an action over an action: 
thus it always comes second—logically, ontologically and 
chronologically” (Revel, 2013: 105). This reactive logic is 
operative elsewhere, most notably in the autonomist Marxist 
theories of class composition. Developing in Italy between the 
1850s and 1970s, composition analysis, among other things, 
seeks to overturn predominant logics of capitalism as being the 
primary motor of history, where labor merely ‘[reacts] to the 
effects of a continuing pattern of development with little hope 
of exerting any real influence’ (Shukaitis, 2009: 21). 
Composition analysis argues, instead, that the development of 
capitalist organization and discipline follows labor’s 
productive energies. As de Molina (2004) argues, ‘the 
hierarchical organization of business is in fact just a response 
to workers’ struggles’, highlighting the reactionary power at its 
core. Capitalism ‘recomposes’ itself based upon the struggles 
and creative interventions of labor, not vice versa.  
The Two Poles of Production  
 
Building on the general description of capitalism described 
above, I will argue in this thesis that there are at least two 
levels of production that make up the topography of creative or 
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cultural capitalism. The first level of production is what I will 
associate with deterritorialization, or the novel slippages that 
escape its modes of discipline and recordings, however briefly, 
and are fundamental to its creation of new cultural 
commodities. This level of production is dominated by the 
circulations of affects that escape consciousness and language, 
propagating and circulating in a state of ‘virtuality’ that comes 
prior to the any actualization in settled forms of subjectivity 
and meaning. To fully understand this level of production, one 
must come to terms with the concept of affect and understand 
its relationship in the production of subjectivity. In the first 
section of this thesis I unpack the concept of affect and 
demonstrate how it is connected to the construction of new 
subjectivities, which privileges it as an object that is both 
integral to capitalist value production, but also, in the same 
manner, a power that has the potential to produce 
revolutionary subjectivities outside of its grasp. Because of this 
power, I argue that capitalism has a great interest in both 
harvesting affects for value production but also delimiting its 
virtuality and disciplining it in order to prevent germinations 
that would harm its own proliferation. After this, I connect this 
level of production to what Nancy Fraser calls ‘the even more 
hidden abode of production’ and what autonomist Marxists 
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refer to as ‘the social factory’. I situate affective production 
within the commons that forms the raw material for the later 
form of production.  
The second form of production I will describe is the production 
of recording and is related to reterritorialization. This level is 
instrumental in actualizing affects, which is both necessary for 
them to be converted into value, but also integral in subjecting 
them to the rules of capital. In the second section of this thesis I 
describe this process at length, tracing out the way in which 
affects move from the commons where they originate into 
more bounded nodes of power, which codify and organize 
affect into permissible forms of culture, delimiting them of 
their potentiality and milking them of value. This is where I 
will discuss disciplinary apparatuses that assist in the process 
of actualizing affects in relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
understanding of apparatuses of capture and Foucualt’s 
technologies of power in biopolitics.  
These two examples of production will be elaborated upon in a 
third section that brings the theoretical concerns of the first 
two sections in conversation with empirical examples that 
highlight and illuminate how these processes work within the 
cultural economy. In this section I argue that graphic design 
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labor and gentrification within the modern city are particular 
manifestations of capitalism’s two primary productions of 
recording: labor and rent. In these sections I argue that design 
and gentrification are predicated upon the affective value that 
is produced throughout the commons but which becomes 
valorized and coded within these two domains of capture.  
Section Layout  
 
In Part One of this thesis I will introduce some material that 
problematizes traditional Marxist assumptions about 
production through an engagement with design labor. Section 
One of Part One will layout the basic tenents of Marx’s “labor 
process theory” as well as more contemporary incarnations of 
that theory by organizational scholars associated with what 
has become known as Labor Process Theory (LPT). Ultimately, 
through this process I will argue that these theories are 
inedequite for understanding the production process of 
cultural labor. As such, this first part acts somewhat as an 
illustration of the problematic that will require subsequent 
analyses. In Section Two of Part One, I will introduce a body of 
theory associated with autonomist Marxism which confronts 
some of the problematics that were uncovered in Section One 
of Part One. I will argue that autonomist theories such as “the 
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social factory” do go further in understanding what I will 
underline as the dilision of boundaries in capitalist production 
for design labor. But while autonomists do go further, I will 
further assert that a more focused approach on what I will 
describe as “affect” is a useful addition to these discussions.  
In Part Two of this thesis, I will fold in a more pointed 
discussion on affect. Section One of Part Two will provide an 
overview of material that speaks about “affective labor”. Here I 
will accomplish a couple of things. First, I will argue that 
“affective labor” is distinct from discussions of emotional labor, 
though the two are certainly connected and even share a 
theoretical basis. In doing so, I seek to provide an 
understanding of the more novel insights that discussions of 
affective labor bring to an anaylsis of work and production. 
This includes, among other things, a different way in which we 
can begin to approach ideas of aesthetics in relation to affect 
and labor. Amongst other things, I set out to, as Shouse (2005) 
does, mark out a analytical difference between emotion, which 
is “the projection/display of feeling” in an almost signifying 
way,  versus affect, which is an unstructured intensity that is 
potentiality (Shouse, 2005:n.p.). Ultimately, I will argue that 
affective labor provides a nice addendum to the previous 
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analyses of the “social factory” in Part One in understanding 
the mileu or productive power of the social factory that create 
laborors draw upon as affective.  
In Section Two of Part Two, I will focus more particularly on 
the ontology of affect. Here I will lay out Deleuze and Guattari’s 
theories of unconscious and non-representative production, 
tracing a trajectory from their discussions of desire in Anti-
Odipus through their more contemporary concerns in A 
Thousand Plateus. I will also fold in a number of contemporary 
theorists that build off of or inform Deleuze and Guattari’s 
work in order to better anchor and explain their concepts. The 
primary point of this section will be to provide an operational 
definiton of affect which will be built upon in latter sections.  
Part Three of this dissertaion will act to bring the lessons I 
have outlined in previous chapters into an alternative view of 
production that I have already discussed in this introduction. I 
begin with yet another problematic I associate with the 
autonomist notion of production as way to frame this Part. I 
argue that autonomist discussions of the social factory wrongly 
assume that the direction and control of the labor process is no 
longer apparent or needed in contemporary forms of labor.  
After setting up this argument, I will then begin to introduce 
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what I believe is a better alternative to understanding the 
production process of creative labor. This alternative, as 
already discussed, is one taken from Deleuze and Guattari 
which appreciates a dual notion of productivity. In Section One 
of Part Three, I will focus on the first pole of this production 
process that I will associate with what Deleuze and Guattari 
refer to as “the body without organs” and “deterritorialization”.  
Section Two of Part Three will alternatively lay out the second 
pole of production. This pole, I will argue, is necessary in order 
to both extract value from the previous level of affectual 
production, but also to ensure that that productive power does 
not lead to subjective formations outside of capitalism. I will 
argue that this second pole, what Deleuze associates with the 
“plane of organization” is synonomous with the labor process 
of graphic design. I will argue that the labor process, under the 
management and direction of different techniques, is used to 
qualify, code, and signify affect into capitalist meanings.  
The final part of this thesis acts as a vignette to illustrate the 
theory I have laid out in conjunction with empirical data. I 
focus on the work of graphic designers as a way to illustrate 
how creative labor depends on the productions of affect, 
circulating throughout what Lazzaratto (1995) calls the “basin 
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of immaterial labor”. Using descriptions from designers, I will 
show how designers draw upon a certain aural power that is 
neither representative, nor conscious. I will further 
demonstrate that while affect is an important form that 
designers siphon off, their work within the production process 
consists of routinizing, representing, and translating affect into 
the needs and desires of both management, the brand, and 
clients.  
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Part 1: Raw Material, The Social Factory and the General 
Affect 
 
One could say this project started years ago, when, as a 
Masters student, I started interviewing workers occupying 
various positions related to the graphic design industry in 
order to gather a broad profile of the industry and day-to-day 
processes of those within the field. I initially sought out basic 
questions related to things like pay, hours, and the most 
frustrating aspects of working within the industry.  Using these 
interviews I was able to tie the contributions that I observed to 
some of the insights in related fields of work. Similar to related 
“creative” or “cultural” occupations that have been studied, 
designers spoke, for instance, of what Gill and Pratt (2008) call 
“bulimic” working hours, sometimes cramming in all night 
shifts to meet a deadline, while at other points having very 
little work to do.  
 
It wasn’t until after my Master’s degree, however, while re-
discovering Marx’s Capital Vol.1 in a postgraduate reading 
group at the University of Essex that I began to ask myself how 
Marx himself may have approached contemporary design labor 
within his wider matrix of capital accumulation. More 
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specifically, I began to ask how I might attempt to map out 
what Marx introduces in chapter 7 of the volume as “the labor 
process” onto the occupation of graphic design I had begun to 
study years earlier. I asked myself things like ‘What are the 
“means of production” for design labor’, or “what forms the 
raw material for graphic design”. Over the years since I first 
began to mull over this problem, what I initially thought would 
be a fairly straightforward thought experiment became a much 
larger and more complex analysis. The more I revisited these 
questions in my head and began to review the data that I had 
collected as a Masters student, I started to see certain 
divergences develop. Most glaring was the contrast between 
Marx’s very industrially anchored descriptions and the ones 
that various design professionals gave me. The people I spoke 
with weren’t manipulating material, as was the case in Capital, 
but were seeking out and transforming something much more 
aesthetic and artistic in quantity. Their descriptions of the 
labor process further highlighted the contrasts--Marx’s 
description was solidly bounded by particular times and 
spaces while the designer’s seemed to complicate the barriers 
Marx set up between production and reproduction.  
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What I began to realize is that the realities uncovered by the 
empirical data I had accumulated from my previous research 
with graphic designers, and my observations of the cultural 
industry more broadly, complicated Marx’s analysis. For 
instance, the object of labor that they sought out and 
transformed often existed outside of what could be defined as 
the labor process. They often borrowed material from outside 
their remunerated working lives; in spaces and times Marx 
would align with reproduction. Moreover, this material was 
extremely difficult to describe, often not qualifiable by the 
language they had at their expense. It was a quality that was 
much more fickle and intensive, fleeting and unfixable than 
what Marx describes in Capital. What the designers I spoke 
with depended on was not so much an object or material at all, 
but an immaterial aura akin to that which Walter Benjamin 
once described as an “aura” (2008). 
 
As I continued to mull over these problems, I was increasingly 
exposed to different theories that began to resonate much 
more fruitfully than Marx’s Capital with the realities that 
designers described to me, and the observations of cultural 
labor. One such theoretical thread was autonomist Marxism, 
which went much further to describe the cultural laborer’s 
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process and the particular cultural and aesthetic dimensions 
that they drew upon. Autonomist Marxism also provided a 
framework for understanding what I saw within cultural labor 
as the blurring of boundaries between work and life. It spoke, 
for instance, to the necessity for workers to mine out different 
aesthetic kernels for their production process outside of work. 
Beyond this, the autonomists also provided a framework that 
provided a number of answers for how the design and cultural 
labor might fit into the larger shifts within the capitalist 
economy. In other words, while they offered a critique that in 
some ways broke with the Marx of Capital before them, they 
still provided a critical appraisal that tethered some of the 
phenomena I was finding in design work with the wider 
system of capitalist transformation.  
 
But while the autonomist descriptions of labor are in part 
appropriate to cultural labor today, I wish to put forth an 
alternative appraisal of labor that both builds off of their work, 
but also diverges in some important ways. The first autonomist 
notion that I wish to contend is the insistence by some 
contemporary theorists, particularly Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri, borrowing from Marx’s Grundrisse, that the 
“general intellect” had become directly productive to 
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capitalism. The general intellect is approached in many 
different ways between autonomist Marxist literature, but 
most accounts understand it as general intellectual 
developments in technology and science that directly 
contribute to capitalist production. What I wish to begin to lay 
out in this section is that while the work of cultural laborers 
seems to corroborate the notion that there is something 
general and socially produced that directly contributes to 
design labor, that “something” is not necessarily concrete 
societal developments of thought or technology, but is rather 
much more vague, non-conscious, and hard to describe; it was 
not a fully formed idea gathered from the social body that 
became productive, but an aesthetic intensity that acted as the 
raw material for what they transformed into an image 
commodity.  
 
The second divergence I wish to begin to outline, related to the 
first, revolves around Hardt and Negri’s thesis that the 
boundaries between capitalist production and social 
production have diminished to such an extent that the two are 
now indistinguishable; that it had now become impossible to 
analytically separate the labor process from every other 
cultural aspect of life. In this shift, they argue that capital 
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becomes somewhat parasitic and organizationally removed 
from the labor process; capital no longer attempted to direct 
the labor process, but allowed for the process to unfold and 
proliferate itself autonomously.  In this respect, I wish to begin 
to argue that, while cultural labor depends on different 
laborious activities outside of the traditional confines of work, 
those processes differ from the labor that is done within the 
traditional confines of the labor process. I wish to set up an 
argument that cultural laborers spend a lot of time outside 
work cultivating various aesthetics, or what I will later call 
“affects” in the next section, but within the labor process they 
are required, in a very structured and formal way, to mobilize 
those aesthetic kernels and transform them into a very specific 
form, guided by the overriding company and client interests. 
As such, I wish to begin to layout the argument that the labor 
process of graphic design is very much still a specific and 
somewhat autonomous link in the production of value, 
different than the labor done outside work that is crucial for 
translating the very non-conscious and aesthetic qualities they 
take from the wider socius into something that is ultimately 
tied to a specific, individualized understanding. The labor 
process of graphic design achieves this by disciplining labor in 
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a number of ways, though the techniques differed from many 
of the ways that Marx would have described.  
 
I wish to ultimately argue that a better analysis of cultural 
production can developed by returning to the work of two 
theorists that have heavily influenced Hardt, Negri, and many 
other Autonomists: Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari; It is 
Deleuze and Guattari offer a more appropriate matrix for 
understanding cultural labor and its relationship with the 
wider circuits of capitalist production. Deleuze and Guattari’s 
work, particularly A Thousand Plateaus, works quite well 
alongside autonomist theories, while overcoming the parts that 
I find at odds with the empirical realities of cultural labor. 
Specifically, I find Deleuze and Guattari’s work offers two 
major advantages in relation to the autonomist theories of the 
general intellect and Marx’s descriptions of the labor process in 
Capital. First is their notion of ‘affect’ and the ‘virtual’, which 
help to frame the aesthetic and intensive raw material within a 
particular ontology of production. Affect helps to describe a 
form of production that is collective but which is non-
conscious and non-signifying. Here Deleuze and Guattari locate 
affective proliferation as an ontological wellspring for all forms 
of cultural and artistic creativity that flows from it.  
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Secondly, and related to this point, Deleuze and Guattari 
provide a framework for understanding production that 
accounts for the sort of graduating and multilayered 
productive process found within cultural labor (more on this in 
later sections). For Deleuze and Guattari there are at least two 
forms of production that capitalism depends on--the 
production of affect, and the production of code, and ultimately 
value. These different styles of production, I find, resonate 
much better with the forms of production necessary in cultural 
industries. Cultural laborers require and seek out various 
affective productions produced within the wider socius outside 
of the confines of the labor process, but also perform a 
different kind of production that in many ways codes these 
affects and ascribes them with certain meanings. In other 
words, while they required the production of affect for their 
work, their own labor process involves a sort of signifying and 
coding process that is guided by various emerging technologies 
of discipline. Thus what Deleuze and Guattari allow us to 
recognize is two types of production, both necessary for 
capital, but analytically different in character. These 
differences are important for understanding the political 
implications of cultural labor, as I will show.  
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In order to arrive at the conclusions that I will argue in this 
thesis, I thus believe the three intonations of cultural and 
political thought I have introduced here are necessary to 
examine, and, in many ways, resonate. First, Marx’s Capital is 
necessary in order to frame the problem, or the certain 
impasse that led me to these conclusions: ‘what is the means of 
production for cultural work?’ While in the end it has become 
less useful for understanding the occupation of design labor, 
cultural labor, and the labor process it involves, it necessarily 
defines some of the key terms that I have worked on 
throughout my PhD. The second stream, autonomist Marxism, 
in many ways helps to define some of the shortcomings of 
Marx’s analysis for understanding contemporary labor like 
graphic design. The autonomists allow one to understand how 
labor has become more diffuse than what labor process theory 
allows, and gestures towards a broader understanding where 
the means of production includes wider productions occurring 
throughout what they refer to as “the social factory”.  And 
lastly, in attending to some of the issues that Marx’s Capital has 
when considering contemporary labor, autonomist Marxism, 
too, has its own deficiencies. Autonomism does not do enough 
to clarify what the raw material that cultural laborers depend 
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on, a quality that is intensive and unattributable. Here is where 
I find Deleuze and Guattari’s work a necessary addendum to 
the two, as a way to overcome the impasses that both 
previously mentioned threads pose. Deleuze and Guattari offer 
a way to not only make sense of the raw material for graphic 
design, but also help to understand how these “affects” are 
translated in the labor process, which remains somewhat 
separate.  
 
Understanding all of these threads allows me to paint a picture 
of design labor that broadly follows the table below. This table, 
it is my hope, will become more clear throughout the sections 
of this dissertation. It allows us to see how Deleuze and 
Guattari offer a nuanced look at both the labor process and the 
“raw material” component of that process. In the first part of 
this section, I will consider Marx’s original contribution to 
understanding the labor process in Capital. This first section, 
then, will explain the content in the first row of the table below. 
After this first part, I will introduce some of the empirical 
material from graphic designers that question many of Marx’s 
concepts and the assumptions bound up with them. In the 
second part of this section I will explain the autonomist 
contributions to political economy that challenge what is laid 
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out in table one. This section will cover the autonomist reply to 
Marx’s Capital, laying out their own interpretation that can be 
found in the second row of the table below. In this second 
section I will also be weaving in some empirical data that both 
resonates with what some autonomists outline, but also begins 
to take their discussions elsewhere. It will include interview 
data from designers that insist on an continued analytical 
specificity to what Marx described as the labor process, though 
it also highlights how labor is much more diffuse than what 
Capital outlines. In the final section I introduce Deleuze and 
Guattari’s take on capitalist production that places affect in a 
foundational role. This final section relates to what is the third 
row in the table, and argues that the raw material for design 
work is similar to a type of virtual affective production. This 
final section draws out the main contribution to this thesis: 
that contemporary capitalism relies on two types of 
production--the production of affect that is produced in the 
wider social factory, and the production of meaning and value 
that occurs within the confines of a more traditional labor 
process akin to what Marx originally described. This latter 
process arises as a necessity for capital to both commodify and 
expropriate value from affective contributions, but also as a 
form of discipline to ensure that affective productions do not 
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lead to subjective formations outside or antithetical to 
capitalist values.  
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 Raw Material Labor Process 
Marx’s 
Capital 
Material “objects” Too limited. Work is 
restricted to a confined 
and specific time and 
space; everything 
outside of that time and 
space is ‘unproductive” 
Autonomist 
Marxism 
General intellect. 
General advances in 
science and technology 
become directly 
productive in the same 
way that factory labor 
was once productive.  
Too broad and 
unspecific--everything 
is productive and 
productive in the same 
way. 
Deleuze 
and 
Guattari 
Affective. Raw material, 
like the autonomist 
interpretation, is 
productive, but not 
productive in the same 
way that work done in 
the labor process is. 
Multilayered and 
Exhaustive. There are 
two types of 
production, both of 
which are necessary 
but carry important 
differences. One layer is 
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This raw material 
requires a second form 
of production to make it 
valuable.   
the production of affect, 
while the other is the 
production of code and 
meaning.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 1, Section 1: Marx, Capital and the Labor Process 
 
In this section I will briefly outline some of the main Marxist 
concepts necessary in order to understand the argumentation 
that will follow in later sections. This section is a way to frame 
the logical progressions from my early attempts to make 
reconcile the empirical world of cultural labor today with the 
work of Marx’s Capital, Vol. 1 (1976/1990). While many of the 
concepts introduced here will ultimately fail to properly 
account for the labor process of graphic design, these failures 
are productive and necessary.  
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Following an introduction to Marx’s labor process and some of 
the primary concepts related to it laid out in Chapter 7 of 
Capital, Vol. 1, I will briefly touch on a body of work that builds 
off of Marx’s labor process concepts, namely the organizational 
literature associated with what has become known as “labor 
process theory” (LPT). These more contemporary 
considerations help to better understand Marx’s original 
contribution while teasing out and clarifying particular 
assumptions bound up with his ideas.  
Marx, the labor process, and associated concepts 
 
In Karl Marx’s Capital, Vol. 1 (1976/1990), one of the central 
concepts we are introduced to is the notion of ‘the labor 
process’, broadly understood as the operation in capitalism 
through which labor is mixed with a material and transformed 
into a commodity. For Marx, there are three different 
components of this process: “(1) purposeful activity, that is 
work itself, (2) the object on which that work is performed, 
and (3) the instruments of that work” (284). Below I will focus 
specifically on the final two components of the labor process, 
which together make up what Marx refers to as “the means of 
production”. I will also refer to other concepts, which are 
closely related to his discussions of the labor process 
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beginning in Chapter 7 of Capital, Vol. 1 which will later 
become relevant. After this, I will revisit the first component of 
the labor process, work itself, and provide a brief discussion on 
LPT that elaborates on this facet of the labor process.  
 
Objects of Labor 
The object(s) of labor for Marx consists of the material(s) on 
which a particular form of labor is performed. Marx identifies 
two types of objects in the labor process. The first is what he 
defines as “nature” which is a material that has had no prior 
labor mixed with it. In other words, nature has not been 
transformed at all by any human interaction with that material. 
Examples of nature acting as a raw material would be certain 
agricultural goods, such as if a forager went out into 
uncultivated woods and picked berries. Certain extractive 
industries also have nature as their raw material, when, for 
instance, they mine out copper from a mountain.  
 
A second type material that forms the “object of labor” is what 
Marx refers to as “raw material”. Raw material is also an object 
on which labor is performed, but is distinguished from nature 
in that “has already undergone some alteration by means of 
labor” (285). It is more frequently the case, “with the exception 
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of the extractive industries, such as mining, hunting fishing 
(and agriculture, but only in so far as it starts by breaking up 
virgin soil)” (1976/1990: 287), that raw material forms the 
objects of labor. To put it differently, raw material means that 
the material that is currently the primary object on which labor 
is done is a result of a previous laboring process.  Harvested 
and cultivated grapes form a raw material for wine production, 
for instance. Thus, it is often the case that a product that can be 
sold as a final commodity, such as grapes, can also be used as a 
raw material for other forms of production. However, 
“whenever [such] products enter as a means of production into 
new labor processes”, such as when grapes become a raw 
material for a new production process of wine, Marx tells us 
that “they lose their character of being products and function 
only as objective factors contributing to living labor” 
(1976/1990: 289). 
 
One more example is helpful in order to understand the 
difference between nature and raw material. Let’s take the 
occupation of commercial fishing as an example. When a 
fisherman catches a completely wild fish in the ocean, the 
object of their labor (the fish) is what would be understood as 
“nature” according to Marx. However, that same fish, once it 
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has been transported back to port, cleaned, and frozen it 
becomes a raw material since there has been all sorts of human 
labor expended in catching the fish, transporting it and 
processing it. Thus, when a chef in a restaurant cooks that fish, 
their object of labor is not nature, but a “raw material” because 
previous labor has already been mixed with the object. In this 
sense, Marx declares that “all raw material is an object of labor 
[ArbeitsgegenstandI] but not every object of labor is raw 
material; the object of labor counts as raw material only when 
it has already undergone some alteration by means of labor” 
(1976/1990: 284-85).   
 
Instruments of work 
Instruments of work are objects that the worker uses in order 
to perform his or her labor on the objects of labor. These come 
between the worker and the object of labor, and can include, 
tools, machines, chemicals, etc. In a more broader view, Marx 
also includes ‘all the objective conditions necessary for 
carrying on the labor process’ to the category of labor 
instruments. Consider the example of winemaking once more. 
In wine production, the instruments of labor would include all 
the barrels involved in aging the wine, the vats used in 
fermenting the grapes, bottles, siphons, and they yeast used to 
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convert the grape sugars into alcohol. In a factory setting, we 
would say that things like machines, hammers and other tools 
are instruments of labor. We could also say that even the roads 
and canals used to transport the goods and the buildings 
where the workers perform their labor are also instruments of 
that process.  
 
Productive consumption 
Marx states that productive consumption happens when, 
“labor uses up its material elements, its objects and its 
instruments” (1976/1990: 290). To return to the wine 
production example, productive consumption is the 
consumption of raw grapes (the object of labor) in the 
production of wine, but also the slow consumption of tools that 
are used in the process of wine production. Things like the 
electricity that is used to run the machinery is consumed in the 
production process is a form of labor, but also the wine barrels 
that eventually break down and have to be replaced. The 
importance of laying out what Marx calls “productive 
consumption” is important because it marks out these 
processes of consumption as very different than what he calls 
“individual consumption”. When consumption happens outside 
of the production process, in the space Marx defines as 
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“reproduction” it is individual; it is consumption that “uses up 
products as a means of subsistence for the living individual” 
rather than for the production of further products within the 
labor process (1976/1990: 290). An example of individual 
production would be when a worker takes their wage that they 
earn from a capitalist and buy anything for subsistence or 
entertainment. The distinction between productive 
consumption and individual consumption will later be become 
important.  
 
Labor or Work Itself 
Above the “means of production” of the labor process that 
Marx names, it is the distinct and primary role that labor and 
the organization of labor holds for Marx and his labor theory of 
value that is perhaps most important. This is the crux on which 
his development of a labor theory of value rests, for human 
labor is the base component that takes an object of labor and 
adds value to it.  It is the labor process that not only 
reproduces the workers means of subsistence, but also 
produces the surplus value over an above the workers 
subsistence which is accumulated and taken from the worker 
by the capitalist as profit. It is for this reason that Marx 
specifies that the control of the labor process is integral, and 
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the greater expropriation of surplus labor is only done through 
either extending the labor process or intensifying the time of 
work.  
 
In the decades since Marx’s original explication of the labor 
process, the components of that process and the centrality of it 
for understanding work and organizations has continued to be 
central to organizational theory. Many decades later, the 
centrality of the labor process for producing value is a theme 
that would be picked up again in the 1970’s, particularly in 
Harry Braverman’s highly influential Labor and Monopoly 
Capital, where he elaborates on how Taylorist regimes of labor 
are continually disciplined and deskilled. Key in these 
discussion is how Braverman focuses his critique on how 
“labor power”, an indeterminate capacity for work, is 
transformed into concrete labor for the creation of value in a 
capitalist society in and through the labor process. For him, 
following Marx, this transformation is a result of “the complex 
interaction between tools and social relations, technology and 
society” (Braverman, 1998: 35) and requires three processes 
in capitalist society: 
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“First, workers are separated from the means with which 
production is carried on, and can gain access to them only 
by selling their labor power to others [what Marx refers to 
as ‘primitive accumulation’]. Second, workers are freed of 
legal constraints, such as serfdom or slavery, that prevent 
them from disposing of their own labor power [they require 
a nominal amount of freedom to sell their labor power]. 
Third, the purpose of the employment of the worker 
becomes the expansion of a unit of capital belonging to the 
employer, who is thus functioning as a capitalist [their 
labor does not belong to them, but to someone else]. The 
labor process therefore begins with a contract or 
agreement governing the conditions of the sale of labor 
power by the worker and its purchase by the employer” 
(1998: 35-36).  
 
In the capitalist arrangement presented above, the worker 
becomes devoid of any other means through which they might 
earn a living and survive other than capitalism, and as such is 
forced to sell their ‘labor power’ to the capitalist through a 
contractual agreement for a determined period of time (36). At 
this point of selling labor power, however, labor remains a 
potential for work. As Marx before Braverman underlined, 
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labor power is a hypothetical, distinguished from the act of 
working, which is ‘labor’ proper or labor power actualized. 
When a laborer sells their labor power they remain in 
possession of that potential, as Braverman highlights: “Muscle 
and brain cannot be separated from persons possessing them; 
one cannot endow another with one's own capacity for work, 
no matter at what price, any more than one can eat, sleep, or 
perform sex acts for another. Thus, in the exchange, the worker 
does not surrender to the capitalist his or her capacity for 
work” (Braverman, 1998: 37). It is only at the point that the 
worker is put to work, or when the workers labor potential is 
turned into actualized labor that the control over one’s 
capacity is relinquished to the capitalist who now owns the 
products of their work and controls the process of work. For 
this reason, Marx explains in Capital that it is only through 
“working, the [labor power] becomes in actuality what 
previously he only was potentially, namely labor-power in 
action, a worker” (1976/1990: 283). Braverman builds on this 
notion, writing “the capitalist can take advantage of the bargain 
[of buying of labor power] only by setting the worker to work” 
(1998: 37). He continues: 
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“If the capitalist builds upon this distinctive quality and 
potential of human labor power, it is also this quality, by 
its very indeterminacy, which places before him his 
greatest challenge and problem. The coin of labor has its 
obverse side: in purchasing labor power that can do 
much, he is at the same time purchasing an undefined 
quality and quantity. What he buys is infinite in potential, 
but in its realization it is limited…” (1998: 39). 
 
For Braverman, following Marx, when the capitalist buys the 
means of production, such as the objects on which labor is 
performed, and the instruments used in the labor process, that 
investment’s quantity and quality is already known. These 
“means of production”, as Marx refers to them, are ‘constant 
capital’ because they do not produce, do not add value, and the 
cost does not change (see Marx, 1976/1990: Chapter 8). Labor 
power, on the other hand, is indeterminate, and as such, the 
quality of work and amount of value it produces is “variable” 
and dependent on the production process and the degree to 
which that labor power can be converted into real work:  
 
“[W]hen the capitalist buys buildings, materials, tools, 
machinery, etc., he can evaluate with precision their place 
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in the labor process. He knows that a certain portion of 
his outlay will be transferred to each unit of production 
and his accounting practices allocate these in the form of 
costs or depreciation. But when he buys labor time, the 
outcome is far from being either so certain or so definite 
that it can be reckoned in this way, with precision and in 
advance. This is merely an expression of the fact that the 
portion of his capital expended on labor power is the 
‘variable’ portion, which undergoes an increase in the 
process of production; for him, the question is how great 
that increase will be” (Braverman, 1998: 39).  
 
It is here that the notion of the ‘labor process” becomes such a 
central feature for Braverman, for without the capitalist 
control over that process, the potential for work could not be 
actualized into a specifically capitalist form of value. Put 
differently, the labor process forms the link that is necessary 
for this transition from labor power to labor, and ultimately, 
value. While the capitalist cannot know in advance the quality 
and quantity of the labor power they are purchasing, they can, 
and indeed do, control how that potential is mobilized to 
ensure that they can maximize the amount of labor, and thus 
value, that is realized. Ultimately it is the labor process and its 
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control, which must be wrested from the worker and brought 
into the exclusive domain of the capitalist and their 
management. The insistence on the labor process as an integral 
and almost exclusive domain of surplus value extraction is 
quite consistent with Marx’s analysis of surplus value, at least 
in Capital. What Braverman adds to Marx’s analysis, however, 
is the notion that the management over that process is 
constantly evolving in order to expropriate ever more amount 
of labor and thus value out of labor power.  
 
The vitality of the labor process found in Braverman’s work 
has become quite influential in the fields of organizational 
studies and the sociology of work since Labor and Monopoly 
Capitalism, eventually informing what would become loosely 
known as “labor process theory” (LPT hereafter). Even today, 
the labor process and LPT specifically is an influential 
component to many in contemporary workplace analyses, 
where figures like Thomson and Smith still insist on the labor 
theory mantra that “management must, under competitive, 
standardizing, and differentiating conditions, seek to release 
and realize productive labor from living labor power” (2001: 
61 cited in Bohm and Land, 2009).  
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The ongoing relevance of LPT for contemporary 
understandings of capitalist accumulation have not continued 
without a number of implicit or explicit confrontations with 
what one could refer to as post-structuralst and post-fordist 
appraisals of work, however. There has been an ongoing LPT 
debate within organizational studies, particularly in the British 
context, which critiques the lack of attention to subjectivity 
within the theory, for instance (O’Doherty and Willmott, 2001). 
One also sees a number of claims from Foucauldian 
perspectives on capitalist production, such as those from 
Knights and Willmott (1989; see also Knights, 2001; Wilmott, 
1994, 1997), who claim that LPT doesn’t appreciate the reality 
the role of micro-relations within capitalist organization (see 
Knights and Wilmott, 1989: 533). More recently, and more 
specific to the analysis here, the contemporary charge that LPT 
doesn’t adequately account for the shifts towards a more 
service based economy have become more prevalent (see 
Bohm and Land, 2009: n.p.). It is this final objection that will be 
further unpacked in the following section with respect to my 
own empirical data with graphic designers, which both 
challenges but also re-affirms certain aspects of LPT. 
The contemporary components of the labor process 
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When both Marx and Braverman wrote their analyses of the 
labor process, they did so with the consideration of specifically 
industrial forms of capitalist production. Despite this 
particularity, some LPT theorist insist that the merits of LPT 
still stand when considering more contemporary service-
dominated economies. While they may in some cases 
acknowledge the changing role of labor process theory in the 
emergent service-led economy, they refute the notion that 
there is a new economy that breaks with industrial forms of 
production and deserves a rethinking of the specificity of labor 
or the labor process in capitalist value accumulation. As 
Warhurst et al (2008) argue, “there has been a continual 
tendency to present service work as somehow involving a 
break with one or more of the feature of the capitalist labor 
process. Yet, for LPT in principle, these features apply equally 
to manufacturing or services, though they may be manifested 
in different ways” (98-99 cited in Bohm and Land). In this way, 
LPT at once insists that the labor power and concrete labor 
itself is still crucial for the accumulation of wealth in 
contemporary arrangements of capitalism, while at the same 
time accepting, as Bohm and Land (2009: n.p.) put it, “the labor 
process and its control mechanisms are continuously reformed 
and adjusted”. In other words, the labor process is still the 
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exclusive mode through which value is produced, though the 
labor process constantly develops new means to convert labor 
power into concrete labor, and those modes change depending 
on the type of work one does.  As Bohm and Land put it, it is 
the “labor that is going on in the capitalist workplace occupies 
a central position for generating surplus value in capitalism” 
(2009: n.p).  
 
But while LPT continues to insist the fairly orthodox 
understanding of the labor process, still applicable to 
contemporary forms of labor, recent arguments have claimed 
the traditional Marxist understanding of the labor process is 
too narrow.  In particular, contemporary theorists associated 
with autonomist Marxism, such as Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri, have claimed that the production process, associated 
with a shift towards more service-led and cultural occupations, 
has rendered the division between the labor process and life at 
large indefinable.  
Interlude: Creativity, Context, and the Labor Process of 
Cultural Labor 
 
All creative work is the result of shared knowledge and labor; 
originality springs forth not from the forehead of geniuses but 
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from ideas pooled by communities of peers and fellow 
travelers. 
-Andrew Ross, Nice Work if You Can Get It, pp. 47 
 
As an increasing amount of academic and empirical analyses on 
the cultural and creative industries emerge, there is still a lack of 
insight and research into the dynamics of just where creativity 
comes from. In the words of Pratt and Jeffcut (2009: 2), we still 
need research which seeks “to understand where creativity and 
innovation is ‘located’’’. The classical view of creativity, which 
largely subsists to this day, tends to locate creativity within 
individual genius and ingenuity. A predominant view would start 
with the individual, as they, of course, are the ones rendering a 
creative idea useful. But just because an individual subject 
renders an idea useful, it would be misleading to look to the 
subject as the sole factor in the process of creativity, as if it were 
somehow an innate quality. For this reason, an understanding of 
creativity and creative labor must move beyond the individual 
and take into consideration the context. This is not to say that 
the subject is of no importance in the process of creative 
production; it is, rather, to emphasize, as Pratt and Jeffcut do, 
that ‘[new] ideas certainly require a context in which they may 
be nurtured, developed and passed on, or made into something 
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more generally useful’ (Pratt and Jeffcut, 2009: 2). This is the 
argument that this research follows as I begin to map out a fuller 
understanding of what this context entails. 
Of course, this issue is not a completely new one, and the tension 
between the individual and context in relation to creativity can 
be noted in varying degrees within the works of those reflecting 
on art and literature over the last several decades. For instance, 
In Roland Barthes seminal 1977 essay, ‘The Death of the Author’, 
he seeks to undermine the prevailing image of writing that 
privileges the author as the sole constituent of texts. The view he 
contends is one in which ‘the explanation of a work is always 
sought in the man or woman who produced it, as if it were 
always in the end...the voice of a single person, the author...’ 
(1977: 143).  In this quintessentially post-structuralist example, 
what interests me is the obvious conflict between the individual 
producer as the originator of creativity and the common or 
social constitution of ideas that they rely on; between the 
singularity of the author and the commonly rooted sociality that 
underpins creativity. Though he focuses specifically on the 
process of writing, and he does not explicitly arrive more 
generally to the question of creativity, his argument can easily be 
informative for understanding artistic creation.  
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Written some years after Barthes’ essay, in Janet Woff’s The 
Social Production of Art (1981) we see the beginnings of 
sociology of art arguing for a redefinition of art and creativity as 
anchored in sociality. She argues that ‘an overemphasis of the 
artist as unique creator of work is misleading, because it writes 
out of the account the numerous other people involved in the 
production of any work, and also draws attention away from the 
various social constituting and determining processes involved’ 
(Wolff, 1993: 137) 
 
In a similar inflection, Howard Becker’s Art Worlds (1982) is 
another early text that critiqued the dominant discourse 
focusing on the artist and artwork as the main site of intellectual 
infatuation. He problematizes ‘[t]he dominant tradition’ that 
‘takes the artist and art work, rather than the network of 
cooperation, as central to the analysis of art as a social 
phenomenon’ (1982:xi). Instead, he opts to treat artistic 
endeavors using the same types of analyses used in any other 
occupation through a so-called ‘sociology of occupations applied 
to artistic work’ (xi). His text is an interesting turn in that it 
looks at artistic creation not through the lens of aesthetic 
judgments applied to individual actors and individual works, but 
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as a form of social organization whereby artistic invention is 
reliant upon cooperative collaboration. What Becker and Wolff 
add to Barthes’ understanding is a more fully developed analysis 
of the importance of sociality and the ‘art worlds’ at large in the 
constitution of creativity.  
 
Still, this notion of context in respect to creativity remains 
largely underexplored in organizational studies on the creative 
industries. As Pratt and Jeffcut observe, ‘[there] is a lack of 
strategic knowledge about the relationships and networks that 
enable and sustain creativity and innovation in the cultural 
economy’ (2009:3). In this sense, the research that follows serves 
as a critical interjection into this gulf of knowledge. In the 
sections that follow, I seek to foreground the certain context that 
underpins and makes the production of creative commodities 
possible. In particular, I wish to identify the context of graphic 
design labor, what I have up to this point associated with raw 
material, with what some have called the ‘social factory’ and the 
‘general intellect’. I will also seek to tie this context with what I 
will refer as affective, an intensity collectively produced but non-
cognitive and non-representative.  
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Part 1, Section 2: From the General Intellect to the Social 
Factory 
 
Perhaps the most insidious occupational hazard of no-collar 
work is that it can enlist employee’s freest thoughts and impulses 
in the service of salaried time. In knowledge companies that 
trade in creative ideas, services and solutions, everything that 
employees do, think, or say in their waking moments is potential 
grist for the industrial mill. 
 
--Andrew Ross, No Collar, pp. 19 
 
The Contested Terrain of Production 
 
In the previous epoch of Fordist capitalism, production and 
reproduction existed relatively distinct from one another. 
Though production had always relied on the reproduction of 
capitalist subjectivity, it had been comparatively 
uncomplicated to draw a line between what was understood as 
work itself and the forms of social production that existed 
outside this realm. Capitalist production was temporally and 
spatially associated with the factory; social reproduction with 
the home, school, and other socializing institutions. If we 
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imagine a typical working class life in North America or Europe 
during the 1950s, it would involve a basic story of a day of 
work that starts at the moment they ‘clock in’ and ends the 
moment that they ‘clock out’. Once ‘clocked out’, the worker 
would enter into a separate domain in which ‘life’ and its 
unfolding took place. Though this example is admittedly 
superficial, it nonetheless highlights relative autonomy of these 
domains; an autonomy that Deleuze (1992: 3) associates with 
Foucault’s disciplinary societies, in which ‘[t]he individual never 
ceases passing from one closed environment to another, each 
with its own laws’. In other words, the domains exist 
somewhat separate, even though they might all reinforce 
capitalist relations.  
 
In the second part of the 20th century, however, the ability to 
define the boundaries of these domains becomes a more 
dubious task. As Nancy Fraser (2014: 62) notes, neoliberal 
capitalism has had a tendency to commodify ‘aspects of social 
reproduction for the first time’, thus seemingly converting 
activities limited to the production of use values, into activities 
that produce exchange value. Thus, it seems that the defining 
categories of production on the one hand and reproduction on 
the other begin to slip into one another. But this analysis that 
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Fraser forwards and her call for an ‘expanded conception of 
capitalism’  in response to this phenomena is not wholly new, 
but is already apparent to a certain extent in autonomist 
Marxist literature focusing on labor from the 1970s. Here it is 
useful to acknowledge the work of figures like Mariarosa Dalla 
Costa and Selma James, who, in a way very similar to Fraser, 
note: ‘We have to make it clear that, within the wage, domestic 
work produces not merely use values, but is essential to the 
production of surplus value’ (1973: 33, cited in Shukaitis, 
2009: 146). Thus, conceptualizing activities that would have 
been previously confined to social production and 
reproduction as integral to the realm of production seems to 
have a much longer history.  
 
In the following sections I seek to engage with the history of 
ideas that Maria Dalla Costa and Selma James draw upon, 
sketching out what I believe to be a very similar, but more 
nuanced way to understand this terrain ‘behind the hidden 
abode’, as Fraser refers to it (2014: 61). Here I focus on the 
Marxist concept of ‘the general intellect’ and the autonomist 
Marxist concept of ‘the social factory’ as useful foundations for 
going beyond Marx’s understanding of the labor process in 
Capital, towards a definition of production that is more in-line 
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with the forms of cultural and creative labor that exist today. I 
will argue that autonomist concepts with foundations in Marx’s 
Grundrisse are helpful to understand what I observed in the 
previous section as both the aesthetic composition of labor, but 
also the reality that labor for graphic designers seems to go 
beyond the confines of the strict labor process. 
Marx’s Fragment on Machines and the General Intellect 
 
Autonomist Marxism has received a growing amount of 
academic attention recently, thanks in large part to the Empire 
(2000) trilogy of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Behind 
these popularized engagements, however, lays a much larger 
theoretical trajectory with roots in 1960s Italy. It was at this 
time the political movement of operaismo (workerism), which 
set the groundwork for the later movements of autonomia and 
post-autonomia, began to formulate a critique to the orthodox 
view of Marxism dominant in the mainstream political left. In 
particular, the work of predominant early figures like Raniero 
Panzieri, Mario Tronti, Romano Alquati, through journals like 
Classe Operaia and Potere Operaio, offered an alternative to the 
dominating thread of neo-Gramscian theory that had become 
ubiquitous with Italian socialism. In an important way, their 
critique opposed the Gramscian insistence on ‘the relative 
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autonomy of the social’ in relation to capital, which informed 
much of the political strategy of the PCI (Italian Communist 
Party) and the PSI (Italian Socialist Party) at the time (see 
Thoburn, 2003: 76). Through a re-engagement with Marx, 
particularly the  ‘Fragment on Machines’ in Marx’s Grundrisse, 
operaismo argued that the social had become intertwined with 
production, leading to a phenomena they refer to as the ‘social 
factory’. Here I would like to expand upon the autonomist 
concept of the social factory, which I believe underlines the 
importance of researching the contexts of production in 
creative labor. I will offer a brief genealogy of  the concept as it 
developed from the formative years of operaismo to its usage 
in contemporary post-autonomia literature.  
From the Fordist Factory to the Social Factory 
 
The concept of the ‘social factory’ initially developed as 
operaistis began to question the orthodox Marxist view of the 
relationship between technology and capital. The orthodox 
view at the time was an ‘objectivist’ one that saw technology 
and science as developing neutrally and distinct from capitalist 
relations (see Thoburn, 2001; 2003; Bologna, 1987). Against 
this view, figures like Panzieri and Tronti argued that 
capitalism had become immanent to technological and 
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scientific innovation; that ‘labor power was condemned to 
perpetual subordination to machinery’ (Bologna, 1987: n.p.). In 
many ways, this autonomist argument was based upon an 
incessant re-reading of Marx’s ‘Fragment on Machines’ in his 
Grundrisse that was integral to the development of operaismo, 
its extension in autonomia, and the current inflections of both 
that exist today. It is within the ‘fragment’ that autonomists 
would resurrect a sort of ‘Marx beyond Marx’ that could speak 
to the current context of capital that had seen widespread 
transformations since Marx’s death.  
 
In Marx’s twenty page ‘Fragment on Machines’ we see quite a 
different conceptualisation of capital than in Marx’s other 
major works. In many ways it almost seems out of place within 
the rest of his oeuvre to the point that Virno (1996: 265 cited 
in Thoburn, 2003: 81) suggests that it’s ‘not at all very Marxist’. 
In this dense passage, Marx suggests that with the integration 
of more advanced technology into the production process, 
workers and labor cease to its driving force, and instead 
become mere points that link together the overarching 
machinery that subsumes them:  
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“The production process has ceased to be a labor process in 
the sense of a process dominated by labor as its governing 
unity. Labour appears, rather, merely as a conscious organ, 
scattered among the individual living workers at numerous 
points in the mechanical system; subsumed under the total 
process of the machinery itself, as itself only a link of the 
system, whose unity exists not in the living workers, but 
rather in the living (active) machinery, which confronts his 
individual, insignificant doings as a mighty organism” 
(Marx, 1973: 693). 
 
Thus, Marx casts the worker, and what I have called ‘work 
itself’, as secondary to the subsuming  ‘mechanical system’ 
in  the process of production. Machinery does not exist outside 
of capitalist relations, but is one of its governing forces such 
that the worker ‘steps to the side of the production process 
rather than being its chief actor’ (Marx, 1973: 705); workers 
are relinquished of their autonomy and particularity within the 
production process, as was familiar in craft-style production. 
Marx moves from an understanding of the formal subsumption 
of labor, whereby capital confronts and subsumes labor as it 
already exists, into a conceptualization of real subsumption, 
whereby labor is governed by capital which manipulates the 
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former towards its own ends. It is here that we can see why the 
Fragment was an integral part of early operaismo contentions 
to the idea technology developed as a separate, ‘objective’ 
domain outside of capitalist relations.  
 
At the time Marx was writing the fragment, mechanisation, 
technology and science had begun to very visibly take centre 
stage within production. It is no wonder, then, why science and 
technology was referenced several times as central to his 
articulation of capital here. The repetition and deskilling of 
labor that is only possible through the instigation of 
technologies of mass production is an obvious concern within 
this piece, and it is not at all hard to imagine a factory where 
the worker is assembled within a conglomeration of 
technology that dictates their working pace, skills and 
affordances. However, it is important to highlight that science 
and technology are merely the most historically visible 
articulations of broader social and intellectual advances. So 
while Marx in parts directs our attention specifically to 
advancements in technology as a mechanism that increasingly 
controls production:  ‘the creation of real wealth comes to 
depend less on labor time and on the amount of labor 
employed than...on the general state of science and on the 
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progress of technology, or the application of this science to 
production’ (1973: 704-5); at other times he frames this 
process terms of a particular type of sociality. He writes, for 
instance, that in the process of real subsumption,  
 
“[the worker] steps to the side of the production process 
instead of being its chief actor. In this transformation, it is 
neither the direct human labor [the worker] performs, nor 
the time during which he works, but rather the 
appropriation of his own general productive power, his 
understanding of nature and his mastery of it by virtue of 
his presence as a social body – it is, in a word, the 
development of the social individual which appears as the 
great foundation-stone of production and of wealth” (Marx 
1973a: 705 cited in Thoburn, 2003: 82). 
 
It is through reading Marx’s references to the ‘social 
individual’, ‘social brain’ and, most notably, the ‘general 
intellect’ that he uses somewhat interchangeably in the piece, 
that one can begin to recognize a different understanding of 
the fragment that doesn’t confine the process of ‘real 
subsumption’ to technology and science. It becomes an 
understanding of ‘direct human labor’ as secondary to the 
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‘social body’ as a whole as the primary producer of value. The 
individual worker becomes important to the production of 
value only in so much as they enunciate a broader social 
context that underpins their work.  
 
This latter understanding of the fragment focusing on the 
‘social individual’ is what is reflected in operaismo thought as it 
moves out of it’s particular focus on technology into Tronti’s 
conceptualisation of ‘the social factory’. Tronti goes beyond the 
technological critique, aimed towards the neo-Gramscian 
thesis that technology and capital are separate, to the very 
heart of the separation of the social and capital that underpins 
the basis of ‘hegemony’, extracting from the fragment an 
argument that as capitalism progresses, social production and 
capitalist production coincide:  
 
“The more capitalist development advances, that is to say 
the more the production of relative surplus value 
penetrates everywhere…the relationship between 
capitalist production and bourgeois society, between the 
factory and society, between society and the state, 
become more and more organic. At the highest level of 
capitalist development social relations become moments 
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of the relations of production, and the whole society 
becomes an articulation of production. In short, all of 
society lives as a function of the factory and the factory 
extends its exclusive domination over all of society” 
(Tronti, in Quaderni Rossi no. 2, cited in Thoburn, 2003: 
137). 
 
As the ‘social factory’ thesis above suggests, social relations 
become constitutive to process of capitalist production instead 
operating merely as a production use values within a separate 
field of reproduction. As Thoburn (2003) remarks in reference 
to the ‘social factory’ thesis,  
 
“The maintenance of circulation [of capital] on a broad 
scale (total annual commodity-product) necessitates not 
the operability of individual capital, or of ‘production’, 
‘reproduction’, and ‘consumption’ as distinct spheres, but 
the maintenance of capitalist relations as a whole across 
society” (78). 
 
Reflecting upon Fraser’s argument earlier, the resonances now 
become clear. The individual capital of reproduction becomes 
mobilized towards the overall ends of capitalist value 
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extraction, which is precisely what she spoke of when she 
highlighted the background conditions that are integral to 
value production.  
Immaterial Labor and the Basin of Immaterial Labor 
 
In more contemporary debates surrounding work, the ‘general 
intellect’ and the ‘social factory’ thesis have emerged as central 
to understanding forms of informational and cultural labor. 
The real subsumption thesis is very much visible in the most 
recent inflections of autonomist Marxist thought through 
figures like Maurizio Lazzarato, Franco Berardi, and Paulo 
Virno. At this point I would like to take some time to speak a 
little bit about how the theory of the general intellect has been 
mobilized in order to make sense of what has been referred to 
as ‘immaterial labor’. In Lazzarato’s (1996) formulation of the 
term, ‘immaterial labor’ defines a growing amount of positions 
within the capitalist economy that either deal with the 
manipulation of data and information, or which are defined as 
producing cultural content. In regards to cultural aspect of 
immaterial labor, which aligns with the object of this study, 
Lazzarato writes: 
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“...immaterial labor involves a series of activities that are 
not normally recognized as ‘work’--in other words, the 
kinds of activities involved in defining and fixing cultural 
and artistic standards, fashions, tastes, consumer norms, 
and more strategically, public opinion” (1996: 132). 
 
In this cultural dimension of immaterial labor, or what would 
be qualified as “creative labor” under current definitions--
which, according to Lazzarato, become more hegemonic in the 
years following the early 1970s--what is required is the 
intellect of the worker, or ‘subjectivities that are rich in 
knowledge’ (1996: 133). As such, organizational command 
shifts from the previous epoch of Fordist capitalism, which 
revolved around the demand to fulfill a number of 
preconceived tasks, towards a demand to ‘become subjects’ in 
which ‘one has to express oneself, one has to speak, 
communicate, cooperate, and so forth’ (1996: 134). Thus once 
capital shifts to not only incorporate but demand the 
subjectivity of the worker, behaviours such as communication 
and cooperation become key.  
 
For Lazzarato, this shift means that the control and 
organization of the labor process changes. Workers are given 
 101
much more autonomy in this arrangement. As Lazzarato would 
argue, workers now have ‘an ability to choose among different 
alternatives and thus a degree of responsibility regarding their 
decision making’ (1996: 133). But within this autonomy, 
subjectivity must be ‘put to work’, so to speak; ‘creativity must 
be made compatible with the conditions of “production for 
production’s sake” (1996: 134). The mantra of capital thus 
allows autonomy and forces one to communicate because it is 
necessary for creative subjectivities. It only becomes key to the 
extent that they are the fundamental to producing value. 
 
So, when labor becomes immaterial and cultural, it necessarily 
involves a subjective element and capitalist demands change 
from a prescription of tasks to a prescription of subjectivity. 
But this subjective quality necessitates a form of collectivity 
and communication, which Lazzarato defines in terms of 
‘networks and flows’. The subjective is in this sense 
immediately collective. Subjective labor of creativity, for 
instance,  is but an enunciation of the social flows that 
underpin that activity. In a terrain of immaterial labor, then, or 
what Franco Berardi (2012: 97) defines as ‘semiocapitalism’, 
what is crucial is being assembled in a sort of ‘infosphere’, or 
an ‘environment where information races toward the brain’. 
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And crucially, flows of communication and subjectivity that 
underpin immaterial production are not confined to the 
domain of work itself, or ‘the four walls of the factory’ (1996: 
136). The flows that constitute labor are at least partially 
located outside of production ‘in society at large, at a territorial 
level we would call “the basin of immaterial labor”’ (1996: 
136). It is through the subjectivization labor, in this sense, that 
the boundaries between production and reproduction, work 
and life, become more fluid and production comes to 
increasingly involve an enunciation of a form of sociality or 
public intellect. As Virno argues, ‘[t]hought...becomes 
something exterior, “public”, as it breaks into the productive 
process’, which results in ‘the hybridization of different 
spheres (pure thought, political life and labor)’ (2004: 64). In 
parallel to the real subsumption thesis of Marx and the concept 
of the social factory of Tronti, what becomes valorised in 
immaterial cultural production is the general intellect, ‘the 
general intellect of society’ (2004: 63), that is located 
throughout the social.  
 
It is within this conception of immaterial labor that autonomist 
Marxism offers a way to reconsider the Marx’s 
conceptualisation of the labor process found in Capital. Using 
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the logic provided here, it would like to suggest  that the means 
of production have come to encompass more than primarily 
material components existing separate from labor and man in 
the classical Marxist sense (‘man and his labor on one side, 
nature and its materials on the other’ (Marx, 1976: 290)). For 
Lazzarato, ‘the “raw material” of immaterial labor is 
subjectivity and the “ideological” environment in which this 
subjectivity lives and reproduces’ (1996: 142). Similarly, Virno 
argues that in the transformations of capitalism towards 
subjectivisation, ‘the means of production are not reducible to 
machines but consist of linguistic-cognitive competencies 
inseparable from living labor...’ (2004: 61). Thus, it seems 
necessary for this research to  widen the potential site of 
inquiry beyond the traditional boundaries of production in 
aiming to understand context in relation to creative 
production.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this first part, I have attempted to clarify an issue that 
current forms of creative labor pose for traditional conceptions 
of labor, particularly in Marx’s Capital. I do not wish to argue 
that Marx was wrong, however, he could not forsee the terrain 
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of labor today. In this respect, returning to his work in the 
Grundrisse, and the subsequent work done by autonomists 
helpt to offer a different way to understand cultural labor in 
this context.  
In the next part, I wish to build off of many of the conceptions 
of labor offered in this section. I will introduce the notion of 
“affect” and “affective labor” into these debates. Folding in the 
notion of affect, I will argue, will help us to better analyze and 
understand what this “basin of immaterial labor” consists of, 
and how it fits within contemporary forms of capitalist 
production and control.  
 
Section 2: Towards an Understanding of Affect 
 
In recent years, the notion of ‘affective labor’ has gained 
significant traction within debates around the shifts in 
capitalist production towards post-Fordism. Within the 
sociology of work (Gill and Pratt, 2008), and contemporary 
Marxist analyses of labor (Hardt and Negri, 2000, 2004, 2009), 
affective labor has been seen as a central object of capitalist 
value and control, as well as a domain that offers a potential to 
escape capitalist modes of subjectivity. Affective labor has 
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become what some even refer to as “at the very pinnacle of the 
hierarchy of laboring forms”. 
 
This chapter presents three different ways in which affect and 
contemporary capitalism have been understood. First is 
feminist discussions of bodily work and ‘emotional labor’ 
which cleared the way for understanding certain affective 
dimensions of labor, particularly in reference to women’s 
housework and forms of service work dominated by women. 
Second is analyses that situate affective labor alongside what is 
referred to as ‘biopolitical production’, namely those 
understandings of affective labor brought about by people such 
as Hardt, Negri, and Patricia Clough. Lastly, I identify a strand 
of thinking that meditates on affect within contemporary work 
that offers a much more developed ontology of affect as pre-
cognitive and pre-linguistic. This last understanding of affect is 
integral in opening up affective labor analysis to forms of labor 
that are aesthetic in character. As such, I will argue that it helps 
to situate some of the empirical work that has been introduced 
within the previous sections, allowing us to begin to 
understand the social factory and general intellect as domain 
that produces affectual relations that forms the raw material of 
cultural labor.  
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To begin this chapter I will introduce a rather reductive 
definition of affective labor offered by Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri to underline its similarities to socialist-feminist 
understandings of caring labor and the concept of emotional 
labor. I will highlight the way in which both affective labor and 
emotional labor seem, at least on the surface, to describe the 
similar qualities. Here, I will also introduce empirical material 
that can be seen to substantiate the idea that affective labor 
and emotional labor are closely related concepts. Afterwards, 
this connection will be complicated as I introduce other facets 
of the affective labor thesis that distances it from these 
previous conceptualizations and contribute to its novelty and 
usefulness as a concept to speak about a wider range of 
occupations. These examples will provide a basis for thinking 
of affect that marks out its ontology as unique in respect to 
earlier feminist theories of work and discussions of emotional 
labor. Through this exercise I hope to demonstrate how 
affective labor holds a particular analytic and theoretical role 
that attunes our attention to facets of work that are missed by 
other theories. Beyond this, the notion of affective labor that I 
arrive at will serve to better contextualize the discussions of 
design labor that were previously introduced. The final section 
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will serve as a way to reimagine design labor, as subsisting on 
and transforming not simply culture, but forms of affective 
production.  
Part 2, Section 1: Affective Labor 
 
The theoretical roots of the concept “affective labor” are indeed 
quite deep, as I will argue throughout this chapter, but the 
terminology itself is quite contemporary. Its usage first 
appears within the work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, 
who introduce the concepts in both their individual (Hardt, 
1999; Negri, 1999) and highly popularized co-authored works 
belonging to the Empire trilogy (2000; 2004; 2009). Within this 
literature, affective labor acts as somewhat of a nexus of 
differing ideas and theories, which I will unpack in the 
following pages, but in a more general reading it can be 
understood as work that produces “a feeling of ease, well-
being, excitement, or passion” (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 293) 
and is very closely tied to ‘caring labor’ and ‘women’s work’, 
traditionally found in the reproductive sphere of the 
household, but increasingly pertinent to the types of labor 
found in the service industries. In Hardt and Negri’s 
conceptualization, affective labor is identifiable in occupations 
such as nursing and other healthcare work that produce 
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feelings of security or happiness; in the fast-food industry that 
requires workers to greet customers with a smile; or within 
entertainment industries who are “focused on the creation and 
manipulation of affect” (2000: 292). It is commonly 
attributable to labor that is bodily, or that involves some sort of 
bodily human contact, though it can also be found in 
occupations that involve virtual contact (2000: 293).  
 
The concept of affective labor within Hardt and Negri’s 
conceptualization is inextricably tied to the broader notion of 
‘immaterial labor’ that has been worked through by Hardt and 
Negri, and a number of other Italian autonomist writers since 
the early 1990s, including Maurizio Lazzarato and Paolo Virno 
(Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2008). Immaterial labor, which has 
become even more popular than affective labor in 
organizational behavior literature, is most fully attended to 
and defined during these earlier years in Lazzarato’s (1996) 
essay by the same name. The essay is a touchstone text in the 
more contemporary inflections of autonomist Marxism, and 
has become widely cited within literature on organizational 
behavior and sociology of work (see Gill and Pratt, 2008). Here 
Lazzarato defines immaterial labor as that which produces ‘the 
informational and cultural content of the commodity’ 
 109
(Lazzarato, 1996: 132). Thus, immaterial labor, in his 
understanding, is made up of two sides, one informational in 
character and the other cultural. The labor that produces the 
‘informational content’ relates to sectors of the economy 
involved in industrial manufacturing, or ‘direct labor’. The idea 
here is that industrial manufacturing comes to rely more 
heavily on computing and cybernetic communication. On the 
other hand, the cultural aspect of immaterial labor ‘involves a 
series of activities that are not normally recognized as work--
…the kinds of activities involved in defining and fixing cultural 
and artistic standards, fashions, tastes… ‘(1996: 132).  In the 
transformation from Fordism to the current manifestation of 
work that immaterial labor seeks to attend to, there is a change 
in capital in that work is no longer qualitatively or 
quantitatively different than ‘life’; that the production of 
subjectivity is at once the production of labor. 
 
By the time we see the immaterial labor thesis defined in Hardt 
and Negri’s later works of Empire (2000), Multitude (2004), 
and Commonwealth (2009), affective labor is included in the 
conceptualization of immaterial labor as third important, if not 
primary, component of work. Their definition includes the 
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previous ‘informational’ and ‘cultural’ poles of immaterial 
labor outlined by Lazzarato, but they also add to it: 
 
“In short, we can distinguish three types of immaterial 
labor that drive the services sector at the top of the 
informational economy. The first is involved in an 
industrial production that has been informationized and 
has incorporated communication technologies in a way 
that transforms the production process itself [...]. Second 
is the immaterial labor of analytical and symbolic tasks, 
which itself breaks down into creative and intelligent 
manipulation on the one hand and routine symbolic tasks 
on the other [what could be understood as the ‘cultural 
aspect’ in Lazzarato’s description]. Finally, a third type of 
immaterial labor involves the production and 
manipulation of affect and requires (virtual or actual) 
human contact, labor of the bodily mode” (Hardt and 
Negri, 2000: 293). 
 
Thus, immaterial labor involves an informational aspect, a 
symbolic or creative aspect, and an affective aspect.  
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It’s hard to say exactly why immaterial labor begins to include 
an affective dimension in Hardt and Negri’s writings on 
immaterial labor, but Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2008: 98) 
suggest that it might be in part due to the issues raised by 
other autonomist writers about the “lack of attention to 
gender” in its earlier incarnations. This would make sense 
considering that the concept of affective labor, as Hardt and 
Negri describe it, shares a lot in common with the socialist-
feminist tendencies of the 1970s and 1980s, and thus, through 
including a discussion of affective labor, perhaps Hardt and 
Negri wish to overcome this apparent critique. Hardt and Negri 
even explicitly state that “affective labor is better understood 
by beginning from what feminist analyses of ‘women’s work’ 
have called ‘labor of the bodily mode’”, referencing feminist 
scholar Dorthy Smith’s The Everyday World as Problematic: A 
Feminist Sociology (1987). Silvia Federici further comments 
that the addition of affective labor to the notion of immaterial 
labor is “a faint echo of the feminist analysis –a lip service paid 
to it” (2006: n.p.). If we turn now to this feminist literature, the 
connection between it and affective labor becomes more 
apparent, which seems to beg the question, at least when 
viewing Hardt and Negri’s cursory overview of affective labor 
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so far, what separates the concept of affective labor from 
previous discussions of labor by feminists at all?   
Affective Labor and Feminist Thought 
 
I use the term ‘affective labor’ as a way to build on [...] rather 
disparate streams of research. The first stream is composed of 
work developed by U.S. feminists about gendered forms of labor 
that involves the affects in a central way--such as emotional 
labor, care, kin work, or maternal work…” (Hardt, 2007) 
 
In her recent article that connects discussions of affective labor 
to earlier socialist-feminist analyses of labor, Kathi Weeks 
writes that “[f]eminist theorists have long been interested in 
immaterial and affective labor, even if the terms themselves 
are a more recent invention” (2007: 233). One of these 
prefigurative examples, no doubt, can be found in the writings 
of Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James, who integrate the 
same autonomist Marxist theoretical basis of which Hardt and 
Negri are aligned into an analysis of women’s domestic labor. 
In The Power of Women and the Subversion of the Economy 
(1972), Dalla Costa and James distinguish their project from 
the dominant Marxist analyses on labor through highlighting 
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housework as a central sphere for both capitalist production as 
well as the struggle against capitalism. Whereas orthodox 
Marxist interests concentrated on the factory as the site of 
production and struggle at the time of their writing, Dalla Costa 
and James opened up critique to the forms of work that 
produced labor power. As James comments in the forward to a 
later version of the text, reflecting on its originality,  “this book 
broke with all those previous analyses of capitalist society 
which began and ended in the factory, which began and ended 
with men” (Dalla Costa and James, 1972: 3). 
 
One of the truly novel steps that James and Dalla Costa make is 
to understand women’s work not only as a form of 
reproduction, but as a form of production proper. They 
challenge the dominant Marxist line by arguing that women in 
fact do produce value for capitalism, albeit in a more indirect 
manner. For them, housework is a form of labor that produces 
not simply use-values, but is labor that “is essential to the 
production of surplus-value” (Dalla Costa and James, 1972: 
33). This recognition of women’s work as productive calls into 
question the dominant Marxist assumption of the separation 
between the domains of production and reproduction, 
production and consumption, life and work, community and 
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capitalism. Invoking the autonomist idea of the ‘social factory’, 
they focus on the ways in which capitalism fundamentally 
depends on the labor done to produce ways of life--child 
rearing, cooking and cleaning, for example--that is unwaged 
and occurs outside what are considered to be the traditional 
boundaries of work. It directs our attention to the ways in 
which sociality, or ‘community’ in their lexicon, is one of the 
bases for capitalist exploitation and should be understood as a 
form of labor: 
 
“The community therefore is not an area of freedom and 
leisure auxiliary to the factory where by chance there 
happen to be women who are degraded as the personal 
servants of men. The community is the other half of 
capitalist organization, the other area of hidden capitalist 
exploitation, the other, hidden source of surplus labor” 
(1972: 11). 
 
In their analysis, the commodity that is produced by women’s 
work is of a different character than material products, but is 
none the less the result of labor. While male-dominated 
industries, confined to the factory or workplace produces 
goods, women’s work, done within the household, produces a 
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form of sociality that is also integral to capitalist production. As 
Selma James writes in reference to Dalla Costa’s work: 
 
“[T]he family under capitalism is a center of conditioning, 
of consumption and of reserve labor, but a center 
essentially of social production. When previous so-called 
Marxists said that the capitalist family did not produce for 
capitalism, was not part of social production, it followed 
that they repudiated women’s potential social power” 
(Dalla Costa and James, 1972: 10). 
 
Instead of only seeing labor as that which produces material 
commodities, confined to the space of the factory, we begin to 
see how housework, too, is a form of unwaged labor, producing 
sociality, life, and labor power. “The commodity they produce, 
unlike all other commodities,” James continues, is “the living 
human being-’the laborer himself’” (1972: 10).  
 
These ideas in many ways anticipate what would later develop 
into the concepts of immaterial and affective labor. Like the 
notion of immaterial labor, they are highlighting the 
production of a commodity that is very different than the 
production of material goods. James writes, in reference to 
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what women produce within the home, “[t]his is a strange 
commodity for it is not a thing” (1972: 11). The product of 
women’s work within the domestic sphere is the production of 
people, of ways of life, similar to Hardt and Negri’s analysis of 
immaterial production. What is produced by domestic labor, 
above all, are “relationships”. What is gained in their analysis is 
a more textural understanding of labor that begins to 
acknowledge the forms of subjectivity demanded and 
produced by labor more broadly, but women’s work more 
specifically.  
Emotional Labor 
 
While offering a novel conception of women’s work in relation 
to the wider circuits of capitalist value production, Dalla Costa 
and James restricted their analysis primarily to domestic labor 
within the household. As they acknowledge, their discussions 
were rooted in a particularly Italian context in which most 
women tended to work in the home while relying on a male 
wage to support themselves and their family--a restricting and 
oppressive reality that they wished to overcome through 
political movements like the Wages for Housework campaign 
that they started at the time. As one begins to look beyond the 
geographical and historical context of their writing, however, 
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the reality that women find themselves change, as does the 
feminist appraisals of work.   
 
By the late 1970’s in places like the United States and Britain, 
women were entering the waged workforce in larger numbers, 
particularly in sectors of the service industry that was 
increasing in economic and political importance. Feminist 
scholarship in this context begins to address women’s labor 
from the point of view of production proper, as a waged labor. 
Many of the central concerns of earlier feminist discussions are 
transposed into this new terrain, as the emotional side of labor 
uncovered in the domain of the household becomes a central 
preoccupation in certain studies on women’s work within the 
growing service industries. This brings along a new set of 
concerns, but also invokes many of the same themes from 
earlier feminism. 
 
One of the most notable examples of feminist scholarship on 
work coming from this latter period is Arlie Hochschild’s The 
Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling (1983). 
On one level, Hochschild’s work can be viewed as a 
continuation of Dalla Costa and James’ concern for the more 
feminized and subjective bases for capitalist value production. 
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On the other hand, it directs our attention away from how the 
subjective social productions produce labor power and 
uncovers how these feminine subjectivities are increasingly 
commodified within the service industry more directly as labor 
itself (that is, work that directly produces value for capital). 
Hochschild shows how emotion is the commodity of 
paramount importance to the types of highly gendered labor, 
such as flight attending, and these types of labor can thusly be 
described as ‘emotional labor’.  
 
One of the theoretical interlocutors that inform Hochschild’s 
Managed Heart, as noted in the preface to the text, is the work 
of C. Wright Mills, particularly the chapter “The Great 
Salesroom” in his seminal work, White Collar (Hochschild, 
1983: ix). Whereas some of the socialist-feminist literature at 
the time was still working within a Fordist paradigm of labor, 
one that restrictively focused on material production within 
factories and the differences this work had in comparison to 
women’s caring labor, Mills identifies how workers’ 
subjectivity was increasingly seeping out of the realm of 
reproduction and into the space of production proper. As Mills 
comments, the “personal or even intimate traits of the 
employee are drawn into the sphere of exchange” (1951: 182 
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cited in Weeks, 2007), underlining the increasingly muddled 
relationship between the personal and privatized, 
reproductive and productive, within the contemporary 
capitalist moment. Like the socialist-feminist tendencies 
described previously, however, the point is that it is not just 
the production of material goods that was crucial for the 
capitalism, but also the very subjective products like 
personality that were central.  
 
Using Mills, Hochschild builds upon the former’s identification 
that what is sold in certain occupations “is our personality” 
(Hochschild, 1983: ix). Interested in this notion, Hochschild 
develops the central question to The Managed Heart that was 
left unanswered in many of the analyses of labor up to that 
point: “what is it that ‘people jobs’ actually require of workers” 
(1983: 10). This interest in “people jobs” begins to take us 
away from the dominant assumptions and concerns of labor 
analyses at the time that privileged the overwhelmingly male, 
Fordist factory worker as the primary subject. Problematizing 
these assumptions, Hochschild comments, “..the modern 
assembly worker has for some time been an outmoded symbol 
of modern industrial labor..” (1983: 8). She identifies a shift in 
production away from the forms of assembly-line factory work 
 120
within places like the United States towards a post-industrial 
economy increasingly based upon service work--”the voice to 
voice or face to face delivery of service”--and sought to 
understand what the labor process of such work consists of 
(1983: 8). 
 
Starting with this basic question and understanding, 
Hochschild’s work focuses particularly on the working realities 
of flight attendants, providing rich empirical data that 
underscores the more subjective dimensions produced by such 
labor. She comes to define the work of flight attending as a 
form of ‘emotional labor’, or ‘labor that requires one to induce 
or suppress feeling in order to sustain the outward 
countenance that produces the proper state of mind in 
others…” (1983: 7). In emotional labor, what is produced is a 
feeling; “the product is a state of mind” (1983: 6). In the case of 
flight attending, the workers (overwhelmingly women) are 
required to engage their emotions and to disguise negative 
feelings such as “fatigue or irritation” in order to induce a 
desired emotional response in the customer (1983: 8). This 
process of acting out and managing emotions is where 
Hochschild delineates from Mills’ analysis. Whereas Mills saw 
emotion as simply what workers ‘have’, Hochschild provides 
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an understanding of how emotions are cultivated, suppressed, 
and ultimately managed at work (1983: ix). Emotional labor 
for Hochschild is active, worked on within the labor process, 
not merely a trait that is brought into work from the outside.   
 
While Hochschild concentrates primarily on flight attendants 
in her empirical descriptions of what she defines as ‘emotional 
labor’, she insists that there are many occupations that are 
more or less in accordance with this concept. She argues that 
“roughly one-third of American workers today have jobs that 
subject them to substantial demands for emotional labor”, and 
that that share, according to her estimates, increases to one-
half for women (1983: 11). She claims that secretaries, hotel 
receptionists, and social workers can be defined as emotional 
laborers to some degree. Waitresses, too, she argues, are 
emotional laborers to the extent that they create “an 
atmosphere of pleasant dining” (1983: 11). Indeed, in the years 
after The Managed Heart, many have found her work and the 
concept of emotional labor in particular useful in describing a 
wide range of occupations. Recent examples draw upon the 
emotional labor thesis in discussions of childcare workers 
(Vincent and Braun, 2013), retail workers (Rutherford and 
Park, 2013), school psychologists (Truta, 2012), teachers 
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(Isenbarger and Zembylas, 2006) and lecturers (Constanti and 
Gibbs, 2004), call center workers (Mulholland, 2002), hotel 
workers (Kim, 2008), and nurses (Lopez, 2006).  
Emotional and Affective Labor 
 
Concentrating on the concept of emotional labor in 
Hochschild’s work allows one to recognize a number of shared 
features to the definition of affective labor offered by Hardt 
and Negri. For Hochschild, emotional labor “require[s] face-to-
face or voice to voice contact with the public” (1983: 147). 
Similarly, affective labor, in Hardt and Negri’s words, is 
“generally associated with human contact, but that contact can 
either be actual or virtual (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 293). The 
second feature of emotional labor, alluded to above, is that it 
“produce[s] an emotional state in another person” (1983: 
147).  This definition would thus fit quite well into Hardt and 
Negri’s rubric of immaterial labor, of which affective labor is a 
part, as a form of work that produces an immaterial good. In 
addition, Hochschild uses emotional labor to characterize 
highly feminized forms of employment. While she concentrates 
most intently on flight attendants, she argues that the category 
could be applied to nurses, for example, which seems to mesh 
quite well with Hardt and Negri’s identification of the work 
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with types of labor that would traditionally be viewed as 
‘women’s work’.  
 
If we turn to a growing number of empirical analyses that 
invoke the terminology of affective labor, the similarities 
between what the concept means within this literature and 
what emotional labor as outlined by Hochschild denotes 
become further apparent. One example can be drawn from 
Emma Dowling’s (2007; 2012) analyses of her own experience 
working as a waitress at a high-end restaurant in which she 
identifies the organizational context of the restaurant she 
worked in as affective in a number of ways. First, she 
underlines the affective dimensions of management discourse 
and strategy, and how these reinforced management’s 
acknowledgement and preoccupation with fostering and 
controlling the affective dimensions of the restaurant 
experience, both between workers and in the employee 
customer relationship.  Secondly, within her own work as a 
waitress, she identifies one of the primary pillars as the ability 
to “make the customer feel happy, contented and entertained, 
in a way that they experienced the restaurant as theatre” 
(2007: 120). Aside from simply acting as a surrogate for food 
and beverage orders going to and from the kitchen, what she 
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and the other wait-staff produced was a feeling, an emotion, 
and ultimately a “dining experience” (2007: 120).  
 
Finding the concept of affective labor useful in her study of sex-
workers in Calcutta, Melissa Ditmore (2007) further adds to 
the definition. Ditmore describes affective labor as “work that 
aims to evoke specific behaviors or sentiments in others as 
well as oneself” (2007: 171), which bears a remarkable 
resemblance to the definition of emotional labor laid out by 
Hochschild. Specific to sex-work, Ditmore underlines the 
women’s self-image projection as instances of affective 
production, such as putting off an air of “the girl next door” or a 
“hypersexual persona” (2007: 172), which works in tandem to 
the sexual intercourse the women sell. The cultivation of these 
specific personas, similar to Dowling’s description of 
restaurant workers, is a kind of performance or theatre played 
out by the workers (2007: 172). In addition to these aesthetic 
projections, they are required in many ways to put in the work 
of cultivating and sustaining client relationships as a further 
affective dimension which takes place both before and after 
sexual intercourse. The sex-worker must be able to spark a 
rapport with their clients, requiring conversational skills and 
identifying things like “shared interests” (2007: 172).  
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In another example, Ariel Ducey (2007) looks at the work of 
healthcare professionals in New York City, sustaining Hardt 
and Negri’s earlier, yet underdeveloped, claim that health care 
work is one of the more obvious forms of affective labor. 
Ducey, like Hardt and Negri, also seems to align affective labor 
with that of the rise of service work more broadly, writing that 
the “affect economy”, is “an economy increasingly central to 
the production of value in a services-based, capitalist society” 
(Ducey, 2007: 190). In her study she concentrates in particular 
on the training programs implemented in the health field as a 
means of trying to control the affective productions of the 
workers, highlighting not only the ways affect is produced, but 
the attempts to organize it within the service dominated 
occupations in the capitalist economy. In this way she, like 
Dowling, looks at both the production and manipulation of 
affect within contemporary forms of work.  
 
Affective labor has also been used to characterize the work of 
modeling by Elizabeth Wissinger (2007; 2015). Keeping with 
the general connection of affective labor with a sort of 
performance or theatre developed by the previous examples, 
Wissinger draws the reader's attention to the ways in which 
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models have to produce feelings, engaging with technologies 
such as cameras, and with other bodies, such as managers, 
fashion show spectators, and designers. Like the other 
empirical examples, she connects affective labor in a field of 
work that is largely dominated by women whose femininity is, 
in part, what is manipulated and sold by the industry.  
 
Finally, Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez (2011) uses the term 
to describe and account for the work done by undocumented 
domestic workers, a further occupation that is dominated by 
women and, which propagates through the subjective markers 
of femininity and coloniality. In her analysis, the domestic 
worker produces a feelings, and reciprocally, absorbs them 
within the house that she does her job. The domestic worker’s 
product is not simply cleanliness, but a less material product of 
feelings. 
 
All these examples of affective labor find a certain affinity with 
what is defined by emotional labor in that they, on the surface 
at least, seem to involve the production and capitalization of 
feelings; the manipulation of feelings in the workers as well as 
the production of feelings in others. The examples show how a 
certain type of femininity is put to work, a further connection 
 127
to Hochschild’s emotional labor. Describing Hochschild’s work, 
Weeks comments that emotional labor “recognizes the 
strategic management of emotions for social effect as an 
everyday practice which, since it is traditionally privatized and 
feminized, is not generally recognized or valued as labor” 
(2007: 240). Indeed, both the empirical examples of affective 
labor above and Hochschild’s definition of emotional labor 
both address the increasing commodification and manipulation 
of feminine subjectivities that were previously tied to the field 
of reproduction, but that are increasingly becoming 
implemented in the direct production of capitalist value. This 
reality seems to bond both emotional labor and affective labor 
to occupations that are dominated by women and that heavily 
involve women subjectivities: flight attendants in the case of 
emotional labor and occupations such as sex workers, 
domestic workers and models in respect to affective labor. 
Furthermore, all examples of affective labor and emotional 
labor are identified in the domain of what we would call 
‘service work’ that involves either face-to-face interaction or 
communication via some other medium. Lastly, the examples 
of affective labor also demonstrate a performative quality to 
the work they concentrate on, which Hochschild also touches 
on in her matrix of self-emotional management. Emotional 
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management for Hochschild entails a sort of acting and playing 
out the emotions that are socially expected within a particular 
social setting, such as work. This acting, through bodily 
gestures and cues seems to be central to both emotional labor 
and affective labor.       
 
Given the similarities, the implicit and explicit ties to feminist 
understandings of labor and the concept of emotional labor, 
why is it that Hardt, Negri, and a growing number of others in 
in organizational studies and the sociology of work, find it 
necessary to speak of affective labor? Isn’t what Hardt, Negri 
and the multitude of others discussing with concept of affective 
labor already covered under the term of emotional labor and 
the prior analyses brought about in socialist-feminist 
literature? What analytic and theoretical specificity, if any, 
does the concept of affective labor offer? In the following 
section I seek to answer some of these questions and flesh out 
some of the specificities of the concept of affective labor that 
identify the concept as unique in relation to emotional labor. 
Whereas I have until now been demonstrating some of the 
resonations between affective labor and other theories of work 
so far, now I will focus on the differences.  
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Towards an analytical and political specificity of affective 
labor 
 
In an issue of Theory Culture and Society dedicated to 
discussing autonomist concepts in the context of sociological 
and organizational analyses of work, Hesmondhalgh and Baker 
offer a scathing critique of Hardt and Negri’s theories of 
immaterial and affective labor. In their study on the television 
industry in Britain, the two find emotional labor as a much 
better theoretical model than affective labor in describing the 
work they studied, concluding, “autonomist concepts of 
‘immaterial labor’ [and] ‘affective labor’ [...] are at best 
evocative metaphors rather than theoretical-political 
constructs with any analytical force.” (Hesmondhalgh and 
Baker, 2008: 115). Much of this critique, it seems, tends to 
center on the apparent underdevelopment of the concepts as 
drawn out by Hardt and Negri. As the two further comment, 
autonomist concepts such as affective labor are “notoriously 
vague categories [that] are hardly specified at all” (2008: 99). 
Emma Dowling (2007: 118), in her own discussion of affective 
labor previously touched on, agrees, writing “[not] much 
analysis beyond a definition of what affective labor is coupled 
with a mere mention of affective labor as ‘service with a smile’, 
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‘care labor’, ‘women’s (reproductive) work’, ‘kin work’, or the 
‘entertainment industry’”.  
 
While I concur that the concept of affective labor is indeed very 
underdeveloped and vague, which is part of the reason this 
thesis is a necessary addition to the affective labor debates, I 
do not think that it is worth abandoning the terms in 
preference for other theoretical concepts like emotional labor, 
as Hesmondhalgh and Baker do. The fact that a concept is 
lacking does not necessarily mean we should throw it out as 
useless. Indeed, many theories can and do begin by mere 
fragments of ideas, or in the process of grasping at something 
that is not quite clear. And if we are to return to the concept of 
affective labor within Hardt and Negri’s work and other 
theoretical and organizational literature that invokes the 
terminology, we can begin to understand where affective labor 
comes to represent something quite different than emotional 
labor and sews the germinal beginnings of a novel analytic and 
political paradigm for understanding work. We begin to see 
that the question is not which model is more developed, 
exhaustive, and therefore appropriate to speaking about labor 
in the current capitalist mode, but how each respective theory 
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does something different and aligns our attention to different 
textures within work and the mechanisms of capitalism today.  
Affect and Biopolitical Production 
 
As I have thusly demonstrated, many of the examples of 
affective labor given by both Hardt, Negri, and the numerous 
other empirical studies do either explicitly or implicitly, 
intentionally or unintentionally, share some sympathy with 
socialist-feminist ideas of work, and Hochschild’s analysis of 
emotional labor in particular. That said, many prefer the 
concept of affective labor over emotional labor because it in 
some way goes beyond these frameworks. As Melissa Ditmore 
in her study of sex workers in Calcutta, writes:  
 
“Arlie Hochschild’s term “emotional labor” describes a 
form of affective labor, one certainly characteristic of sex 
work. And indeed the term emotional labor has been 
usefully applied to sex work by Wendy Chapkis. However, 
these analyses of the work in service industries including 
the sex industry have not delved deeply into the 
components of labor...” (2007: 171).   
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But how exactly does affect offer a deeper understanding of the 
components of labor? Answering this questions requires one to 
understand two of the primary theoretical bases for the 
concept of affective labor not yet covered so far that marks out 
its specificity in relation to feminist discussions on labor and 
the concept of emotional labor.   
Biopower and Affective Labor: a Politics of Life 
 
One way to begin to define affective labor’s particularity in 
respect to terms like emotional labor is to understand how the 
concept fits within Hardt and Negri’s wider critique of post-
Fordist capitalism. Affective labor in Hardt and Negri’s version 
is indispensable of further theoretical foundations of their 
thought, particularly the notions of ‘biopolitical production’. 
Here I would like to briefly discuss affective labor’s 
relationship to this concept in order to render affective labor’s 
political specificity visible. While biopolitical production holds 
relevance beyond the scope of this discussion, I will try not to 
meander too far away from the topic at hand, and focus on the 
connections the concept has with affective labor specifically.  
 
For Hardt and Negri, the current capitalist moment is 
characterized primarily by what they refer to as “biopolitical 
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production”. In a rather simplistic way, Hardt and Negri use 
this term to denote a turn in post-Fordism whereby “the 
production of forms of life is becoming the basis of added 
value” (2009: 132). In other words,’life itself’, the very 
inclusive notion of all human activity, becomes directly 
productive to capitalism. This concept of biopolitical 
production comes from the much earlier concept of ‘biopower’, 
which first arises in Foucault’s History of Sexuality Vol. I: The 
Will to Knowledge (1976/1998). Foucault uses the term 
biopower to designate a shift away from techniques of juridical 
power based upon reduction and repression towards an 
emergent form of power that was concerned with the body, 
populations, life, and the proliferation of life. While previous 
juridical formations of power were typically exercised by the 
subtraction of life, as Foucault argues, in biopower the concern 
of power lies in fostering and organizing life. It is “a power bent 
on generating forces, making them grow and ordering them, 
rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them 
submit or destroying them” (1976/1998: 136). Whereas older 
techniques of power were based upon the “right to take life or 
let live”, in biopower the objective is to “foster life or disallow it 
to the point of death” (1976/1998: 138).  
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For Foucault, the rise of biopower in many ways parallels the 
rise of capitalism as a mode of production that prevailed over 
feudalistic forms of economic organization. Indeed, one might 
even say that the development of biopower and capitalism 
were co-constitutive to a certain degree. As Foucault states, in 
the 18th century, techniques of biopower were “present at 
every level of the social body”, but crucially, were “an 
indispensable element in the development of capitalism” 
(1976/1998: 140-141). The ability for capitalism to become 
the dominant economic paradigm relied on “[the] investment 
in the body, its valorization, and the distributive management 
of its forces…” (1976/1998: 141). Biopower was integral in 
shaping capitalism in a way in which life and the body become 
primary basis for its proliferation and the primary object of its 
management and control.  
 
While Foucault’s brief description of the connection between 
biopower and capitalism focuses on the development of 
capitalism in the 18th century, Hardt and Negri invoke 
biopower in a much more contemporary context. The 
integration of life more wholly with capitalist production--
biopolitical production--reaches its apogee in the turn towards 
immaterial labor. Biopolitical production here might be 
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considered another way of describing the rise of immaterial 
labor; it is what the three different kinds of immaterial labor all 
have in common: they all produce forms of life (Hardt and 
Negri, 2009: 132). Within this understanding of biopolitical 
production, however, affective labor plays a more pivotal role 
than the other two forms of immaterial labor discussed earlier. 
As Hardt and Negri insist, “[t]he productivity of bodies and the 
value of affect, however, are absolutely central [to biopolitical 
production]” (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 30). As they further 
elaborate, “the production and manipulation of affects [...] with 
its focus on the productivity of the corporeal, the somatic, is an 
extremely important element in the contemporary networks of 
biopolitical production” (2000: 30).  
 
Affective labor’s privileged role within the circuits of 
biopolitical production becomes somewhat clearer if we 
understand what it is that affective labor creates for Hardt and 
Negri. Earlier, we spoke of affective labor along similar lines of 
emotional labor in that it created, for example, “feelings of well 
being”. Once Hardt and Negri explain the term in relation to 
biopolitical production, however, the definition becomes more 
diffuse. In his essay, “Affective Labor” (1999), Michael Hardt, in 
explaining affective labor within the context of biopower, 
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writes: “[w]hat is created in networks of affective labor is a 
form-of-life”, or, “collective subjectivities, sociality, and society 
itself” (1999: 98). Though this declaration remains quite vague, 
it is nonetheless quite important. For what this understanding 
of affective labor underlines is the notion that affect is creative-
-that is, it produces something novel--and what it creates is 
subjectivity, life. Thus, it is affective labor, and more 
importantly affect, which produces forms of life that are 
increasingly central to this biopolitical turn of capitalism; 
affective labor, and affect more particularly, is a sort of 
substrate out of which forms of life emerge. 
 
Because affect is imbued with this status of producing new 
forms of life, affective labor has a somewhat complex 
relationship to capitalist control in Hardt and Negri’s definition 
of biopolitical production. Of course, in this “biopolitical turn of 
the economy”, the need to produce new commodities depends 
on novel subjectivities, new information, different outlooks, 
ways of life, and thus affective labor is absolutely integral. This 
is, perhaps, why Michael Hardt argues that affective labor “is 
not only directly productive to capital, but [is] at the very 
pinnacle of the hierarchy of laboring forms” (Hardt, 1999: 90). 
In this way, affective labor is a necessary, welcomed, and even 
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fostered element to capitalist value production because it is 
constitutive of these forms of life on which capitalism in the 
biopolitical realm depends.  
 
This increasingly central position that affective labor has in 
contemporary arrangements of biopolitical production results 
in a very different relationship between labor on the one hand, 
and biopolitical governance on the other. When increasingly 
the commodity that is valued by capital is a form of life, a 
subjectivity, capitalism’s power becomes less prescriptive and 
more external to the production process itself. This idea is 
already at work in the earlier incarnations of the ‘immaterial 
labor’ thesis in which Lazzarato (1996) argues that as 
subjectivity becomes the dominant object of labor, Capitalism 
no longer defines “tasks of execution”, but instead demands 
that workers “become subjects” (134), a process that depends 
on open communication and cooperation:  
 
“...workers are expected to become “active subjects in the 
coordination of the various functions of production, 
instead of being subjected to it as simple command. We 
arrive at a point where a collective learning process 
becomes the heart of productivity, because it is no longer 
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a matter of finding different ways of composing or 
organizing already existing job junctions, but of looking 
for new ones” (Lazzarato, 1996: 134). 
 
Like Lazzarato, for Hardt and Negri capitalism’s control is 
somewhat removed from this relationship of affective labor, 
external to it. As Hard and Negri argue, “affective labor 
generally produce[s] cooperation autonomously from 
capitalist command, even in some of the most constrained and 
exploited circumstances” (Hardt and Negri, 2009: 140). Here 
we can see how the notion of biopolitical production is related 
to Foucault’s analysis of biopower. As is the case of Foucault’s 
understanding, power is not marked by restriction and 
prescription, but rather by its ability to foster forms of life and 
to make them commensurable with capitalist value production. 
For Hardt and Negri, the ability to foster life depends on open, 
unimpeded cooperation that happens primarily outside of the 
direct employment relation “at the level of social production 
and social practice” (2009: 141). In other words, it is what 
Hardt and Negri describe as ‘the commons’ that is the site of 
affective and biopolitical production, a commons that is 
relatively autonomous from capitalist command.  
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Within this understanding of biopolitical production, capitalist 
exploitation is more akin to a sort of “capture” or 
“expropriation” of labor power, which is different than 
previous arrangements of capital, like Fordism, which worked 
through the direct exploitation and organization of labor. In 
biopolitical production, “the extraction of value from the 
common is increasingly accomplished without the capitalist 
intervening in its production” (2009: 141). Instead, they 
identify “capitalist rent” as the primary mechanism through 
which capitalist accumulation and control operates (2009: 
141). The two describe this difference in capitalist 
organization, writing that “[w]hereas profit is generated 
through internal engagement in the production process, rent is 
generally conceived as an external mode of extraction” (2009: 
141). In this way, capital’s role in relation to production is 
removed, “simply hovering over it parasitically” (2009: 142). 
Affective Production and ‘Biopower From Below’ 
 
Foucault makes a very brief but interesting comment in The 
Will to Knowledge when describing how biopower works. He 
writes, “[i]t is not that life has been totally integrated into 
techniques that govern and administer it; it constantly escapes 
them” (1976/1998: 143). In other words, despite the constant 
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attempts of biopower to order life, the productions of life 
constantly fall outside of the grasp of the formers control. 
Later, he would write that while biopolitical capitalism 
produces a sort of “generalized control, it is nevertheless 
forced to preserve a minimum of degrees of freedom, creativity 
and inventiveness in the domain of sciences, technology and 
the arts, without which the system would collapse in a kind of 
entropic inertia” (Foucault, Le Peinture de Manet, Seuil, Paris 
2004 cited in Lazzarato, 2013). This ambiguous relationship 
that the production of life has with biopower, one of constant 
escape and ordering, is what Hardt and Negri outline within 
their analysis of affective labor and biopolitics. Like Foucault, 
for Hardt and Negri, biopolitics is built off of what escapes it 
(2009: 31), and what escapes it is affect. The removed 
relationship of capitalism to affective production and the fact 
that biopolitics constantly escapes control underlines the 
political status of affect within capitalism.  
 
While in The Will to Knowledge Foucault somewhat prioritizes 
the way in which biopower is exercised as a power over 
populations as a form of control, Hardt and Negri concentrate 
on this notion of escape in relation biopower. They 
acknowledge how biopower is deployed by sovereign power in 
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control of life (biopower), but also underline a potentially 
useful way in which it can be deployed against capitalist power 
arrangements (“biopower from below” or “biopolitics”). In this 
way, they diagnose affective labor as simultaneously one of the 
central bases for biopolitcal production and capitalist value, 
but also as the potential site for creating new forms of life that 
go outside of its control (Hardt, 1999: 98; Hardt and Negri, 
2009: 59):  
 
“On the one hand, affective labor, the production and 
reproduction of life, has become firmly embedded as a 
necessary foundation for capitalist accumulation and 
patriarchal order. On the other hand, however, the 
production of affects, subjectivities, and forms of life 
present an enormous potential for autonomous circuits of 
valorization, and perhaps for liberation” (Hardt, 1999: 
100).  
 
Whereas in the earlier writings by Hardt and Negri on affective 
labor, the radical potentiality of affect is understood in relation 
to the idea of a “biopower from below” against the pernicious 
capitalist use of “biopower from above”, in later writings this 
relationship is recast as an antagonism between biopolitics and 
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biopower. Biopower is used to describe the ways in which life 
is cultivated and controlled, whereas biopolitics takes on an 
ontological status as the creative and generative productions of 
life and subjectivity that are fundamentally resistant to 
biopower. In this way, biopower comes ontologically and 
chronologically second to a biopolitics identified “with the 
localized politics of life--that is, the production of affects and 
languages...the invention of new forms of relation to the self 
and others” leading to forms of “resistance and de-
subjectivication” (Hardt and Negri, 2009: 58-59).  
 
This notion of biopolitics as a form of resistance and de-
subjectification comes from its status as a type of event. Here it 
is useful to quote Hardt and Negri at length in order to 
understand their conceptualization of the event as it relates to 
biopolitics: 
 
“Biopolitics, in contrast to biopower, has the character of 
an event first of all in the sense that the ‘intransigence of 
freedom’ disrupts the normative system...it ruptures the 
continuity of history and the existing order, but it should 
be understood not only negatively, as rupture, but also as 
innovation…” (2009: 59).  
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It is here where affective labor, tied to biopolitics, becomes 
central to Hardt and Negri’s politics of capitalist subversion in 
addition to how it works for capitalist production. For it is 
affective labor that has the potentiality to create a rupture that 
both breaks from normative subjective arrangements of 
capitalism and to create subjectivities that might be outside of 
it’s control.  
 
Thus we have the politics of affective labor according to Hardt 
and Negri: affective labor is both the most important base for 
capitalist production in the biopolitical economy, but is also 
one of the primary sites of production that offers a way out of 
capitalist control. Both these realities center around affective 
labor’s status as that which creates new forms of life--forms of 
life that are integral for creating ever more commodities on the 
one hand, and forms of life that might rupture from capitalist 
subjectivity on the other. To put this in Hardt and Negri’s 
terms, affective labor is both one of the central objects of 
control under biopower, but is also one of the central spheres 
of intervention for biopolitics. This tension is very nicely 
summarized by Ben Anderson, who writes: 
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“On the one hand, life is that which exceeds attempts to 
order and control it. On the other hand, life is that which 
is made productive through techniques of intervention. It 
is in the tension between these two versions of how 
power and life relate that a politics of affect resides…” 
(Anderson, 2010: 1). 
 
For Anderson, it is not surprising how affective labor on the 
one hand and biopower on the other would both be useful 
interlocutors. This is because “an encounter between ‘affect’ 
and ‘biopower’ is to bring together two ways of thinking about 
the relation between power and life” (2010: 1). In other words, 
affect and biopower both speak to the way in which power and 
life go together, albeit from slightly different angles. This 
connection is further commented on by Patricia Clough, 
another prominent figure to comment on the connection 
between affect and capitalism in recent years. Like Hardt and 
Negri, she finds concepts like biopower and affect useful in 
order to understand how life becomes the primary object of 
capitalist proliferation. Affect, for Clough, becomes a central 
concern within a “changing global process of accumulating 
capital’, whereby value extraction becomes concerned with 
‘the structure and organization of the human body, or what is 
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called ‘life itself’’ (Clough, 2007: 3). On the other hand, like 
Hardt and Negri, affect can also pave the way for “new 
possibilities inside capital for making an outside for capital, 
and the potential for change” (2007: 25). Thus affect within her 
diagnoses of capital, similar to Hardt and Negri’s, is both one of 
the increasingly central objects of extraction in capital, but is 
also a dimension of life that opens up ways out of capitalist 
subjectivity.  
Beyond Hardt and Negri’s Affective Labor: Towards an 
understanding of affect itself 
 
Hardt and Negri’s definition of affective labor, while useful in 
its identification of how affect is an integral political 
component in modern capitalism, is still quite vague when 
describing what affect is.  Beyond the fact that it is mostly 
described as a sort of substrate that produces forms of life, or 
life itself, they only passingly denote that their understanding 
of affect is taken from Spinoza. Moreover, while they go beyond 
some of the preceding feminist literature and emotional labor 
theory in tying affect to forms of biopolitics, their definition 
doesn’t do enough to distinguish their concept of affective 
labor from that of emotional labor. Why not simply build upon 
emotional labor rather than developing a new term, for 
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instance? The closeness of the terms’ meanings is part the 
reason, I believe, why individuals such as Hesmondhalgh and 
Baker find it difficult to see the value in affective labor. More 
recently, however, a growing amount of research taking up the 
relationship between affect and capitalism has provided a 
more robust definition that goes beyond Hardt and Negri’s 
initial formulations. These descriptions are an important 
advancement in discussions on affective labor for they begin to 
lay out more concretely the distinctions between operative 
words of emotion and affect particular to each definition. In 
laying out these distinctions, affective labor becomes a useful 
concept for exploring not only those occupations associated 
with service work or feminized labor of the bodily mode, but 
also for the fields of advertising and cultural production.  
 
Part of laying out a distinction between emotional labor and 
affective labor requires one to understand the ontology of the 
operative words within both descriptions--affect and emotion--
and how each term works within their respective theoretical 
frameworks. Returning to Arlie Hochschild’s Managed Heart, 
we find that her definition of emotion draws it out as a type of 
“biologically given sense”, like smell or taste, that provides us 
with “a means by which we know about or relation with the 
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world” (1983: 219). Unlike other senses, however, emotions 
are cognitive to the extent they “ ‘signal’ messages to the 
individual” (1983: 220). Thus, in borrowing from Freud and 
Darwin, Hochschild understands emotions as a sort of 
communication that tells individuals information about 
themselves and their surroundings, a sort of shortcut to 
linguistic signification. Hochschild continues: “emotional 
states--such as joy, sadness, and jealousy--can be seen as the 
senders of signals about our way of apprehending the inner 
and outer environment” (1983: 220-221).  
 
In Hochschild’s analysis of service work, it is this signal 
function that is manipulated and managed within occupations 
such as flight attending. Workers have to act out specific 
emotions with the hope of signaling a desired message to the 
customers whom they serve. Hochschild’s conceptual mix of 
Freudian psychology and evolutionary biology in her 
understanding of emotions generally produces what might be 
understood as a ‘functional’ understanding of emotion. In other 
words, emotions relay information crucial for our survival. 
Anxiety or fear tell us that something might be potentially 
harmful, disgust tells us we should refrain from a certain 
activity. They are thus personal experiences of states, tied to 
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cognition, that are reflected upon by the individuals that 
undergo them with the aim towards an action.  
 
In comparison to the term emotion in Hochschild’s work, the 
term affect within much of the contemporary affective labor 
literature denotes a much less stable and cognitive 
phenomena. Instead, affect is largely conceptualized as a sort 
of transference from body to body that occurs prior to our 
conscious reflection, subsisting below its threshold. Patricia 
Clough, for instance, explains that affect can be understood as 
“a substrate of potential bodily responses, often autonomic 
responses, in excess of consciousness” (Clough, 2007: 1-2). 
Indeed, this notion of affect as potentiality that is outside of 
consciousness is one the defining features that many 
commentators insist on when situating the concept affective 
labor in opposition to emotional labor. This difference is laid 
out quite clearly in Ariel Ducey’s work on healthcare workers 
in New York, for example, where she explicitly distinguishes 
between affect and emotion. For her, “the concept of 
affect...refers to a different register of phenomena than the 
concept of emotions” with the former being “a process that can 
become, but does not necessarily become, conscious” (Ducey, 
2007: 190). Emotions, on the other hand, are more akin to 
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feelings, which are the cognitive response to objects or 
phenomena (2007: 191). In this way, emotions are situated on 
a level of conscious sense making that comes after a non-
conscious affectual process has taken place; emotions are tied 
to self-reflection that happens in response to an affective event.  
 
These ontological differences between affects and emotions 
are at the center of why many have chosen to speak of affective 
labor instead of emotional labor. In Gutiérrez Rodríguez (2011: 
n.p.) work that analyzes domestic labor in light of affect theory, 
she, like those above, distances affective labor from emotional 
labor. While she recognizes the significance and usefulness of 
prior socialist-feminist writings and terms such as emotional 
labor for understanding work, she insists affective labor works 
on a different level: 
 
“The analysis of “emotional labor” in domestic work has 
uncovered the role of personal care and the investment of 
subjective faculties by stressing the significance of love in 
women’s labor. Frequently, the assumption is made that 
when we speak of emotions we mean affects. But the 
perspective on affects, while it might embrace an analysis 
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of the dynamics of emotions, goes beyond the cognitive 
framework of emotions”. 
Elizabeth Wissenger (2007; 2015) provides an even more 
specific understanding of affective labor in her empirical work 
on the modeling industry that further clarifies its distinction 
with emotional labor. For her, to speak of affect is to underline 
a different understanding of the body and interactions 
between bodies where bodies are understood as “uncontained 
and fluid” and ultimately open to investments that “control, 
amplify, or channel bodily forces” (2007: 231). Affects are 
“bodily forces” that subsist below the threshold of 
consciousness, analogous to a type of energy flow that passes 
between bodies (2007: 231). These affective forces are “pre-
individual”, not contained within the particular subject, but 
diffuse and gaseous, freely flowing between people. In 
Wissenger’s more recent work, a truly detailed and coherent 
empirical monograph, This Years Model: Fashion, Media and 
The Making of Glamour (2015), the definition of affective labor 
is further expanded upon. In this work affect becomes 
understood as “the unsaid, unseen, emergent potentials 
efflorescing in the confluences of the model-image-body-
product” (Wissinger, 2015: 26). She interrogates modeling as a 
form of affective labor in which affect, understood as this 
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bodily energy full of potentials, gets shaped and manipulated 
into a specific ‘looks’, captured by cameras and distributed 
throughout different medias. She offers a very concrete 
analysis of how “our life energy and potential” are “circulated 
by imaging technologies, and how that circulation is turning a 
profit” (Wissenger, 2015: 27).  
 
The distinction between affect and emotion is thus a very real 
and important one to those who invoke the prior. Affect tends 
to speak about a relationship that is involved with the 
production of subjectivity in a very elusive energetic realm that 
unfolds outside of or below consciousness and cognition. In the 
next chapter I will focus and elaborate more fully on the 
ontology of affect, but for now it is important to acknowledge 
that many of the understandings of affective labor largely 
borrow from social theorist Brian Massumi’s conceptualization 
of the term. As Ducey states, “I am engaging in a concept of 
affect along the lines Brian Massumi has suggested” (Ducey, 
2007: 191). Accordingly, Ducey associates affect with a type of 
intensity that is not only non-conscious, but also with a 
different level of experience than that of “semantics and 
semiotics, of language, narrative…” on which emotion belongs 
(2007: 192). When affect becomes one of the primary objects 
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of capitalist control, this “affect economy cultivates 
engagement and generates energy, which are both before and 
other than meaning” (Ducey, 2007: 198). Clough also cites 
Massumi’s definition of the term in her work, writing that 
“affect is in excess of conscious states of perception, pointing to 
a pre-conscious ‘visceral perception’ that is the condition of 
possibility of conscious perception” arriving before the 
emotional “narration” of this process (Clough, 2009: 48). 
Understanding this side of affect is integral for situating it in 
relation to emotion in Hochschild’s analysis: affect is not a 
phenomenon that denotes cognition, meaning, or a signal that 
relays information, but is, rather, a “contagious energy, an 
energy that can be whipped up or dampened in the course of 
interaction”, as Wissinger argues (Wissenger, 2007: 232).  
 
Situating affective labor in this way also highlights the 
similarities of affective labor discussions with what has 
become known as ‘non-representational theory’ (NRT) within 
the field of geography. Nigel Thrift has been at the center of 
discussions around NRT, outlining it as a break from 
representational forms of thinking about the world that trade 
specifically on discourse, language, and to certain Humean 
empiricism. NRT, for Thrift, seeks to underline the importance 
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of the pre-cognitive experiences that shape our subjectivity as 
“something more than an addendum to the cognitive” (Thrift, 
2008:6). Attention to the pre-conscious experiences that 
animate our lives provides a much more rich and exhaustive 
understanding of our day-to-day experience: 
 
“What is called consciousness is such a narrow window of 
perception that it could be argued that it could not be 
otherwise. As Donald (2001) makes clear, defined in a 
narrow way, consciousness seems to be a very poor thing 
indeed, a window of time – fifteen seconds at most – in 
which just a few things (normally no more than six or 
seven) can be addressed, which is opaque to 
introspection and which is easily distracted. Indeed, 
consciousness can be depicted as though it hardly existed, 
as an emergent derivative of an unconscious” (Thrift, 
2008:6). 
 
Similar to discussions around affect, taken in large part from 
people like Brian Massumi, NRT attends to the “onflow” of 
human experience that happens prior to cognition and 
representation, described as a “rollng mass of nerve volleys 
[that] prepare the body for action in such a way that intentions 
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and decisions are made before the conscious self is even aware 
of them” (Thrift, 2008:7).  
 
Like those discussing affective labor, Thrift highlights the 
centrality of politics in his analysis of NRT. His task, amongst 
others, is to address how the pre-cognitive is involved in 
adding new political subjectivities to the world, producing new 
forms of being that break with normative politics (Thrift, 
2008:22). On the other hand, he understands that this level of 
experience is simultaneously employed within contemporary 
configurations of power (2008: 22). This is particularly 
relevant in his discussions on the shifts in capitalism towards 
an “age intent on producing various new kinds of captivation 
through the cultivation of atmosphere or presence or touch” 
(2008: 23). Here, in particular, Thrifts analysis of NRT strikes a 
very similar chord with the figures working through affective 
labor.  
Aesthetic Production as Affective Labor 
 
Understanding affective labor and NRT helps to distinguish not 
only its politics and ontology from that of emotional labor, but 
also allows one to view a number of different forms of labor as 
affective. Whereas emotional labor is largely associated with 
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forms of caring labor or service work (even Hardt and Negri 
tend to use affective labor restrictively in relation to service 
work) this understanding of affect has been employed to look 
at forms of cultural and aesthetic production. In Thrift’s 
analysis, for example, he speaks of how this affective level is 
mobilized in what he refers to as ‘vitalist capitalism’ (Thrift, 
2008). For him, the non-cognitive, affective layer of life is 
involved in much of our daily thinking, where thought is 
understood as something quite different than cognitive or 
conscious sense-making. And Within the ‘vitalist’ turn of the 
economy, “capitalism is attempting to use the huge reservoir of 
non-cognitive processes, of forethought, for its own industrial 
ends” (2008 :36). The body and its pre-cognitive relations are 
now becoming harnessed by capitalism to produce novel 
commodities. In Thrifts words, “persons are to be trained to 
‘unthinkingly’ conjure up more and better things, both at work 
and as consumers, by drawing on a certain kind of neuro-
aesthetic which works on the myriad small periods of time that 
are relevant to the structure of forethought and the ways that 
human bodies routinely mobilize them to obtain results” 
(2008:37). Workers and managers alike are encouraged “to 
pay much more attention to affect” as an integral process to 
creativity and innovation within the market (2008:37). 
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It is these latter interjections into affect that help to situate 
cultural labor as occupations that depend on the circulation 
and production of affects within the broader social factory. 
Like Thrift’s discussions, we can see how cultural labor 
depends upon the non-cognitive or pre-cognitive aesthetic 
dimensions that animate our lives. Cultural labor can be seen 
as a part of a larger movement in capital bent on commodifying 
the affectual dimensions of the broader urban environment. 
Secondly, Thrift and other affective scholars help to situate 
affect as the substrate out of which creativity takes place. This 
generally correlates with what we witness with design 
workers. The affectual is integral in the ability of affects to 
spawn novel ideas that are critical for the ongoing production 
of new commodities. As designers told me, it was the ineffable 
quality of objects, art, and environments that sustained their 
work. Without affective productions, the work of design would 
fall into creative entropy. 
 
Not only is the affective level of experience a valuable resource 
for producing commodities and ideas in Thrift’s analysis, but 
the affective characteristics of the commodity itself have 
become integral; affect is what is produced. Consumption is an 
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affective experience and as such commodities are increasingly 
designed in ways to heighten the pre/nonconscious draw and 
experience of the commodity. Designers, for instance, are more 
likely to be involved in understanding how to create and 
market commodities that work on the affective level where 
“commodities are thought of as interfaces that can be actively 
engineered across a series of sensory registers in order to 
produce positive affective responses in consumers” (Thrift, 
2008:39). Elsewhere, Thrift writes that “[economies] must 
generate or scoop up affects and then aggregate and amplify 
them in order to produce value, and that must involve 
producing various mechanisms of fascination” (Thrift, 2010: 
290). Thus, for thrift, the current economy is one in which this 
new “intangible value” comes to the fore as an integral part of 
turning a profit (Thrift, 2010: 290). 
 
It is no surprise, then, that for Thrift one of the examples in 
which we are able to witness this affective economy most 
abruptly is within the field of aesthetic production. In his 
conceptualization, aesthetics is not to be confused with a sort 
of secondary facet of experience, a luxury that is an added 
bonus to our lives, but as a key component of life. And whereas 
some forms of entertainment “require cognitive engagement 
 158
with narrative, word play, or complex, intellectual allusion” 
(Postrel, 2003:6 cited in Thrift, 2010), aesthetics for him is 
fundamentally an “afffecctive force that is active, intelligible 
and has a genuine efficacy: it is both moved and moving” 
(Thrift, 2010: 292). The ‘allure’ or magical quality that 
aesthetic objects or people have over us is another way to 
describe this quality, a quality that is only partially perceived 
(Thrift, 2010: 293). Better yet, Thrift claims this can be 
understood in terms of “style” and even more particularly in 
the type of style that is “glamour” (Thrift, 2010: 297). It is on 
this level that capitalism increasingly works to entice 
consumers and enchant them with this spell like quality.  
 
Building on discussions of affective labor, Wissenger (2015), 
whose work has already discussed, similarly finds affect useful 
for understanding the ‘the making of glamour’ in modeling. 
Where Thrift prefers to discuss glamour in relation to “style”, 
Wissenger relates the affective level of production with “the 
look” cultivated by models, where “the look” is understood as 
“an ineffable quality”, or “a magical quality that the old 
fashioned notion of ‘charisma or ‘charm’ goes some way to 
capturing” (Wissenger, 2015: 11). The look, of course, is 
produced in the capitalist market within modeling, as a means 
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to capture the attention of would be consumers of any number 
of commodities they are charged with selling.  
 
It is only when one understands this broader concern of affect 
with the non-cognitive, pre-conscious energetic level of 
experience that we are able to see how the notion of affective 
labor has the potential to speak about certain forms of 
aesthetic or cultural production that are largely absent from 
earlier feminist concerns for women's domestic work, 
emotional labor theory, and even earlier inflections of affective 
labor by Hardt and Negri. Affect takes on a particularly 
aesthetic context that helps to position the design work I sopke 
about earlier as affective, as drawing upon affects that are 
integral to producing new creative aesthetics.  
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have attempted to bring out some of the 
fundamentals of what has become understood as affective 
labor. I started by charting some of the theoretical foundations 
of the term, looking at the some of the early descriptions of it 
by Hardt and Negri, and situating their analysis alongside 
earlier discussions of housework by socialist feminists and 
Arlie Hochschild’s emotional labor theory. I have uncovered 
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some of the similarities of affective labor with this earlier 
literature and highlighted many resonances that question its 
relative specificity to these theoretical bodies. After this, I have 
sought to address where and why affective labor goes beyond 
earlier tendencies to mark out the term as divergent and 
specific from these earlier critiques of labor. Here, I returned to 
the work of Hardt and Negri specifically to show how the term 
interfaces with their notion of ‘biopolitical production’, 
emphasizing the political stature of affect within their work. 
Moving beyond Hardt and Negri’s analysis of the term, I then 
reviewed some contemporary literature on affective labor and 
‘the affective economy’ that offers a much more detailed and 
robust ontology of affect that further clarifies affective labors 
relationship to emotional labor, but also moves the concept of 
affective labor beyond Hardt and Negri’s conceptualization. 
Here I have sought to demonstrate how the concept of affective 
labor has become useful for understanding forms of aesthetic 
production, particularly graphic design labor introduced 
before.  
Through charting the concept of affective labor, I hope to begin 
to illustrate how the term interfaces with previous discussions 
on the social factory by autonomist writers. Throughout 
following sections, I will seek to make this connection stronger, 
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showing how it is an affective milieu that forms the basin of 
immaterial labor, which is in many ways non-representative 
and more intensive than signifying. The basic understanding of 
affective labor offered in this chapter, then, will form a basis 
for the discussions that will unfold in the following chapters. 
Certain parts of this discussion will be expanded upon, some 
will be found useful, and others will be problematized. In the 
next chapter I wish to concentrate more specifically on affect 
itself and how the term has developed in cultural theory 
beyond the discussions of affective labor. Specifically, I will 
offer an understanding of affect according to Deleuze and 
Guattari and many of their contemporaries who build upon 
and transform their understanding of the term. This will be 
necessary for providing my own interpretation of the concept, 
which will be integral to understand in section three.  
Part 2, Section 2: Towards a Deleuzoguattarian 
Understanding of Affect 
 
In the previous section I laid out a general overview of 
literature that ties labor and capital on one hand to discussions 
of affect and affectivity on the other. The purpose of that 
section was to identify what ‘affective labor’ has come to mean, 
and to understand the convergences and divergences it has 
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with other fields of thought, such as socialist feminist 
understandings of housework, the concept of emotional labor, 
and Foucauldian understandings of biopolitics. Through this 
exercise, I tried to arrive at the particularity of affective labor; 
some of the novelties this concept holds for discussing work 
within the contemporary moment, but also, more than this, an 
understanding of affective labor that opens the term up to a 
use within the more aesthetic fields of work, such as graphic 
design.  
 
In this section I want to bracket out the discussion of labor for 
a moment and hone in on the concept of affect from the 
perspective of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. While there 
are obvious influences of Deleuze and Guattari’s theory--and 
indeed even their interpretation of affect--in many of the 
discussions of affective labor discussed thus far, it is useful to 
interrogate their conceptualization of affect more directly in 
order to tease out some of the nuances that the term holds 
beyond the discussions of affective labor. This process will help 
to clarify and expand many of the insights initially introduced 
in the previous chapter, providing a more thorough ontology of 
affect, and will also lay the groundwork for later chapters when 
I will reconnect Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of affect with 
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their broader critique of power, politics, and capitalism. For 
what seems to me to be a crucial absence in the literature on 
affective labor is a thorough understanding of how Deleuze and 
Guattari themselves offer a way to understand the connection 
of affect to capitalist production. And in order for to map out 
my contribution to the affective labor debate, a 
Deleuzoguatarian perspective, I will first need to provide a 
certain operationalization of the term according to Deleuze and 
Guattari. 
 
This section will first attempt to briefly lay out the 
development of the term in their thought from the years prior 
to Deleuze and Guattari’s acquaintance, up through their later 
joint publications, such as Anti-Oedipus (AO), and A Thousand 
Plateaus (ATP). I will begin by situating Deleuze and Guattari’s 
theory in relation to certain figures in psychoanalytic and 
philisophical theory, particularly Lacan, Spinoza and 
Simondon. This is crucially useful in this context for a couple of 
reasons. First, as I will demonstrate, Deleuze and Guattari’s 
thinking, particularly in works like Anti-Oedipus, are a direct 
confrontation with some of the predominant philosophical 
views that form the foundation of, and continue to animate, 
psychoanalytic discourse. In this regard, it helps to understand 
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how affect is in some ways developed as a way to overcome 
some of the critiques waged against specific assumptions 
bound up in certain branches of psychoanalytic thought. On the 
other hand, the foundations of affect for them is heavily 
indebted to figures like Spinoza and Simondon, who prove very 
useful to Deleuze and Guattari in offering an alternative to 
some of the ideas they find problematic in the work of Freud 
and Lacan, for instance.  
 
Before going further, a preliminary note on Deleuze and 
Guattari’s method is useful in order to better approach their 
concept of affect in relation to some of the figures mentioned 
above. One should understand that Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concepts are not born out of some sort of dialectical negativity. 
While what they arrive at in their philosophy is in many ways 
opposed to certain threads of thought, such as some 
psychoanalytic theories of the unconscious and desire, 
opposition is not what propels them. Deleuze and Guattari’s 
method, instead, is one of what Deleuze refers to as ‘buggery’: 
“taking an author from behind and giving him a child that 
would be his own offspring, yet monstrous” (N: 6). Affect for 
Deleuze and Guattari, to be sure, is born out of a certain 
buggery of Spinoza, but also to more minor figures, like 
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Bergson and Simondon. Here I will present some of those lines 
that connect Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of affect its 
proverbial forefathers. It must be said, however, that as 
important as it is to identify those who Deleuze and Guattari 
buggered in order to understand affect, it is equally important 
to note that what they create in the concept of affect is 
somewhat monstrous. In other words, while there are definite 
similarities between Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of 
affect and the foundational figures they use to develop the 
term, there is some ‘slippage’ and shifts in meaning when 
comparing their usage of the term to those who initially 
inspired it. As Deleuze comments, in regard to their method of 
buggering influences in his work, “It was really important for 
the child to be his own child, because the author had to actually 
say all that I had him saying. But the child was bound to be 
monstrous too, because it resulted from all sorts of shifting, 
slipping, dislocations, and hidden emissions…” (N: 6).  Viewed 
in this light, affect for Deleuze and Guattari is not simply an 
outright adoption of the ways in which Spinoza discussed the 
term, for example. Through Deleuze and Guattari’s theoretical 
gestation, the term takes on different meanings, particularly as 
it is used in conjunction with their other concepts, and with the 
different subjects that inform their thinking. Furthermore, as 
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Massumi explains, while “ [i]t is Gilles Deleuze who reopened 
the path to these authors [figures like Spinoza and Bergson]”, 
“nowhere does he patch them directly into each other” 
(Massumi, 2002: 32). It is for this reason that much of this 
chapter will be laying out the connections between Deleuze 
and Guattari’s definition of affect and these influential figures 
that is not explicit their own work. This will involve a return to 
some of the foundational figures for Deleuze and Guattari’s 
theory of affect in order to provide a more complete picture of 
its ontology.  
 
Finally, a further component of this section will be to layer in a 
number of resonances that Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of 
affect has with some of the more contemporary literature 
associated with what has been dubbed “the affective turn” 
(Clough and Halley, 2007). This is literature that has been 
generally conceived as a move towards more a more non-
representational and non-conscious understanding of cultural 
and subjective production. What certain the authors associated 
with this shift do, namely Brian Massumi, is to help define 
affect beyond the brief references provided in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s, connecting it with the latters broader ontology. It’s 
important to understand that while affect is an important 
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concept to Deleuze and Guattari, it is merely one amongst 
many that all tend to reinforce their wider contributions to a 
non-representational philosophy. These later authors help to 
make these reinforcing connections explicit. As I will try to 
illustrate in this chapter, and as some associated with the 
affective turn have shown, affect animates and runs through 
much of Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking, even where the term 
itself is absent. Inversely, one could also say that affect, 
particularly in its more contemporary usage, is a kind of 
shorthand for an entire way of thinking about the production 
of subjectivity in Deleuze and Guattari’s theory. While the 
literature I will bring in here borrows from Deleuze and 
Guattari, it also participates in its own buggery of sorts, 
creating a definition of affect that is anchored in their thought, 
but also bleeds off in different directions.  
 
In providing this Deleuzian understanding of affect, I hope to 
hone in on a couple dimensions of affect that are important for 
the following sections, but also refer back to the previous ones. 
One is an understanding of affect that separates it from 
versions that tend to use the term interchangeably with 
emotion. Here I want to mark out an ontological difference 
between emotion, and affect.  Secondly, and connected to the 
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first point, I want to elicit a version of affect that positions it 
within the wider process of subjective production. The 
importance of affect for Deleuze and Guattari and others who 
further develop their thought, is in its ability to produce new 
forms of becoming, but make it clear that affect operates on a 
level that is prior to the subjective formations that are the 
result of such productions. Third, connecting both the two 
previous points, I hope to highlight an understanding of affect 
tied particularly to aesthetic production or poesis. This is 
particularly important for later chapters where affect is 
employed to speak specifically on forms of aesthetic 
production within capitalism.  
When Deleuze and Guattari Met 
 
What we call idealism in psychoanalysis is a whole system of 
projections, of reductions, in analytical theory and practice: the 
reduction of desiring production to a system of so-called 
unconscious representations, and to corresponding forms of 
causation or explanation… (N: 17) 
 
When Deleuze and Guattari met one another in June 1969, the 
two had been occupying somewhat different professional and 
intellectual worlds. Guattari had been working for several 
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years under the tutelage of Jacque Lacan, a figurehead of the 
French psychoanalytic scene, and came from a primarily 
clinical background. He was just starting to get his intellectual 
life off the ground, was not well published and struggled to find 
a voice outside of the shadow of his mentor. Deleuze, on the 
other hand, was quite a well-established philosopher within 
intellectual scene in France, having published a number of 
successful works that offered novel readings of major 
continental philosophers. Despite these differences in status 
and disciplinary affiliation--the latter being a boundary that 
they would repeatedly disrupt throughout their joint works--
the two shared a certain disdain for established politics and 
theory of the time. Knowing what each of them was 
individually working on at the time they met, and having the 
privilege of looking back on what they would come together to 
write, one could say that the following were apparent points of 
resonance, among others, that would help explain the 
magnetism towards one another: (1) a shared interest in the 
unconscious and desire as integral aspects in the formation of 
subjectivity, and (2) a certain contempt for psychoanalytical 
and structuralist tendencies that placed linguistics and 
meaning at the center of social analyses and subjectivity. Both 
Deleuze and Guattari had a shared interest in the unconscious, 
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but wished to rid it of the structurizing and linguistic principles 
that were bestowed upon it by contemporary psychoanalytic 
theory, putting forth a theory of subjectivity propelled by 
unconscious productions, not representations. 
 
In the latter part of the 1960s, Guattari’s relationship with his 
mentor, Lacan, had begun to deteriorate as he found himself 
increasingly critical of his teachers’ views. Guattari was 
convinced of the importance of the unconscious, but was 
critical of the primary view of it developed by Freud and 
filtered through Lacan and his disciples. The increasing gulf 
between Guattari and Lacan grew apparent in his 
renouncement of the latters ‘Oedipal triangulation and the 
reductiveness in his thesis on the signifier’ (cited in Dosse, 
2010: 3). For Guattari, Lacan’s insistence on the unconscious 
being structured ‘like a language’ became the antithesis of 
what he saw as a generating, creative capacity of the 
unconscious, one that was non-representative and 
unstructured. In the same year as his first meeting with 
Deleuze, Guattari published the article, ‘Machine and 
Structure’, arguing that Lacan ‘linguistifies, diachronoizes, and 
destroys the unconscious’ (1969/1984). Against this signifying, 
structured view of the unconscious, Guattari proposed a model 
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of a ‘machinic unconscious’, which is not located within the 
subject, but alongside it, exterior to it. The machinic 
unconscious is a disrupter, scrambling signs, in order to create 
new territories (Guattari, 1969/1984: 113); it is revolutionary, 
productive, and as Guattari insists we ‘should make sure that it 
is fortified against any attempt to “structuralize” that potential‘ 
(Guattari, 1969/1984: 119).   
 
Along similar lines, one can identify a certain variation of 
Guattari’s thinking simultaneously being worked through by 
Deleuze prior to their acquaintance. Where Guattari’s interests 
and concerns primarily laid within field of clinical 
psychoanalysis, Deleuze makes a similar case through 
philosophical explication, particularly in his analysis of Baruch 
Spinoza in his book dedicated to the thinker. Like Guattari and 
those engaging with psychoanalysis at the time, the 
unconscious, or at least some version of it, was critically 
important for Deleuze in understanding subjectivity. Indeed, 
what made Spinoza so important and controversial for Deleuze 
was precisely the former's rejection of the primacy of 
consciousness that had long been held central in philosophy 
(Deleuze, 1988: 17). In his reading of Spinoza, Deleuze 
emphasized the his conception of ‘parallelism’ that seeks to 
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highlight what he considered the shadows of philosophical 
inquiry: ‘what a body can do’. For Deleuze, Spinoza’s major 
breakthrough was in attending to the body, its affects and his 
discovery that “the body surpasses the knowledge that we 
have of it, and thought likewise surpasses the consciousness 
we have of it” (Deleuze, 1988: 18). This development allowed 
Spinoza to question the predominant image of mind over body 
found in most philosophy of his time. It was no longer a 
question of consciousness being the ultimate bearer of 
knowledge and propeller of action, but that the body itself 
contains knowledge that in many ways precedes and surpasses 
consciousness. Because of this, Deleuze credits Spinoza with “a 
discovery of the unconscious, of an unconscious of thought” 
(1988: 19). 
 
In Spinoza’s view, consciousness only registers effects, not 
causes. And in Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza, 
consciousness is merely a residue of interactions between 
bodies and their affective interaction. As Deleuze comments, 
“we are only conscious of the effect of external bodies on our 
own, ideas of affections (Deleuze, 1988: 59, emphasis mine). 
Consciousness becomes, in Deleuze’s interpretation, secondary 
and reactive to an unconscious level of interaction animated by 
 173
affects and central to subjective production. I will come back to 
these ideas, and the notion of affect later, but for now I will 
define affect as the process through which a body, in meeting 
another body, goes through changes—changes ‘by which the 
body’s power of acting is increased or decreased, aided or 
restrained…’ (Spinoza, cited in Deleuze, 1988: 49). 
 
It is obvious here that Deleuze finds Spinoza’s identification of 
the unconscious an important one, but that alone is not 
necessarily the only dramatic breakthrough. What is important 
for Spinoza’s version of the unconscious for Deleuze was that, 
unlike the psychoanalytic understandings from Freud on, it is 
both unrepresentative and active. The unconscious for Spinoza 
is engaged in thinking, doing, producing. In this way we might 
say that what is important for Deleuze is Spinoza’s 
identification of what Guattari, commenting during the same 
period, called the ‘machinic unconscious’. Furthermore, what is 
just as important for Deleuze in his reading of Spinoza, which 
further underlines the similarities between Deleuze and 
Guattari’s respective concerns, is that this unconscious also 
precedes or escapes representation. The unconscious realm for 
Spinoza was one in which affects between bodies circulate that 
are ‘not indicative or representative’ (1988: 49). 
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In both Deleuze and Guattari’s solo works prior to their 
relationship we can see the beginnings of what will become a 
long engagement with an exploration of the unconscious that 
involves a movement beyond the boundaries of both 
structuralism and psychoanalysis of the time. And while such 
ideas might seem subtle and underdeveloped during this 
period, by the publication of their first joint work, Anti-Oedipus, 
their critiques and delineations from the status quo became 
anything but. Anti-Oedipus emerges as a battle cry against 
what the two saw as “the tyrannical, terrorizing, castrating 
character of the signifier”, and psychoanalysis as “a whole 
system of projections, reductions” that limit the unconscious to 
“representations and the corresponding forms of causation and 
expression or explanation” (Deleuze and Guattari, N: 17,21). 
The great violence done to the unconscious since its discovery, 
according to Deleuze and Guattari, was to assume that it can be 
read like a great theatrical display of oedipal desire. They 
viewed this mistake as a product of the grand assumption that 
to enter the unconscious in a critical way is to be dominated 
and bounded by the signifier, leading one to search for 
meaning. In contrast, Anti-Oedipus argues, “The unconscious 
doesn’t mean anything…” (N: 22). As the famous adage from 
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Anti-Oedipus goes, “the unconscious is not a theatre, but a 
factory”, underlining their view of an unconscious that is 
machinic and productive. Deleuze and Guattari replace the 
search for representation, meaning and signs with a concern 
for how things work, how things get produced, “with [their] 
intensities, flows, processes, partial objects--none of which 
mean anything” (N: 22). 
 
In a different way, one might say that what Deleuze and 
Guattari are arguing, which becomes more apparent in their 
latter works that are less preoccupied with countering 
psychoanalytic theory, is that the unconscious is engaged in the 
production of subjectivities. And within that process it is not 
language and representation that form the basis of this 
productive unconscious. As Guattari would later remark: 
“What the structuralists say isn’t true; it isn’t the facts of 
language or even communication that generate subjectivity” 
(Guattari, cited in Lazzarato, 2014: 56). Instead, subjectivity, at 
least in part, is generated on a level that exceeds 
representation, signification and language, in an intensive layer 
constantly escaping these boundaries. Subjectivity, being 
produced in the unconscious, is  “collectively manufactured in 
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the same way as energy, electricity, or aluminum”, as Guattari 
would later argue (2014: 56). 
 
In Anti-Oedipus this non-representative layer of subjective 
formation  is designated using the psychoanalytic concept of 
desire. Desire is that which animates all of human behavior 
within the depths of the unconscious, but in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s usage, it does not lack any object as it is understood 
to in many of the existing psychoanalytic fields (AO: 25-26). It 
is productive, spilling out in all directions, breaking open new 
pathways. This is one of the reasons why Deleuze and Guattari 
prefer to model their version of the unconscious after the 
schizophrenic, rather than the neurotic (AO: 2). The 
schizophrenic scrambles meaning, escapes signification, 
producing partial objects as opposed to the neurotic who tries 
to overcode everything under the dominance of the signifier, 
and give everything meaning. Deleuze and Guattari are 
interested in how unconscious desires in specific assemblages 
produce “lines of flight, lines of absolute decoding” that escape 
from meaning and signification (Deleuze and Guattari, AO: 22). 
They become enveloped in a quest that seeks out these 
ruptures of desire that escape linguistic coding in the fields of 
film and literature, for example: “What we look for in a book is 
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the way it transmits something that resists coding…” (N: 22). 
Thus, what is important in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
understanding of desire is that it is innovative, producing, and 
also non-representative. 
From desire to affect 
 
Years after the publication of Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and 
Guattari continued to work together in publishing a number of 
significant  works, most notably A Thousand Plateaus (ATP). 
One of the most marked shifts in their latter works when 
comparing it to AO is that ‘desire’ as a concept figures much 
less prominently. It’s not that desire disappears altogether, but 
that it is used much more sparingly and no longer forms the 
central thrust of their argument; desire becomes but one term 
amongst many others that they use in their philosophical work. 
There are a number of reasons why this could be, the most 
obvious being that latter works like ATP served a different 
purpose than AO: they are no longer primarily driven by the 
critique of oedipal desire apparent in the latter, which, as a 
result, may have drifted their thinking away from 
psychoanalytic concerns. As the emphasis in ATP shifted away 
from an oedipal critique, different terms without a connection 
to the oedipal critique come into focus. It might also be 
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possible that AO was not quite radical enough in ridding 
philosophy of the problematics bound up in psychoanalytic 
terms, and as such they wanted to distance themselves from 
the term desire all together. As Foucault would say to Deleuze 
in private, “I can’t stand the word desire; even if you use it 
differently, I can’t stop myself from thinking or experiencing 
the fact that desire = lack, or that desire is repressed” (Deleuze, 
2007: 130). It’s possible such an exchange had an impact on 
Deleuze, who would then go on to develop an alternative way 
of approaching some of the fundamental philosophical ideas 
enshrined in his critique of psychoanalysis.  
 
Despite the shift away from desire as a central concern, 
whatever reason that may be, there are a number of 
similarities and continuities between Deleuze and Guattari’s 
latter works and AO. While the rhetorical devices and objects 
of discussion in some ways change, many of the core ideas 
contained in  AO--and indeed their independent work prior to 
AO--live on. Interests with the non-representational and 
unconscious that were bound up in psychoanalytic term of 
desire in AO show themselves again in a different lexicon; the 
diminishing importance of the term desire, for instance, is 
replaced by a multitude of other terms with their foundation in 
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art, literature, geology, science, etc.. One of the terms that gains 
prominence in Deleuze and Guattari’s latter works following 
AO is the concept of affect that Deleuze initially focused on in 
his work on Spinoza years earlier. It is a concept that seems to 
in some ways substitute, or at least supplement, their concept 
of desire in accounting for the ineffable, intensive, and non-
representative level of experience and subjective formation 
found in AO. Indeed, Deleuze would even go as far to say desire 
is “an affect […]” (2007: 130). 
 
In the following section I wish to focus more specifically on this 
concept of affect and unpack many of the nuances that the term 
holds for Deleuze and Guattari. While the concept crops up 
quite frequently within the two’s work, pinning down a 
definition and adequate understanding of the term requires a 
lot more work than simply lifting a definition out of their text. 
Like much of Deleuze and Guattari’s work, it requires one to 
connect the term with their much larger philosophical project, 
demanding further references to a number of other 
Deleuzoguattarian concepts such as the event, becoming, the 
virtual, haecceity, and individuation. Additionally, the concept 
of affect establishes resonances with further foundational 
figures like Bergson and Gilbert Simondon, whose injection 
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bastardizes and complicates its original Spinozan foundations 
introduced above. These figures, too, will be necessary to 
introduce in order to understand Deleuze and Guattari’s usage 
of affect. Finally, while I will be eliciting some help from the 
figures that were influential to Deleuze and Guattari’s project, I 
will also reference contemporary figures of affect theory that 
develop Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of affect beyond their 
analyses.  These figures, particularly Brian Massumi, will help 
to ‘connect the dots’ of Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of affect, 
so to speak, and will also help tie their theory of affect to their 
wider ontological argument.  
Affect as Non-Conscious and Non-representative 
 
“What we’re interested in, you see, are modes of individuation 
beyond those of things, persons, or subjects: the individuation, 
say, of a time of day, of a region, a climate, a river or a wind, of 
an event” (N: 26) 
 
As I have tried to elicit so far, in respect to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s understanding of desire and the unconscious, two 
major themes animate Deleuze and Guattari’s work: the 
critique of signification/representation and critique of 
consciousness. It’s not that they deny either of these 
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phenomenon’s existence, or even their importance, but that 
philosophical inquiry fixed to these poles cannot fully account 
for how subjectivity is produced. As I will try to explain in this 
section, for Deleuze and Guattari, an understanding of 
subjective formation and creativity must open up to an 
alternative plane of productivity operating quite separate than 
that of representation and consciousness. As I will further here, 
subjectivation, or the production of subjectivity, is not 
understood by starting with the conscious subject, 
significations and representations for Deleuze and Guattari, 
but rather through identifying the virtual that is fundamental 
to the production the subject, subjectivity and representations 
in a process of individuation. This level--prior to and 
quintessential to the individuation or subjectivation of 
individuals, which produces subjects and object but is neither 
subject or object--is where Deleuze and Guattari identify affect.  
 
The critique of representation and consciousness for Deleuze 
and Guattari is manifest in varying ways throughout their work 
beyond the psychoanalytic commentary previously discussed. 
It is apparent in Deleuze’s earliest works, such as Difference 
and Repetition, where he introduces the notion of “difference in 
itself” as a basis for his ontology of creativity and the related 
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attack on variants of philosophy that produce a predominant 
“image of thought”. In terms of politics, it is obvious in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s disdain for what might be understood as 
representational politics, and their alternative identification of 
‘micropolitcs’ that exists outside of the field of representation. 
It is apparent, too, in Deleuze and Guattari’s affinity for 
revolutionary ‘minorities’ that arise in both politics and art. 
Minor literature, for instance, is literature that escapes 
representation and signification, scrambling meaning and 
language, identified by Deleuze and Guattari particularly in 
Kafka’s work. Crucially, for my discussion here, the critique of 
representation and consciousness is also embedded within 
their concept of affect.  
 
Deleuze succinctly comments in one of his lectures that “every 
mode of thought insofar as it is non-representational will be 
termed affect” (Deleuze, 1997c: 1, cited in Seigworth, 2011: 
161). Indeed, throughout Deleuze and Guattari’s work, one 
could understand affect, on one level, as a conceptual gesturing 
towards a sort of fickle, non-representative quality that 
escapes linguistic signification. It is often associated with what 
they describe as a haecceity, a word derived from Duns 
Scotus’s haecceitas, roughly translatable to ‘thisness’ in English. 
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It is a type of spatial and temporal singularity “different than 
that of a person, thing or substance” (ATP: 287). Affective 
haecceities are more elusive than subjectivities, and non-
ascribable to a definite sign, or individual. They are, as Deleuze 
and Guattari caution, “not to be confused either with an 
intelligible, formal essetiality or a sensible, formed and 
perceived, thing hood” (ATP: 450). Instead, they are “vague 
essences” or assemblages that “cease to be subjects to become 
events… inseparable from an hour, a season, an atmosphere, an 
air, a life” (ATP: 289).  
 
These affective ‘essences’ should not be understood in the 
Platonic sense, however. Essence for Deleuze and Guattari is, 
as Brian Massumi explains, “always of an encounter; it is an 
event…” (Massumi,1992: 18). This conceptualization of affects 
as an event underlines an important aspect to their character 
for Deleuze and Guattari. Unlike a formed object or subject, 
haecceities and affects belong to a different plane of 
proliferation prior to their formation into objects and subjects. 
Affects are bound up in a process of becoming that 
is  autonomous of things and subjects, but do “direct the 
metamorphosis of things and subjects” (ATP: 288). In this 
sense we could say affects are connected to a process of 
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individuation that is implicated in the production of 
individuality in both humans and objects, things, but do not 
amount to the same thing.  In order to more fully understand 
what I mean by this, to demonstrate how affect relates to this 
process of becoming and individuation, it is useful to 
interrogate the roots of individuation for Deleuze and Guattari 
which undoubtedly starts in the work of Gilbert Simondon. 
Through introducing Simondon’s concept of individuation, and 
the related term of ‘preindividuality’, we can begin to develop 
how Deleuze and Guattari’s own conception of affect relates to 
creativity and subjectivation.  
 
Here we can see how Deleuze’s understanding of affect and 
haecceity begins to link up with the descriptions offered from 
designers in section two. If one remembers, designers spoke 
about the certain objects and aesthetics in a muddled, fickle 
manner that pointed not to particular consciously reflected 
traits, but in terms of the atmosphere and mood. They had a 
hard time putting into words exactly what the “it” value that 
they derived was; the material that designers draw upon was 
not concrete, linguistically definable and knowable, but rather 
something transitive and elusive, yet impactful and moving. 
The material they required, as Deleuze and Massumi would 
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describe, was “an event”, which transpires and emerges, but 
which is not the same thing as a formed object or subject. 
Moreover, the affects designers spoke of are generative--they 
are absolutely critical in their own ability to create something. 
The affective power designers harness, as Deleuze and Guattari 
would say, “direct the metamorphosis of things and subjects”, 
but they are in quality neither of those things.  
Affect, the Pre-individual and Individuation 
 
Individuation, or the process through which the individual, 
object, subject, or thing is produced, is a concept that Deleuze 
and Guattari partially adopt from Gilbert Simondon. Writing at 
a time that is very close to Deleuze and Guattari’s own project, 
Simondon developed a definition individuation that begins 
with a critique of two separate ways of thinking about the 
constitution of the individual that has dominated most of 
continental philosophy: First is the “substantialist viewpoint, 
which conceives of the unity of living being as its essence, a 
unity it has provided for itself, is based on itself and is created 
by itself” (Simondon, 1992: 297); and second, the 
“hylomorphic” account, which sees the constitution of the 
individual as a product of “the conjunction of a form and some 
matter” (1992: 297). What connects these two separate 
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understandings, and what makes them problematic for 
Simondon and Deleuze and Guattari, is that they start with the 
assumption of an already stable individual, and “are then led to 
try to recreate the conditions that have made its existence 
possible” (1992: 297). What Simondon argues for is somewhat 
of a reversal of this process (Simondon, 2009: 5); to 
“understand the individual from the perspective of the process of 
individuation rather than the process of individuation by means 
of the individual” (Simondon, 1992: 300). In this way, to put it 
in Muriel Combes terms, “the individual is [...] neither the 
source nor the term of inquiry but merely the result of an 
operation of individuation” (Combes, 2013: 2).  
 
To start as Simondon does with the claim that the individual is 
a consequence of a process of individuation, rather than its 
basis, prompts a repositioning of individuality as but only one 
part within the larger process of the production of being 
(Simondon, 1992: 87; Combes, 2013: 2). As Deleuze would 
highlight in his own review of Simondon’s work, for Simondon 
“individuation is no longer coextensive with being; it [...] 
represent[s] a moment, which is neither all of being nor its first 
moment” (Deleuze, 2004: 86). What precedes this moment of 
individuality is “the preindividual”, or “preindividual being”. 
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The preindividual is a ‘millieu’ out of which individuation 
occurs, which “contains latent potentials and harbors a sort of 
incompatibility with itself” (Simondon, 1992: 87; see also 
Simondon, 2009: 5). Simondon refers to this domain of 
preindividual being as “metastable” and proliferating with 
“tensions” (Simondon, 2009: 5). Individuation doesn’t arise out 
of stability, which Simondon relates to the substantialist and 
hylomorphic accounts, precisely because stability is a finality, a 
resolution that can no longer develop into something else, can 
no longer result in any new emergence. In short, nothing new 
would come about if being was anchored in stability: 
 
“Individuation has not been able to be adequately thought 
and described because previously only one form of 
equilibrium was know--stable equilibrium… Stable 
equilibrium excludes becoming, because it corresponds to 
the lowest possible level of potential energy; it is the 
equilibrium that is reached in a system when all of the 
possible transformations have been realized and no more 
force exists. All the potentials have been actualized, and 
the system having reached its lowest energy level can no 
longer transform itself” (Simondon, 2009: 6).  
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This understanding of preindinvidual metastability, which 
forms the milieu of which new individuations arise, is what 
Deleuze finds particularly informing within Simondon’s 
account. Deleuze recognizes in the preindividual a way to think 
about singularities against the constitution of individualities 
which are different but dependent on the prior: 
 
“The importance of Simondon's thesis is now apparent. 
By discovering the prior condition of individuation, he 
rigorously distinguishes singularity and individuality. 
Indeed the metastable, defined as pre-individual being, is 
perfectly well endowed with singularities that correspond 
to the existence and the distribution of potentials” 
(Deleuze, 2004: 87). 
 
As Deleuze highlights in respect to Simondon, the condition for 
the individual is a metastable field of singularities, full of 
potential, but distinctly different than the actualization of the 
individual itself. But in order for this potential energy, or 
singularities, to be transformed into an individual--whether 
that be a person, a thing, a subjectivity--it must go through a 
process of individuation proper, a process fundamental to 
actualizing this potential.  According to Simondon, this is done 
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through a sort of ordering or organization of this potential 
(Simondon, 2009: 6,7). Muriel Combes, in her illuminating 
book on the work of Simondon, sums up the process that 
preindividual potential must go through in order to become 
‘actualized’: 
 
“Before all individuation, being can be understood as a 
system containing potential energy. Although this energy 
becomes active within the system, it is called potential 
because it requires a transformation of the system in 
order to be structured, that is, to be actualized in 
accordance to structures” (Combes, 2013: 2). 
 
Thus, for Simondon, the actualization of potential is 
synonymous with a type of structural ordering. But as this 
preindividual reality becomes ordered and actualized into the 
individual, through individuation, it is important to note that, 
for Simondon, the result is never a fully stable or individual 
form. A certain amount of the metastable preindividuality lives 
on within the individual that is both the result of the initial 
individuation process, and also the basis for further 
individuations. As Simondon remarks, “individuation does not 
exhaust all of the preindividual reality, and that regime of 
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metastability is not only maintained by the individual, but 
carried by it, so that the constituted individual transports with 
itself a certain associated charge of preindividual reality, 
animated by all of the potentials that characterize it” 
(Simondon, 2009: 8). Thus, while a certain amount of 
metastability is actualized and oredered, a certain amount of 
the preidinidualtity and potentiality lives on and acts as the 
foundation for further individuations, individuations 
Simondon describes as psychic and collective. These later 
individuations are what constitute more evolved formations 
like subjectivity. And significantly for the understanding of 
affect here, for Simondon, as Jason Read (2014: n.p.) argues, 
“affects are part of the metestable millieu that remains” after 
individuation occurs, and which forms the basis for further 
individuations.  
 
At this point I would like to further reflect on the first two 
sections. I would like to suggest that the preindividual 
described here is akin to what autonomist theorists associated 
with the social factory. In other words, the affective milieu that 
designers draw upon is a preindividal substrate out of which 
their personal or individuated creations arise. Affective 
singularites, circulating throughout the wider society are the 
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raw material for what designers do, inform the creative 
individualities that arise out of these circulations. This 
preindividual, social factory milieu is a fully formed 
individuality, whether that be a personal idea, color, trait, or 
object, but rather a field of potentiality. The creation of the 
individual form comes out of this, in a later process of 
individuation. The important thing to understand here is that 
there are two different levels of production beginning to 
emerge. The first level is this level of the preindividual, which 
is animated by affective propagations, but is not a formed 
object or subject. This initial level leads to a later process, 
individuation, which is the constitution of individualities from 
the affective. This latter section I will associate later with the 
labor process, but for now it is important to begin to recognize 
the analytical differentiation between the two levels described. 
In the act of individuation, or what I will later refer to as a 
“secondary production”, the preindividual is not fully 
individualized, or commodified into an object, as Simondon 
states, but lives on in excess of the particular object.  
Affect, Becoming, and the Virtual 
 
It is apparent, if we now return to the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari more directly, that many of the ideas contained in 
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Simondon’s theory of individuation and its prefigurative level 
of the preindividual are at the very least mirrored in their 
ontology of affect, and more likely a part of its conceptual 
foundation. In ATP, Deleuze and Guattari explicitly reference 
Simondon’s notion of individuation in respect to affect, writing 
“Simondon demonstrates that the hylomorphic model leaves 
many things, active and affective by the wayside” (ATP: 450). 
Obviously impressed by Simondon’s arguments, they further 
his identification of a sort of preindividual with the 
affective:  “to the formed or the formable matter [the 
individuated for Simondon] we must add an entire energetic 
materiality in movement, carrying singularities or 
haecceities…[what would be akin to the preindividual for 
Simondon]” (450).  
 
While references like these to Simondon are sparse within 
their work, Simondon’s ideas do resonate well with a number 
of other concepts found within Deleuze and Guattari’s work. In 
particular, the Bergsonian concept of the virtual for Deleuze 
and Guattari acts as a way that the two similarly mark out a 
field of preindividuality against that of the constituted 
individual or object. The virtual for Deleuze and Guattari is a 
type of event, existsting in a sort of temporal limbo. It is “an 
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already-there that is at the same time not-yet-here, a 
simultaneous too-late and too-early, a something that is both 
going to happen and has just happened” (ATP: 289). French 
social theorist Jean-François Lyotard described Deleuze’s 
understanding of the virtual as “a past located this side of the 
forgotten, much closer to the present moment than any past, at 
the same time that it is incapable of being solicited by voluntary 
and conscious memory--a past Deleuze says that is not past but 
always there” (Lyotard 1990: 12 cited in Seigworth, 2011:163, 
emphasis mine)”. Gregory Seigworth offers the most 
transparent understanding of the virtual and its relationship 
with affect, worth quoting at length: 
 
“[T]he virtual can be understood, in part, as what has 
happened: as subsistent past, in full affective-
accumulation, on this side of forgetting. However, 
crucially, the virtual is also always in contact and actively 
affectively participating with what is happening and 
about to happen contemporaneously [...]: in excess of 
consciousness, an affective-accumulation continually 
press-ing toward its differentiated actualization in the 
future. The virtual is perhaps easiest to consider as what 
transpires in those passing everyday moments that never 
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really present themselves to our conscious minds, 
generally because such moments (in their various 
contexts and variable durations) arrive with insufficient 
force or otherwise descend with an intensity that is 
altogether dispersed or atmospheric. As they slip well 
beneath the thresholds of consciousness, these intensive 
passages of affect [...] are, Lyotard writes, in excess like air 
and earth are in excess of the life of a fish (1990: 12). In 
fact, these low-level gradient changes in the passages of 
intensity are so much in excess that the word moment is 
not entirely adequate. This ongoing process of affective-
accumulation [...] makes up most of our days, as the 
between-moments [...]that come to constitute ‘a life’” 
(Seigworth, 2011: 163).  
 
Here we can begin to see some of the similarities between 
Simondon’s project and Deleuze and Guattari’s. Like 
Simondon’s understanding of the preindividual, the virtual is 
belongs to a plane that is different than that of the formed 
individual subject, but at the same time very much implicated 
in and anticipating its actualization or individuation. And like 
Simondon’s view of the preindividual, while some of these 
virtual affects will become actualized or individuated, a 
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residual amount will remain “in excess” of that individuated 
thing, and will continue to proliferate outside of the field of 
actuality.  
 
Importantly, as Siegworth’s excerpt further illustrates, this 
plane of virtuality that is animated by an affectual unfolding 
(ATP: 283)  below reflection, and prior to subjective and 
material manifestations. This understanding of affect, together 
with the concept of the virtual, underlines the ongoing critique 
of consciousness in accounting for subjectivity and everyday 
life for Deleuze and Guattari. It certainly retains the Spinozan 
foundations of the term that Deleuze found so pervasive earlier 
in his career which called into question the centrality of 
consciousness in human subjectivity, and correlative emphasis 
of mind over body. It serves to highlight how, as Nigel Thrift 
(2008: 6) puts it, “consciousness seems to be a very poor thing 
indeed, a window of time – fifteen seconds at most – in which 
just a few things (normally no more than six or seven) can be 
addressed, which is opaque to introspection and which is 
easily distracted”. And in borrowing and expanding upon 
Spinoza’s ideas on affect, Deleuze and Guattari reiterate his 
understanding that in many ways consciousness is but a 
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restrictive force in comparison to affect, coming secondary to 
the virtual level. 
 
Massumi and the Intensivity of Affect 
 
In order to put together and relate all of the conceptual pieces I 
have thus far laid out under the terminological umbrella of 
affect--haecceities, events, the preindividual, individuation, and 
the virtual--it is useful to turn to Brian Massumi’s seminal work 
on the subject, Parables for the VIrtual: Movement, Affect, 
Sensation (2002). For Massumi, the Deleuzian notion of affect, 
as an event, captures a relationship that is left out of many 
philosophical and sociological approaches that restrictively 
“operate only on the semantic or semiotic level”. As such, affect 
for Massumi is a way to contend many of the theoretical 
appraisals that rely restrictively to the dominance of structure: 
“our entire vocabulary has been derived from theories of 
signification that are still wedded to structure” (2002: 27). The 
affective is novel in that, similar to the way Deleuze lauded 
Simondon’s identification of the preindividual, it directs our 
attention to the unstructured, the unindividuated, 
extralinguistic and non-conscious processes that animate our 
lives. In the affective event, “nothing is prefigured”, “it is a 
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collapse of structured distinction into intensity” (Massumi, 
2002: 27, emphasis mine).  
 
Intensity, for Massumi, is a way in which we might better 
understand affect in relation to a separate but related, 
structured and extensive level of what he calls qualification. 
The intensive layer of experience is “not semantically or 
semiotically ordered”. Echoing the descriptions found in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s corpus, intensity is “where futurity 
combines, unmediated with pastness” (2002: 30). It is a 
prefiguration of things to come: “the pressing crowd of 
incipiencies and tendencies [...], a realm of potential” (2002: 
30). Intensity is where Massumi positions affect. It is a level 
that is consistent not only with Deleuze and Guattari’s virtual, 
but also the domain of preindividuality laid out by Simondon. 
As virtuality, intensities are understood as “[s]omething that 
happens too quickly to have happened” (Massumi, 2002: 30). 
 
As affects circulate within this level of intensity they remain 
outside or below the level of consciousness, but none the less 
leave traces of themselves. The trace of affects “are conserved 
in the brain and in the flesh, but out of mind and body 
understood as qualifiable interiorities” (2002: 30). They are 
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conserved as what political scientist William Connolly (2002: 
25), drawing upon Bergson, refers to as “virtual memories”, 
made up of an “affective energy below the threshold of 
intellectual attention”, but which “shape the color, tone, and 
direction of everyday perception” (Connoly, 2002: 25). 
 
It is at this point we can introduce the separate but connected 
level that works alongside the level of intensity, what Massumi 
refers to as qualification. For Massumi, qualification is another 
way of speaking about the Deleuzian notion of the actual, 
which is the individuated level that emerges out of the 
virtualities.  While the level of intensity is “embodied in purely 
autonomic reactions most directly manifest in the skin” leaving 
behind only traces of themselves, the level of qualification is 
associated with “depth reactions” that are related to “a rise of 
the autonomic into consciousness” (2002: 25). The level of 
qualification is an infolding of the affective event into higher 
forms of volition and reflection. On the plane of qualification, 
the affective event becomes “fixed” in the consciousness of an 
individual, requiring a type of semiotic or semantic ordering, 
an ordering that is defined either “linguistically, logically, 
narratologically, or all of these in combination, as Symbolic” 
(2002: 27).  This is the level where, erroneously, most of social 
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theory restricts itself. And as such, according to Massumi, 
“[w]hat they lose, precisely, is the expression [affective] event--
in favor of structure” (2002: 27).  
 
Thus, we have the two levels of Massumi’s ontology that 
borrows from Deleuze and Guattari: the affective level of 
intensity, comparable to Deleuze and Guattari’s virtual and 
Simondon’s preindividual, which operates outside of linguistic 
qualification and consciousness, but that leaves autonomic 
traces of themselves and which forms the basis of new 
subjective formations; and the level of qualification that is a 
more reactive layer coming ontologically and chronologically 
second to affective proliferation, conceptualized as a linguistic, 
symbolic and conscious fixing of the affectual event. In order to 
better understand the relationship and features of each of 
these two levels, Massumi asks us to consider a couple 
of  examples that point to what he refers to as “the missing 
half-second”. Here Massumi invokes two scientific studies, one 
in which scientist monitored the brain ways of volunteers 
using an electroencephalograph machine (EEG). Participants of 
the study were told to flex their finger at any moment they 
chose while simultaneously registering the precise time of the 
decision using a clock. The results found that “the flexes came 
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0.2 seconds after they clocked the decision, but the EEG 
machine registered significant brain activity 0.3 seconds before 
the decision” (Massumi, 2002: 29). As Massumi highlights, 
speculating about the results of the study, the researcher 
suggested “we may exert free will not by initiating intentions 
but by vetoing, acceding or otherwise responding to them after 
they arise” (2002: 29).  
 
So what is significant about this missing half second--the lapse 
between when a body is stimulated and when consciousness 
registers that stimulation, or the gap between the initiation of 
an event in the body and the conscious response to that 
initiation? Massumi suggests that this space of the half second 
is not empty, but is precisely the point of virtual proliferation, 
laden with potential. It is “overfull, in excess of the actually-
performed action and its ascribed meaning” (2002: 29). And 
further, the missing half-second also proposes that 
consciousness is secondary to this virtual, affective level in that 
it is much more passive in relationship to the latter. What 
comes after the missing half-second--namely, consciousness--
only operates negatively in relation to affectivity: 
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“Will and consciousness are subtratcive. They are 
limitive, derived functions that reduce a complexity too 
rich to be functionally expressed. It should be noted in 
particular that during the mysterious half second, what 
we think of as ‘free,’ ‘higher’ functions, such as volition, 
are apparently being performed by autonomic, bodily 
reactions occuring in the brain but outside of 
consciousness and between the brain and finger but prior 
to action and expression. The formation of a volition is 
necessarily accompanied and aided by cognitive 
functions” (2002: 29).  
 
While Massumi makes use of limited scientific research here to 
demonstrate his thesis, the ideas contained in his theory have 
explicit connections to Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, as 
described earlier, and both of Deleuze’s most important 
theoretical interlocutors, Bergson, Spinoza, and Simondon. As 
Massumi acknowledges, “it is Bergson who stands as a 
philosophical precursor to many of these points: the brain as a 
center of indetermination; consciousness as subtractive and 
inhibitive” (2002: 31). And, to bring the discussions of affect 
here back to the beginning of this chapter, to the critique of 
representation and consciousness in Deleuze’s earlier work, 
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we also find that it is Spinoza’s prefigurative understandings of 
parallelism and affect that provide another foundational pillar 
to Massumi’s explication. Like Deleuze before him, for Massumi 
an event is registered on two parallel planes of existence 
(intensity/qualification, virtual/actual) simultaneously. This 
idea he credits partially to Spinoza’s definition of affect as 
“affection [in other words an impingement upon] the body, and 
at the same time the idea of the affection” (2002: 31). Massumi 
claims that the idea of affection is “not only not conscious but is 
not in the first instance in the ‘mind’” (2002: 31). The idea of an 
affection is thus not a conscious idea or response to being 
affected, but rather a “trace of an encounter, the ‘form’ of an 
encounter, in Spinoza’s terminology (an infolding, or 
contraction…)” (2002: 32). It is only later that this original 
idea, which is non-conscious and autonomic, may become 
conscious: 
 
“In Spinoza, it is only when the idea of the affection is 
doubled by an idea of the idea of affection that it attains 
the level of conscious reflection. Conscious reflection is a 
doubling over of the idea itself…” (2002: 31).  
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It is this doubling movement that Massumi assigns to the field 
of qualification, which comes after the affective level of 
intensity, subsequently situating, ordering and attempting to 
grasp the even that has already transpired.  
 
Massumi’s attention to figures like Spinoza and Bergson in his 
own conception of affect in many ways follows on from the 
implicit work done by Deleuze and Guattari. In Massumi’s own 
words, “it is Gilles Deleuze who reopened the path to these 
authors” (2002: 32). But his indebtedness to Deleuze and 
Guattari does not stop there. For it is Deleuze and Guattari who 
truly give Massumi’s understanding of affect its association 
with productivity and inventiveness, which is no doubt a 
continuation of Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology of becoming. 
As Massumi explains in respect to affect: “it is all a question of 
emergence” (2002: 32). The potential for novelty and 
productiveness is, for Massumi, where the true value of affect 
lies: “the real conditions of emergence, not of the categorical, 
but of the unclassafiable, the unassimiable, the never-yet-felt, 
the felt for less than half a second, again for the first time--the 
new” (2002: 33).  
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The field of emergence, what I have thus far been describing in 
relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology, is a dual process 
that involves both the levels of intensity and qualification, 
virtual and actual, the preindividual and the individuated. As 
Massumi states, “[e]mergence is a two-sided coin: one side in 
the virtual […], the other in the actual” (2002: 35). But while 
we might say emergence requires both of these levels, we 
should also point out that it is affect, and it’s connection to the 
virtual, which is the truly novel point in this relationship of 
emergence. In Massumi’s language, it is the autonomy of affect 
which propels new relations to emerge: 
 
“The autonomy of affect is its participation in the virtual. 
Its autonomy is its openness. Affect is autonomous to the 
degree to which it escapes confinement in the particular 
body whose vitality, or potential for interaction, it is. 
Formed, qualified, situated perceptions and cognitions 
fulfilling functions of actual connection or blockage are 
the capture and closure of affect” (Massumi, 2002: 35). 
 
Affect and its autonomy forms fundamental milieu out of which 
resulting actualities might and do emerge. Put differently, it is 
“out of the pressing crowd [of intensities that] an individual 
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action or expression will emerge and be registered consciously” 
(2002: 30-31).  But once affect is actualized, by way of 
qualification in either language, perception or cognition, the 
affect ceases to be affect and at that point becomes that of a 
different order. Massumi argues that “[e]motion is the most 
intense (most contracted) expression of that capture” (2002: 
35), thus marking out an ontological difference between affect 
and emotion. In this regard, Massumi is very clear: 
 
“An emotion is a subjective content, the sociolinguistic 
fixing of the quality of an experience which is from that 
point onward defined as personal. Emotion is qualified 
intensity, the conventional, consensual point of insertion 
of intensity into semantically and semiotically formed 
progressions, into narrativizable action-reaction circuits, 
into function and meaning. It is intensity owned and 
recognized. It is crucial to theorize the difference between 
affect and emotion” (2002: 28).  
 
Here we have the difference between affect and emotion, as 
laid out by Massumi. Emotion belongs to the level of 
qualification, or the level Deleuze describes in terms of the 
actual. It is always bound up with the subject and their 
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interpretation and ordering an affective event according to 
semiotics and meaning. Emotion comes after an affective event, 
and in many ways limits the complexities of the event into a 
recognizable feeling.  
 
While affect does in some cases become actualized and 
qualified into cognitions, perceptions or emotions associated 
with the subject and their actualization, affect is never fully 
qualified. The autonomy of affect is the “something” that 
always “remains unactualized” (2002: 35). It is this escape--the 
autonomy of affect in regards to qualification or actualization--
that ensures new productions will go on. In Massumi’s words, 
“[i]f there was no escape, no excess or remainder, no fade-out 
to infinity, the universe would be without potential, pure 
entropy, death” (2002: 35). Within this declaration are obvious 
resonations with the relationship between the preindividual 
and individuation previously described with regards to 
Simondon. In both accounts, affect is never fully realized and 
understood, and a residual remainder always lives on, which 
insures that future emergences will unfold. 
 
These last lessons brought out by Massumi will help direct the 
section that follows. Following Massumi’s analytic distinction 
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between the level of intensity and qualification, I hope to 
situate the production process of graphic design as an 
occupation that depends on both the production of affect, 
occuring at the level of what autonomists describe as the social 
factory, and the level of qualification, which I wish to associate 
with the defined labor process of graphic design. This later 
process of qualification is at this point admittedly vague, but it 
will hopefully become more clear as we move along. The 
important thing to note now is how Deleuze, Guattari, 
Simondon, and Massumi each lay out this distinction in 
different ways.  
Conclusion: Towards an Affectual Politics of Work 
 
In this chapter I have sought to lay out the operational 
understanding of affect that will be invoked and built upon 
throughout the remainder of this thesis. The purpose of this 
exercise was to lay out a conception of affect that underlines its 
association with the imperceptible, the unconscious or non-
conscious, and the non-linguistic. Through this section I have 
tried to show the specificity of a Deleuzoguattarian 
understanding affect in relation to others which codify the 
term within psychoanalytic appraisals or those which use the 
term somewhat interchangeably with the ontologically 
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different domain of emotion. Most of all, I have attempted to 
show how affect is crucially implicated in the process of 
ontological emergence, related to the proliferation of new 
subjective formations. This last point is pertinent for 
positioning affect within the work process of graphic design, as 
the milleu out of which design pulls its creative capacity.  
 
On the other hand, I have tried to lay out a relationship 
between two levels of subjective emergence that work 
together, but are by no means the same thing. I have referred 
to this relationship as the one between the 
preindividual/individuated, intensity/qualification, 
virtual/actual. The important point here is to understand that 
it is affect that belongs to the preindividual, intensive, and 
virtual side of emergence, while it is the individual, 
subjectivity, language and emotion that relates to the 
individuated, qualified, and actualized side. This latter side 
comes ontologically and chronologically second to the prior 
level of affect, though the two intertwine repeatedly. Language, 
cognition and emotion are a ‘doubling over’ of affect, which 
qualifies it and in some ways sutures up its virtual potentiality. 
The actuality or individuated side of proliferation is what I will 
align with the labor process in the following section.  
 209
 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Towards an Alternative 
Conception of Production 
 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia figures as the subtitle to two of 
the most popular references to Deleuze and Guattari’s political 
theory, Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. And in order to 
understand Deleuze and Guattari’s politics developed 
throughout these two volumes, it is the relationship between 
these two terms that forges an appropriate entrance. While it 
may seem at first peculiar to connect such seemingly arbitrary 
terms, each apparently responding to seemingly different 
concerns in different disciplines, Deleuze and Guattari uncover 
a valuable schizoanalytic appraisal of capital and the process of 
accumulation on which it is based. 
 
In connecting capitalism and schizophrenia, Deleuze and 
Guattari seek to underline the apparent madness that the 
former shares with the latter. They argue that, once we 
understand capitalism as a system that, at least in part, is 
propelled by a sort of schizophrenia, the mechanisms for which 
we might understand capital share the same foundations that 
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we might use to approach madness. In an interview published 
directly following the publication of Anti-Oedipus, Vittorio 
Marchetti asks Guattari: “[w]hy speak of capitalism and 
schizophrenia?”, to which Guattari responds: 
 
“It seemed to us that these two poles [capitalism and 
schizophrenia] have a connection in their common feature 
of non-sense… [I]n order to understand the true meaning of 
the politics of appropriation of surplus value, we would 
have to bring into play the same concepts that one relies 
upon to interpret schizophrenia” (SS: 54-55). 
 
Capitalism, as indeed many other power constellations for 
Deleuze and Guattari, is built upon the non-sensical or, 
delirious, to use another one of their descriptive words. At its 
core, nothing makes sense, though it comes to be codified into 
a perfectly rational system. It is in this sense we could say that 
the very rationality of a system is based upon its insanity. As 
Deleuze and Guattari write, “it [capitalism] has been mad from 
the beginning, and that’s where its rationality comes from” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, cited in SS: 35). Deleuze expands upon 
this relationship between rationality and insanity further, 
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writing: 
 
“Everything is rational in capitalism, except capital or 
capitalism itself [...] It is in this sense that we say: the 
rational is always the rationality of the irrational. 
Something that hasn’t been discussed about Marx’s Capital 
is the extent to which he is fascinated by capitalist 
mechanisms, precisely because the system is demented, yet 
works very well at the same time. So what is rational in a 
society? It is--the interests being defined in the framework 
of this society--the way people pursue those interests, their 
realization. But down below, there are [...] an enormous 
flux, all kinds of libidinal-unconscious flows that make up 
the delirium of society” (SS: 36). 
 
What is crucial to understand in respect to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s analysis of capital is how it shifts from the delirious 
state, marked by a flux and flow of an unconscious milieu, into 
a realization of these flows within the mechanisms of a rational 
regime of capital. This latter state--the fixation of the delirious 
or schizo tendencies into the rational organization of capital--is 
the second pole of its composition. And it is in this way that as 
much as Capitalism could be said to be schizophrenic, one 
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might say that it is equally paranoid. Opposed to schizo 
delirium, the paranoid side of capital works through a 
“combination of signs” that seeks to control the delirious flows 
into “vast territories of reactive integration” (N: 28). 
 
These two movements, displayed by the competing, though 
complimentary, notions of schizophrenia and paranoia, make 
up the two sides of capitalism identified by Deleuze and 
Guattari. Beyond the obvious critiques of psychoanalysis found 
in their first collaborative work of Anti-Oedipus, they develop a 
novel way of approaching how capital works through both 
unleashing a massive amount of unmediated schizophrenic 
desire, while simultaneously deploying a wealth of different 
mechanisms to control, channel, and suppress those same 
desiring flows. In their words, “capitalism, through its process 
of production, produces an awesome schizophrenic 
accumulation of energy or charge, against which it brings all its 
vast powers of repression to bear” (AO: 34). 
 
In the following pages I will seek to interrogate the 
relationship within capitalist production between this schizo 
level of the non-sensical, the unconscious, ambiguous and the 
non-representational on the one hand, with that of the 
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paranoid level of rationality, representation and 
consciousness. The point is to map out capital’s oscillating 
movements between these two poles; to trace how capital 
moves from its nonsensical foundation into the more rigid and 
defined. Put differently, and building upon the work in the 
previous chapter, I will seek to reveal how, from the depths of 
the virtual level of affectivity, capitalist value, normativity, and 
discipline are built up. 
 
There are two different sections that follow in this chapter, 
both relating to the two poles on which capitalist value 
production depends, alluded to above. The first introduces the 
delirious side of capital, which I relate to affect, and which 
Deleuze and Guattari further relate with the concepts of lines 
of flight, deterritorialization and decoding, amongst others. 
This is the side of production that deals with the emergence of 
the new, which constantly but temporarily escapes the more 
coded and subjectivated forms of control on which capitalist 
discipline, and ultimately value, relies on. Though these 
affective deterritorializations momentarily abscond forms of 
control, capital constantly reigns them in, or reterritorializes 
them, ensuring that these fissures of creativity are made 
commensurable to the foundations of capitalist accumulation. 
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This is the second, neurotic level of capital that reterritorializes 
the former deterritorializations, both expropriating the 
creativity from the affective productions for value, but also 
ensuring that the novel, deterritorialized affects do not 
precipitate into new subjective formations outside of 
capitalism. This second level will be discussed in the second 
section, which will map out the forms of discipline appropriate 
to this process. 
 
In addition to uncovering some of the more affective or 
infinitesimal dimensions that compose capitalism, I will also 
introduce an alternate side of capitalist organization that is 
connected, yet in many ways opposed to the affective, what has 
been expressed so far in relation to the paranoid side of capital, 
or in Section 1, in relation to the forms of production outlined 
in Capital. This side of capitalist production—a side 
characterized by representation and organization--accounts 
for how the affective becomes integrated, imbricated and 
subsumed into capitalist value. In exploring this second feature 
of capitalism, I will also show how this process delimits, tames 
and confines the affectual, ultimately cleansing affect of any 
potential to become anything other than a capitalist 
subjectivity. This side of capitalism I wish to associate with the 
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second form of production, or what Deleuze and Guattari refer 
to as the “production of production”, that takes place largely 
within what I have described earlier as the ‘social factory’. I 
will further uncover the different techniques of control that 
ultimately act to channel, code, and tie the various affects 
produced in the wider social factory.  
 
Part 3, Section 2: 
Creativity and Deterritorialization in Capitalism 
 
“We weren’t looking for anything timeless, not even the 
timelessness of time, but for new things being formed, the 
emergence of what Foucault calls ‘actuality’”. 
- Deleuze and Guattari, Negotiations, pp. 86 
 
Deleuze and Guattari’s work, it could be said, is first and 
foremost an investigation into the mechanisms of emergence, 
flux, change, metamorphosis, and creativity. As Deleuzian 
scholar Craig Lundry notes, “Deleuze is widely and rightly 
regarded as a philosopher of creativity, one of the greatest of 
the last century, if not several before” (Lundry, 2012: 1). 
Indeed, Deleuze himself describes his method as one which 
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seeks to uncover not “the eternal or universal”, but “the 
conditions under which something new is created 
(creativeness)”. This way of approaching the social is borrowed 
explicitly, Deleuze says, from Alfred North Whitehead. But one 
can also identify resonations with another of Deleuze’s 
theoretical interlocutors, Gilbert Simondon, particularly in the 
latter's notion of individuation and the preindividual. Opposed 
to epistemological research which “accords ontological 
privilege to the already constituted...” Simondon’s method 
similarly calls for “looking for the principle of individuation 
[the constitution or emergence of an individual, subject, object, 
or thing] in a reality the precedes individuation itself [the 
preindividual, for Simondon]” (Simondon, 1992: 298). For both 
Simondon and Deleuze, there is a shared notion that, in order 
to understand unfoldings and morphogenesis in art, social life, 
political and economic structures, you begin not with the 
individual, object or institution in a formed, stable and 
articulated state of being, but with the subterranean, 
rhizomatic, infinitesimal micro-relations that prefigure and 
contribute to its constitution. 
 
This method for understanding emergence and transformation 
is brought directly into conversation with Capitalism--
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particularly capitalist production--within Deleuze and 
Guattari’s thought.  An excerpt from Anti-Oedipus is 
particularly relevant in this regard where, building off the 
foundational work by Marx in Capital, Deleuze and Guattari 
write: “We cannot tell from the mere taste of wheat who grew 
it; the product gives us no hint as to the system and the 
relations of production” (AO: 24). Though this passage might 
appear at first rather unremarkable, it speaks volumes about 
how they approach creativity, how that understanding extends 
into the field of economics, and how the economic can inform 
the way we understand creativity. Often we take the result of a 
process to be the primary level or means of analysis for 
understanding particular phenomena at the expense of the 
mechanisms that constitute a particular reality. Marx 
understood this often-misleading proclivity, and challenged it 
through his descent down into the relations of production 
below the visibility of commodities, uncovering the labor, 
organization, and mechanisms that give rise to their 
constitution. Deleuze and Guattari extend this method even 
further, however, directing us not only to the field of labor 
below the level of the commodity, but also to a micropolitical 
field of proliferation below “comprehension or expression” 
which they position as central for capitalist production of value 
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(AO: 24). It is this incomprehensible field makes up “the real 
process on which it [capitalism] depends” and which forms the 
primary focus of the first part of this chapter (AO: 24)” 
 
 
To get to the core of this infinitesimal level that is buried below 
the surface of visibility, I will speak in the following pages of a 
few co-constitutive concepts developed by Deleuze and 
Guattari, particularly those promoted in A Thousand Plateaus. 
Each of these following concepts, to be sure, are formulated by 
Deleuze and Guattari around different concerns and issues, but 
they are simultaneously connected in their general desire to 
construct an understanding of a field of virtual proliferation 
often missed out in other analyses of politics and capitalism. 
While each section shares a certain orientation towards what I 
spoke of in the previous chapter in terms of virtuality, the 
preindividual and affect, in this chapter, the political and 
economic importance of this domain is brought to the fore. 
Each subsection, numbered one through five, will build upon 
one another to provide a more coherent picture of this field, 
while in turn also complicating that picture through folding in 
new layers. The idea here is that each new section will 
introduce a slightly different way to approach this 
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subterranean level, bringing together the characteristics that 
define it. 
The Body Without Organs, The Virtual and Affect 
 
Desire is […] a process, as opposed to a structure or a genesis. It 
is an affect, as opposed to a feeling. It is a hecceity—the 
individual singularity of a day, a season, a life. As opposed to a 
subjectivity, it is an event, not a thing or person. Above all, it 
implies the constitution of a field of immanence or a body-
without-organs, which is defined by zones of intensity, 
thresholds, degrees and fluxes. This body is biological as it is 
collective and political. It is on this body that assemblages are 
made and come apart, and this body-without-organs is what 
bears the offshoots of deterritorialization of assemblages or 
flight lines. 
- Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness, 130 
 
“[T] he socius, or the Body without Organs […] is massive, 
imposing, and unavoidable. It defines the very situation in which 
we live. It is the milieu that all our thoughts and actions 
presuppose, the environment to which they all refer…” 
- Steven Shaviro, “The Connective and Disjunctive Syntheses” 
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To begin to understand this alternative field with which 
Deleuze and Guattari’s accord capitalist production--or indeed 
the production of any system, subjectivity, object, or thing--one 
starts with a sort of rhizomatic, subsurface plane, which they 
categorize as the body-without-organs (BWO), or 
interchangeably at times as the plane of consistency (POC) 
(ATP: 170). The BWO is a sort of milieu out of which 
“alluvisions, sedimentations, coagulations, foldings, and 
recoilings that compose an organism--and also a signification 
and subject--occur” (ATP: 176). It is on this plane on which 
Capitalism imposes a number of organizational techniques in 
order to extract useful labor (ATP: 176). But while the BWO 
serves as the object of manipulation, the source against which 
the organizations, significations, hierarchizations of capitalism 
are brought to bear--a process that I will discuss in the second 
part of this chapter--it is fundamentally opposed to such 
operations (ATP: 176). Put differently, while order is 
unleashed against the BWO, the BWO is not in itself any of 
these things, and in fact does its best to ward off the 
organization imposed on it. 
 
The BWO derives its name precisely because it “opposes all 
strata of organization, the organism’s organization as well as 
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power organizations” (TRM: 130; emphasis mine; See also ATP: 
406). Contrary to the ordering and individuating level that is 
imposed against it, the BWO and the POC might be better 
defined as a plane of dis-organization.  It is a level that 
disarticulates and desubjectivates, embracing the movement 
of  “dismantling the organism” (ATP: 176). Describing the POC, 
Deleuze and Guattari write that “there is no longer any forms 
or developments of forms; nor are there subjects or the 
formation of subjects. There is no structure...” (ATP: 294). In 
this way, the BWO can be thought of as a plane on which there 
is an unraveling of sorts, what Deleuze and Guattari would call 
the process of decoding. Codes for Deleuze and Guattari are 
sorts of traditional, implicit rules of a society that constitute 
what is admissible and what is not. As Jason Read explains, 
“[c]odes can be thought of as tradition, or prescriptions and 
rules bearing down on the production and distribution of 
goods, prestige and desire”, often apparent when one hears the 
declaration “this is how things are done, how they have always 
been done” (2011: 142). The BWO works in part by undoing 
these traditional organizational forms, and replacing them 
with schizophrenic modes that “scramble meaning” (AO: 15). 
On the BWO, there is no meaning; there are no significations, 
no formed subjectivity. The BWO cries out against meaning--
 222
”no signifier, never interpret!”--and unravels individual 
identities through “desubjectification” (ATP: 176). Thus the 
BWO not only unravels traditional codes, but also forms of 
linguistic significations, meanings, and specific formed, 
individualized subjectivities. 
 
To say that the BWO is associated with the undoing of codes 
and subjectivities-- de-coding --does not imply that it is simply 
subtractive. There is a lot happening on the BWO; the plane is 
populated by numerous flows and proliferations of 
unconscious desires that are “[torn] away from meaning”, 
which are more analogous to “colors and sounds, becomings 
and intensities” (ATP: 180) (ATP: 177). Deleuze and Guattari 
speak of the BWO as a type of ‘egg’ which is “not regressive”, 
but a forms “milieu of experimentation”, or a “milieu of pure 
intensity” (ATP: 181). Such descriptions do not mean that the 
BWO is completely undifferentiated matter, however (see ATP: 
182). Difference proliferates, but they are differences of 
“gradients” (ATP: 179). In this sense one could say that the 
BWO is somewhat atmospheric in composition, containing a 
number of different tonalities which are distinctive yet not 
linguistically or consciously accountable for. Quoting Henry 
Miller’s novel, Tropic of Capricorn, Deleuze and Guattari 
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describe the BWO as “‘a gloomy fog, a dark yellow mist’ that 
affects...” (ATP: 180). It is a vague composition of intensities 
that are concrete, yet ambient and out of consciousness, 
comprising of what I referred to in the previous chapter as a 
haecceity--a particularity that is undeniably present, inducing 
shifts in consciousness or emotion, but at the same time out of 
mind and unaccountable by language[1]. Put differently, one 
might say that the BWO is populated by numerous 
“microperceptions” (ATP: 179), which, as Brian Massumi 
explains, are “not a smaller perception”, but a “perception of a 
qualitatively different kind. It’s something felt without 
registering consciously” (Massumi, 2015: 107). 
 
This should all be sounding familiar to some of the main 
themes developed in the previous chapter, and for good 
reason. The BWO and POC is another iteration of what Deleuze 
and Guattari call the virtual plane of existence that precedes 
and contrasts the field of actuality. It is, like the virtual, a way 
of highlighting the affective, which is qualitatively different 
than a linguistic and the conscious level of comprehension. In 
Deleuze’s words, the BWO contains “affects, the wind, fine 
segmentation, microperceptions, [that have] replaced the 
world of the subject” (ATP: 179); on it “there are only 
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haeccities, affects” (ATP: 294). While “nothing subjectifies” on 
the POC, “haecceities form according to composition of non-
subjectified powers or affects” (ATP: 294). Both the BWO and 
the level of the virtual are traversed by affects that have not yet 
been defined and confined to language, meaning and 
subjectivity. The BWO is virtuality. 
 
Along a similar vein, it might help to understand the BWO with 
reference to Gilbert Simondon’s conception of the 
preindividual, discussed in the previous chapter. As 
highlighted, Deleuze’s draw towards Simondon’s thinking of 
the preindividual was in the latter's distinction between what 
the former describes as singularities and individuals. The 
individual is a product of a process; it’s an actualized result, 
achieved by a sort of ordering, signification, and 
subjectivization. Singularities, on the other hand, belong to the 
field of the preindividual, and “correspond to the existence and 
the distribution of potentials” (Deleuze, 2004: 87). The BWO, 
we could say, is populated by preindividual singularities that 
are not yet formed into an individual, organized ‘organ’, 
subjectivity, society or object, but are the bedrock or raw-
material from which those things will be formed. 
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In yet another way, the BWO could also be approached in 
relation to Deleuze’s essay, “Immanence: A Life”, where he 
describes ‘“a” life’ as kind of ‘thisness’ not akin to a fully 
formed and articulable subjective individuality, but a certain 
affective liveliness that is much more elusive. ‘A life’ is an 
energy or, as Jane Bennett describes, a vitality, identified by 
Deleuze in small children who are “not yet individuals” but 
‘singularities’ in that each [...] express just this smile, or 
gesture, or grimace” (Deleuze quoted in Bennett, 2010: 53). It 
is this quality that forms the BWO milieu, what Deleuze calls 
the “indefinites of life”. Jane Bennet explains this force at 
length: 
“A life thus names a restless activeness, a destructive-
creative force-presence [...] A life is vitally proper not to 
any individual but to “pure immanence,” or that protean 
swarm that is not actual though it is real: ‘a life contains 
only virtuals. It is made of virtualities” (2010: 54). 
 
Once we begin to see the BWO in this more animated, vital and 
lively manner, we can appreciate its generative power; its 
ontogenetic force that propels things forward, in addition to 
the more destructive movements of decoding that it enacts. As 
a virtual-affective field of becoming, the BWO forges ruptures 
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into the surface of what is possible and permissible. It is the 
plane from which moments of novelty--that capitalism both 
depends on, welcomes, but also despises and suppresses--
begin. Understanding this process is crucial in order to connect 
the understanding of the BWO, and the related concept of 
affect, with the wider shifts in capitalist development and 
production. 
 
I would suggest that instead of associating the raw material of 
graphic design labor with what Hardt, Negri, and others refer 
to as the “social factory”, it is perhaps better to understand it 
within the context of the BWO. In this way, I would like to 
insist that the affective raw material for cultural labor, 
discussed in earlier sections, is what Deleuze and Guattari 
would define as a BWO. Instead, I would suggest that the raw 
material cultural laborers draw upon is a proliferation along 
the lines of what is described here as a “milieu of 
experimentation”, or a preindividual reality traversed by 
virtual haecceities. The thisness that laborers draw upon is not 
a definable reality, but rather, like the BWO, something much 
more intensive and non-explicable, a fog or atmosphere that 
affects them in different ways. Ultimately, the social factory or 
general intellect for cultural laborers is the BWO. 
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Escape, not Contradiction: Lines of Flight and 
Deterritorialization on the BWO 
 
This productive character of the BWO further serves to 
highlight the way in which Deleuze and Guattari’s own 
understanding of historical becoming, anchored in an 
understanding of virtual affectivity, is quite different than that 
of traditional notions of capitalist development and political 
transformations based in opposition. Against the orthodox 
Marxist version of historical dialecticism, Deleuze and Guattari 
dismiss the notion that contradiction drives the societal--and 
capitalist--development. Instead, “a society, a social field does 
not contradict itself, but first and foremost, it leaks out on all 
sides. The first thing it does is escape in all directions” (TRM: 
127).[2] This anti-Hegelianism--apparent from Deleuze’s earlier 
writings onward--is particularly demonstrative of how 
capitalism functions, and further underlines its connection to 
schizophrenia: “Schizophrenia is indissociable from the 
capitalist system, itself conceived of as primary leakage 
(fuite)...” (C: 14). Capitalism, and indeed any economic, 
political, or social system, is made up of a multitude of leaks 
that escape its organizational grasp. As Massumi points out in 
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his reading guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia, “a structure 
is defined by what escapes it” (Massumi, 1999:105). Thus, for 
Deleuze and Guattari, in order to come to terms with the 
conditions for the emergence of any new social or political 
structure, capitalism included, one begins with tracing out 
these ambiguities that escape its control. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari denote this elusive, discharging power 
with the reinforcing, and sometimes interchangeable, notions 
of deterritorializtion and lines of flight. A line of flight should be 
understood in the context of its original French denotation, 
linge de fuite, where, as the English translator of ATP, Brian 
Massumi, remarks: “fuite covers not only the act of fleeing or 
eluding, but also, flowing, leaking and disappearing into the 
distance” (ATP: xvii). Put differently, a line of flight denotes a 
movement of carrying something off and away into an 
unknown. Adding to this, Deleuze and Guattari conceive of 
these lines of flight as  “a composition of speeds and affects”, 
emphasizing an understanding of flight with not only 
movement, but with speed and linguistic and cognitive 
imperceptibility (ATP: 258). 
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The related term of Detterritorialization--”almost the same 
thing” as a line of flight--similarly identifies a transformative 
shift away from the more formed or organized level of actuality 
(TRM: 127). It refers specifically to a movement away from a 
territory, or, as Paul Patton puts it, “the movement by which 
something escapes or departs from a given territory”. In this 
more literal sense, this transitory action is associated with 
spatial fleeing, often ascribed to nomads traveling freely over 
the ‘smooth space’ of the steppe, quite literally abandoning a 
fixed territory to perpetually deterritorialize (ATP: 421). 
Deterritorialization does not always hold a spatial connotation 
within Deleuze and Guattari’s work, however, and is often 
invoked to describe an escape or transformation in a number 
of cultural fields, too. Music and sound, understood as a 
“sonorous block that opposes visual memory” (K: 5), is perhaps 
the most acute form of deterritorialization: “a cry that escapes 
signification, composition“ where in “intensity alone matters” 
(K: 6). Writing and language, too, can be deterritorializing, and 
Deleuze and Guattari find the literature of figures like Franz 
Kafka and William Burroughs to be particularly demonstrative 
of this process (see Land, 2005). The power of Kafka’s work, 
for instance, is the process of “experimentation” that it 
unleashes; a deterritorializing process achieved not through 
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“structure with formal oppositions and a fully constructed 
signifier”, but through escaping “interpretation or significance” 
(K: 7). These more artistic examples of deterritorialization thus 
underline the asignifying and unconscious character that it 
shares with the concept of affect. Here, deterritorialization is 
not simply a movement away from a spatial territory, but also 
a movement away from meaning and conscious perception in 
order to experiment with something new. It is understood as “a 
simple way out, ‘right, left, or any direction’, as long as it is as 
little signifying as possible” (K: 6). 
 
These lines of flight and deterritorializations are the points, 
cracks, and leakages that “draw [the POC] and cause it to rise 
to the surface” (ATP: 297). But to simply associate these 
movements of deterritorialization with the abstract notion of 
the BWO is not enough to understand who or what is behind 
deterritorializations and lines of flight that brings the BWO to 
the surface. The BWO and the related cracks and movements 
that escape organization are spawned by figures and things 
which themselves coalesce in the production of the BWO. Put 
differently, the BWO or POC, and the related 
deterritorializations that push it forward “must be 
constructed” (ATP: 174). This construction can take a number 
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of different forms, ranging from the “artistic” to the “scientific, 
mystical, political” (ATP: 174). What each of these different 
deterritorializations has in common, however, is that they are 
produced and made up by “a collectivity” (ATP: 179), which is 
given conceptual and political particularity in ATP with the 
concept of the “nomadic war machine”.  
The War Machine and the Production of ‘Nomad’ Science 
 
In ATP, Deleuze and Guattari introduce us to yet another term 
that not only underlines the virtual level underneath the 
surface of linguistic and conscious perception, but also to the 
figures or components that are involved in its production. The 
nomadic war machine is a concept that Deleuze and Guattari 
use to denote collectivities that exist outside of centralized 
power and direction that engage in the formation of novel 
artistic, scientific, or political forms of deterritorialization. The 
war machine is the mechanism that pushes forth 
deterritorializations that flee the codes and the confines of 
what is perceptible, consciously intelligible and admissible. Put 
simply, this collective machine is what produces the BWO as an 
experimental plane outside of rigid organization, linguistic 
signification, and conscious perception. In Deleuze and 
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Guattari’s words, “every creation is brought about by the war 
machine” (ATP: 253). 
 
While Central authority will subsequently try to contain and 
channel the power of the war machine--a process to be 
discussed in the second section--the war machine itself is 
guided by more diffuse conglomerations of “bands” or “packs”. 
A pack--the relational and (dis)organizational unit of the war 
machine--is not a hierarchical form, but a “rhizomatic” 
configuration (ATP: 395). And in constituting a BWO, the pack 
of the war machine attempts to ward off any hierarchy from 
establishing itself. Deleuze and Guattari liken these bands to 
gangs of street children in Bogata, where a “leader is prevented 
from acquiring stable power” (ATP: 395). But while bands like 
these prevent hierarchical power, they are still very much a 
collectivity with a shared cause: ”These street gangs ‘undertake 
their [criminal] activity in common, with collective sharing of 
the loot, but disperse or sleep separately’” (ATP: 395). These 
packs, then, are connected not by a transcendent power that 
governs over them, but by transversal “alliances” and act in 
orchestration (ATP: 395). 
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The packs that make up the war machine are also different 
than other organizational forms in that they communicate 
through contagion instead of more the formalized and 
categorical modes language or writing (ATP: 266-267); it is 
contagion that connects these bands and allows them to work 
in alliance.  In this sense, we can relate, as Deleuze and Guattari 
do, the BWO and the war machine with a sort of crowd or ‘hive’ 
relationality: “A body without organs is [...] distributed 
according to crowd phenomena, in Brownian motion, in the 
form of molecular multiplicities” (ATP: 34). It’s here, too, that 
Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of crowd or pack communication 
links up with yet another theoretical figure, Gabriel Tarde. As 
Tony Sampson illustrates, Deleuze’s notion of contagion in 
several ways follows or parallels Tarde’s understanding of 
crowd proliferation as “mostly unconscious associations [...] of 
imitative social encounter” (Sampson, 2012: 18). Deleuze’s 
formulation of the crowd is like Tarde’s understanding of 
“immatative rays”, which is a communicative transfer “not to 
be confused with a purely cognitive, ideological, or 
interpsychological transfer between individuals” but 
comprising of “affecting [...] non-cognitive associations, 
inferences and collisions that spread outward, contaminating 
feelings and moods before influencing thoughts, beliefs and 
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actions” (Sampson, 2012: 19). The pack is a rhizomatic unit 
that functions along these lines, communicating in a dispersed 
way through contagious affects that infect and are likewise 
infected. 
 
The war machine is a ‘machine’ in the sense that it produces, 
and what it produces is a BWO and lines of flight that are 
experimental and deterritorializing. The productive process of 
the war machine, however, is much more haphazard, intuitive 
and malleable when compared to the types of production one 
witnesses on industrial scales with bureaucratic and 
organizational structures. What is produced by the war 
machine, and what this production depends upon, is 
“heterogeneity” as opposed to forms of production which are 
based upon and result in “the stable, the eternal, the identical, 
the constant” (ATP: 398). The war machine experiments with 
what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as a “nomad” or “minor” 
science that is distinct and often conflictual to the more 
standardized and rational process which they denote as being 
“royal” or “imperial sciences” (ATP: 398).  
 
Whereas royal science is understood as a method dependent 
on “templates”, a “fixed model of form”, “mathematical figures” 
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and precise “measurements” (ATP: 402), nomad science 
“develops eccentrically” and organically, engages in 
experimentation rather than standardization, and requires a 
much more affective experience with materiality (ATP: 399). In 
contrast to nomad science, Royal science’s method, for Deleuze 
and Guattari, is based upon a “hylomorphic” assumption 
regarding form and matter, where form is understood as 
chronologically and ontologically primary. It implies that 
“form...organizes matter” and that “matter is prepared for the 
form” (ATP: 407). Materiality thus has a passive role in relation 
to form, in which the former is merely acted upon and not in 
any way acting. For Deleuze and Guattari, this understanding 
implies a specific division of labor, organizational structure, 
and hierarchy that produces dichotomies between “intellectual 
and manual, the theoretical and practical, [...] ‘governors’ and 
‘governed’” (ATP: 406). Once the hylomorphic model is 
adopted as a ‘royal’ science, ‘royal’ art or a way of production, 
the conception and idea precede the practice and execution of 
a task upon material. This results in the parceling off of the 
conception from the execution of tasks, developing hierarchical 
organizations that follow this separation. Deleuze and Guattari 
criticize this hylomorphic understanding, noting that “it 
assumes a fixed form and matter deemed homogeneous” (ATP: 
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450). It is flawed in that it “leaves many things, active and 
affective, by the wayside” (ATP: 450). It leaves out the 
processes of becoming that radiate under the surface of stable 
being, what Simondon relates to the preindividual affective 
layer that becomes individuated through the very process of 
individuation, or what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as 
“singularities or haecceities” (ATP: 450). Hylomorphism simply 
looks for the repetition of forms; how the ‘ideal’ form repeats 
itself the same way in matter and history, society and politics. 
It is a method through which pattern and sameness is assumed 
to be at the center of uncovering the transcendental form from 
which all matter replicates, and is the precise method that is 
used in what Deleuze and Guattari identify as ‘royal sciences’. 
 
In contrast to the royal sciences method that seeks 
“reproduction”, the war machine’s nomad science is based 
upon “following” (ATP: 410), and what it follows are the 
“connections between the singularities of matter” (ATP: 407). 
As such, this method does not start with the assumption that 
form guides matter, but rather that form and matter are co-
constitutive. It is a process that occurs when one is “in search 
of the singularities of a matter, or rather a material, and not out 
to discover a form” (ATP: 410). This “ambulant” way of 
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experimentation is exemplified in forms of wood-working, for 
example, where the productive task “is a question of 
surrendering to the wood, then following where it leads by 
connecting operations to a materiality, instead of imposing 
form upon matter” (ATP: 451). This way of following, a form of 
nomadic science, is artisanal, as opposed of the more fixed, 
industrial forms of work which seek to impose a preconceived 
idea or form onto material. An artisan is defined as “one who is 
determined in such a way as to follow a flow of matter [...]. The 
artisan is the itinerant, the ambulant. To follow the flow of 
matter is to itinerate, to ambulate. It is intuition in action.” 
(ATP: 452). 
 
The revelations of the war machine highlighted here can 
further add some context to the raw material that cultural 
laborers draw upon. Following Deleuze and Guattari, I would 
suggest that the raw material they require is not something 
produced in a scientific way, but a milieu that is the result of 
various “bands” of artists or urban groups that itenerantly 
created various affects. This will be discussed further later on, 
but the point I wish to make here is that the BWO, which makes 
up the social factory for cultural labor, is not a product of one 
individual, but is largely the result of communal forms of 
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production--street trends, an urban atmosphere, or an 
intensity one gets when they are at a cafe. When laborers 
consume culture in order to do work, a form of productive 
consumption, the culture that they are consuming is often the 
product of various itinerant musicians, artists, and writers, not 
a formalized science.   
 
Micropolitics and Minor Productions 
 
So far we have discussed the BWO, lines of flight, 
deterritorialization, the war machine and nomad science. Each 
of these terms attends to specific concerns within Deleuze and 
Guattari’s work, to be sure, but they also share the common 
purpose of illustrating the affective, non-conscious and non-
representative field of reality that is bedrock of political, 
artistic, social, and economic becoming. In attempting to tie 
these notions together, and clarify their political potency, it is 
helpful to speak of two more terms: “micropolitics” and 
“minor” production. These two terms allow us to contrast the 
types of infinitesimal productions we have discussed thus far 
in relation to the BWO, deterritorialization and the war 
machine with a rather different but coalescent plane of 
actuality and organization that manipulates, harnesses and 
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directs these flows into concrete arrangements or 
“assemblages” of power and, ultimately, capitalistic 
mechanisms of value production. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, “minor” productions and 
“micropolitics” are types of political becoming that are related 
and foundational to, but opposed and qualitatively different 
than, a macropolitical or major field characterized by “molar 
organization” and hierarchical forms of power (ATP: 235). I 
will speak more on the macropolitical or “major” side of 
politics in the latter section, but it is worth noting now, in 
order to draw out the contrast between the micro and the 
macro, that the macro or molar political form is closely aligned 
with ‘state power’, or with powers that are enshrined in very 
particular and coded forms of law and language. The 
macropolitical names a type of politics based upon identity or 
representation, and makes judgments based upon that identity 
which forms a standard. The key here is that the macropolitical 
is uniform, consistent, concrete, exhibits a certain reluctance to 
change and operates in a somewhat delimiting role. 
 
The micropolitical and minor, in contrast to the macropolitical 
and molar, consists of “an entire world of unconscious 
micropercepts, unconscious affects…” (ATP: 235). In this way, 
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the micropolitical is much more elusive and less defined than 
the macropolitical; it is non-representative rather than 
representative, affective and non-conscious rather than coded 
and consistent. The micropolitical is a productive process that 
contributes to societal, economic and political change, whether 
it be a “‘change in values’, the youth, women, the mad, etc.” 
(ATP: 236). Put differently, we could say that the minor and 
micropolitical field are deterritorializing; the politics 
developed here “flows or flees” and “escapes” the more molar 
organizations of power (ATP: 236). The micropolitical names a 
deterritorializing politics of becoming, flux, and 
disorganization that is virtual, subsisting below the more 
visible and articulable forms of major or macro politics. As 
Nicholas Thoburn explains, it “is the process of deviation or 
deterritorialization of life– it is a process of calling forth the 
virtuality of the world [...]” (Thoburn, 2003: 7). The first 
characteristic of the micro and minor, then, is that it is creative; 
it is a production that creates novel forms of life, subjectivity, 
perceptibility, aesthetics and politics. Like the BWO, it is a non-
conscious and non-linguistic proliferation that absconds 
organization and control, however momentarily. It is an 
experimental plane of virtuality in the sense that it is “active, 
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yet unformed” (Thoburn, 2003: 7), producing a future that is 
not yet actual, but in the process of becoming. 
 
To illustrate the contrast between the micropolitical and 
macropolitical, Deleuze and Guattari provide the rise of Nazism 
in Germany as an example. For them, the rise of Nazism 
involves two separate political movements—fascism, relating 
to the field of micropolitics, and totalitarianism, which relates 
to the macropolitical: 
 
“[F]ascism implies a molecular regime that is distinct both 
from molar segments and centralization. Doubtless, fascism 
invented the concept of the totalitarian state, but there is 
no reason to define fascism by a concept of its own devising: 
there are totalitarian states of the Stalinist or military 
dictatorship type that are not fascists. The concept of the 
totalitarian state applies only at the macropolitical level 
[...] and a particular mode of totalization and 
centralization. Fascism is inseparable from a proliferation 
of molecular focuses in interaction, which skip from point 
to point, before beginning to resonate together in the 
National Socialist State” (ATP: 236). 
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Here Deleuze and Guattari further define and contrast the 
organizational and mechanistic features of micropolitical and 
minor positions against the macro and major. Whereas the 
micropolitical is diffuse and rhizomatic, macropolitical 
expressions like totalitarianism are centralized. Fascism works 
through mobilizing micropolitical flows that bleed out all over 
the place, that occupy all the little nooks and crannies of life 
outside or not immediately under the direction of a centralized 
state power. Fascism becomes totalitarian only after fascism’s 
micropolitics--which have been radiating underneath or beside 
state power relations--become integrated into a centralized 
bureaucracy, and channeled into the state form (ATP: 236). 
Based upon these identifications laid out by Deleuze and 
Guattari, one might say that the micropolitical is a power of 
diffusion, flux, and change, while the macropolticial is one of 
contraction, coagulation and stability. 
 
It is important to understand that while fascism is one of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s more cited examples of micropolitics in 
action, it is but one of many. As they emphasize, “everything is 
political, but every politics is simultaneously a macropolitcs 
and a micropolitics” (ATP: 235). Thus all forms of life are 
political, and all forms of politics involve an affective escape 
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that disturbs and morphs meaning, identity, and subjectivity. 
All politics begin, like all subjectivities and individuations, with 
a leakage, with what I referred to earlier as 
deterritorializations, or what Deleuze and Guattari similarly 
discuss here in relation to the micropolitical. It’s in this sense 
that the student-worker manifestations of May 1968 in Paris 
are as much an example of micropolitical eruptions as the 
micro-fascisms that spread throughout German society in the 
rise of the Nazi party. As Deleuze and Guattari emphasize, 
During May ‘68, like the period preceding Hitler and his 
totalitarian ascent, the micropolitical was gaining momentum 
and proliferated at an increasing speed, building up like a wave 
or radiating like a forest fire: “a molecular flow was escaping, 
miniscule at first, then swelling, without, however ceasing to 
be unassignable” (ATP: 238-239). The importance here is that 
while this energetic becoming is maturing and shifting, it is 
‘unassaignable’, uncoded and non-representable. 
 
Both micropolitics and minor productions begin from a 
position of impasse or impossibility. They arise from a 
“cramped space” or a “segmented” reality where little or no 
conceivable avenues exist for creativity outside the dominant 
social, political and economic prescriptions that cage in the 
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majoritarian in on all sides. This segmentation is everywhere 
and occurs all the time: “we are segmented from all around and 
in every direction” (ATP: 230). Work, play, the spatial layout of 
the city, etc., can all be segmented, and all these segmentations 
are similar in that they develop according to a dualistic 
opposition. People are parsed out into identities of “social 
classes but also men-women, adults-children, and so on” (ATP: 
230). In an almost Derridean fashion, these dualisms produce a 
major or molar standard against which its minor or micro 
opposition is put in a denigrated or deficient position; the 
worker, the woman, the ghettoized African-American, and the 
sexually deviant are all cast as hierarchically inferior to the 
major standard, or, completely blocked off from the major 
experience. The standard, major, or molar is thus not defined 
necessarily by its quantity or size, but by the or dominant norm 
that it constitutes: 
 
“Let us suppose that the constant or standard is the 
average adult-white-heterosexual-European-male-
speaking a standard language (Joyce’s or Pound’s Ulysses). 
It is obvious that ‘man’ holds the majority, even if he is less 
numerous than mosquitoes, children, women, blacks, 
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peasants, homosexuals, etc.” (ATP: 105 cited in Thoburn, 
2003). 
 
Here the molar standard is abstract in the sense that it is a 
standard of judgment, but that no one is truly major. Put 
differently, the major or molar is a position of impossibility, 
but an impossibility which defines the terrain of what desires 
should be directed towards; it is an idea that is meant to be 
striven for. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, “the majority, 
insofar as it is analytically included in the abstract standard, is 
never anybody, it is always Nobody” (ATP: 105). The minor 
and micropolitical, on the other hand, are the fissures that 
break away from major, delineations from the norm that hold a 
virtual potential for a different subjective emergences or 
becomings. 
 
It’s helpful at this point to refer to the work of Kafka, which 
Deleuze and Guattari closely associate with minor creation, 
specifically, ‘minor literature’. Kafka, as a Jew living in Prague, 
is in many ways removed from both the Czech milieu in which 
he writes, but is also cut off from the German language which 
serves as the official standard of the intelligence in Prague at 
that time. Despite his position as somewhat of an outsider in 
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relation to these molar surroundings, he, out of necessity, is 
forced to write in the official, “major” language of German-- an 
“oppressive”, “paper language” that is both territorially and 
socially removed from his experience. He writes from what 
Deleuze and Guattari refer to as a position of “impossibility”, or 
an alienated, ghettoized situation in relation to the “major” that 
surrounds him on all sides (K: 16-17). So while the minor could 
be said to emanate from a position that is removed or swept to 
the margins of what the major defines as permissible and 
desirable, the minor takes the major form--in this case 
German--as its venue of expression. This is the first point of 
any minor creation: it comes from a “cramped space” of 
impossibility, and is forced to find its means of expression in 
what constitutes the major or molar standard. The minor, in 
the case of writing, is to “live in a language that is not [your] 
own” (K:19). 
 
Though the minor uses the major form to advance itself, minor 
production deterritorializes the major form in its productive 
process: “Prague German is a deterritorialized language, 
appropriated for strange and minor uses” (K: 17). Kafka takes 
the German language and makes it intensive and vibratory, 
using language in productive way that opposes “all symbolic or 
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even significant or simply signifying uses” (K: 19). The 
language is bent, and becomes something other than itself as it 
is bastardized and intensified. This same minor relationship is 
found in African-American culture and literature, Deleuze and 
Guattari tell us, where the major form of ‘proper’ American 
English becomes altered through ebonic transformation (K: 
17). The figure of the black American, a minor figure, is forced 
to express their minor desires through the major form, but 
through the process, creates a new language, a new sensibility. 
So while minorities are, as Nicholas Thoburn puts it, “a 
condition of those who lack these resources, or who experience 
them as oppressive or inadequate” they take a hold of the 
major, de-subjectify and de-signify it, creating something new 
that speaks to their position. In this way, minor productions 
are “seeds, crystals of becoming whose value is to trigger 
uncontrollable movements and deterritorializations of the 
mean or majority” (ATP: 106 cited in Thoburn, 2003). As 
Nicholas Thoburn further summarizes, “It is from their [the 
minority’s] very cramped and complex situations that politics 
emerges – no longer as a process of facilitating and bolstering 
identity, or ‘becoming-conscious’, but as a process of 
innovation, of experimentation, and of the complication of life, 
in which forms of community, techniques of practice, ethical 
 248
demeanours, styles, knowledges, and cultural forms are 
composed” (Thoburn, 2003: 8). 
 
The deterritorializations set in motion by minor figures are, as 
is the case of Kafka’s minor literature, not strictly individual 
and subjective in character. Minor compositions are 
immediately collective enunciations. They are of the pack and 
rhizomatic form, of which I previously spoke. The minor 
writer, for instance, is a subject that pushes forth a 
deterritorialization, but that deterritorializing process is 
already at work in a common field below the surface of 
perceptibility; “what each author says individually already 
constitutes a common action” (K: 17). Thus, another 
characteristic of minor or micro productions is that they are 
collective enunciations within, but against the major, 
bastardizing and deterritorializing the latter: “the minority is 
the becoming of everybody, one’s potential becoming to the 
extent that one deviates from the model” (ATP: 105, cited in 
Thoburn, 2003). Minor productions, like the war machine, 
connect immediately to a collectivity; they are articulations of a 
desire that circulate and build below the thresholds of 
representation and consciousness that will deterritorialize the 
major or molar model itself. 
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Again, the discussions of minor and micropolitics reiterate 
much that has already been covered, but gives it political 
determinacy. I would argue that design labor draws largely 
upon the microproductions that escape models of linguistic 
and cognitive qualification. These productions on the BWO are 
moving, or deterritorialization--they take the designer in new 
and unforeseen directions, escaping the coded and stagnant 
forms of meaning. These microproductions are collective, too--
they are produced by the social at large, by the commons or 
urban milieu as collectivity. 
 
Cultural Labor and Affective Deterritorializations 
 
At this point it is worth taking a moment to bring the lessons of 
Part 3 discussed so far back into conversation with one of the 
other fundamental concerns of this thesis—capitalist 
production and cultural labor. How does this field that I have 
laid out through reference to the Deleuzoguattarian concepts 
of the BWO, deterritorialization, war machines, and micro or 
minor proliferations relate to how capitalism and cultural 
labor functions? To begin to bridge this gap, it is important to 
understand that for Deleuze and Guattari, capitalism is not a 
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closed system that creates its own energetic, propelling force 
but, instead, is an open system that requires an outside energy 
source for its proliferation. For if it were to be a completely 
closed system, as classical economists imagined it was, it 
would be become entropic. In other words, capitalism does not 
self-renew, or produce its own means of creativity; it is not a 
system of equilibrium, but, as Steven Shaviro argues, one that 
requires a flux of creative energy from outside itself: 
 
“Capital is not a closed, self-contained, self-renewing system 
[…]. Rather, it is what Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers 
call a dissipative structure, a far-from-equilibrium 
conductor of flows of energy. If the socius were only able to 
feed back upon itself, and live upon its own resources, it 
would either suffer a short circuit and quickly burn out, or 
else succumb to entropy” (Shaviro, 2008: n.p.). 
 
If capitalism does not produce its own energetic flows, but is 
rather a sort of ‘conductor’, it must obtain its creative source 
from an arena that is not within itself. It requires what Deleuze 
and Guattari refer to in AO as a “production of production”, a 
“primary production” or “an energy-machine” (AO: 4). This 
primary production is what I have thus far spoke of as the 
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production of the BWO, or the virtual, preindividual plane 
which I have associated with affect. It is a deterritorializing 
force built from micro or minor relations of virtuality. These 
virtual deterritorializations or lines of flight will form the 
initial process of creativity on which capital will attach itself to. 
To put this more concretely, and in the words of Guattari, 
“capitalism has a very peculiar character: its lines of flight […] 
are the conditions of its own operation. It is constituted by a 
generalized decoding of all flux, fluctuations of wealth, 
fluctuations of work, fluctuations of language, fluctuations of 
art, etc..” (C: 47). In this way, capitalism can be “defined much 
more by what escapes [it] or [its] impotence than by [its] zone 
of power” (ATP: 239). Thus, in order to propagate, capitalism 
must tolerate escapes, and “in fact it requires a certain 
peripheral polymorphy” (ATP: 482). 
 
Cultural Labor and Affective Deterritorializations 
 
At this point it is worth taking a moment to bring the lessons of 
Part 3 discussed so far back into conversation with one of the 
other fundamental concerns of this thesis—capitalist 
production and cultural labor. How does this field that I have 
laid out through reference to the Deleuzoguattarian concepts 
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of the BWO, deterritorialization, war machines, and micro or 
minor proliferations relate to how capitalism and cultural 
labor functions? To begin to bridge this gap, it is important to 
understand that for Deleuze and Guattari, capitalism is not a 
closed system that creates its own energetic, propelling force 
but, instead, is an open system that requires an outside energy 
source for its proliferation. For if it were to be a completely 
closed system, as classical economists imagined it was, it 
would be become entropic. In other words, capitalism does not 
self-renew, or produce its own means of creativity; it is not a 
system of equilibrium, but, as Steven Shaviro argues, one that 
requires a flux of creative energy from outside itself: 
 
“Capital is not a closed, self-contained, self-renewing system 
[…]. Rather, it is what Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers 
call a dissipative structure, a far-from-equilibrium 
conductor of flows of energy. If the socius were only able to 
feed back upon itself, and live upon its own resources, it 
would either suffer a short circuit and quickly burn out, or 
else succumb to entropy” (Shaviro, 2008: n.p.). 
 
If capitalism does not produce its own energetic flows, but is 
rather a sort of ‘conductor’, it must obtain its creative source 
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from an arena that is not within itself. It requires what Deleuze 
and Guattari refer to in AO as a “production of production”, a 
“primary production” or “an energy-machine” (AO: 4). This 
primary production is what I have thus far spoke of as the 
production of the BWO, or the virtual, preindividual plane 
which I have associated with affect. It is a deterritorializing 
force built from micro or minor relations of virtuality. These 
virtual deterritorializations or lines of flight will form the 
initial process of creativity on which capital will attach itself to. 
To put this more concretely, and in the words of Guattari, 
“capitalism has a very peculiar character: its lines of flight […] 
are the conditions of its own operation. It is constituted by a 
generalized decoding of all flux, fluctuations of wealth, 
fluctuations of work, fluctuations of language, fluctuations of 
art, etc..” (C: 47). In this way, capitalism can be “defined much 
more by what escapes [it] or [its] impotence than by [its] zone 
of power” (ATP: 239). Thus, in order to propagate, capitalism 
must tolerate escapes, and “in fact it requires a certain 
peripheral polymorphy” (ATP: 482). 
 
If, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, capitalism depends on 
these various affective escapes from the body without organs 
to engender itself with new and novel ideas, where might we 
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locate this in respect to graphic design labor? What and where 
is graphic design labor’s own milieu of experimentation, and 
who are the characters behind these minor manifestations that 
provide the creative gold that they use for the production of 
their commodities? An answer to this question, I would like to 
suggest, begins with what I spoke of in earlier sections as the 
“social factory”. 
 
From preindividual affectivity to Individuated subjectivity 
 
In Gabriel Tarde’s 1893 Monadology and Sociology, the French 
sociologist lies out a novel way to approach the emergence of 
social phenomena. Challenging the dominant theoretical line of 
the time, Tarde sought to uncover the “infinitesimal” relations 
lying “beneath the appearance of uniformity”, a layer “whose 
depths and secrets we have not begun to fathom” (Tarde, 
1893: 45). This sort of subterranean reservoir, what Tarde 
describes as a “heterogeneous but not yet organized mass”, 
would be identified as the foundation out of which all 
phenomena emerges (Tarde, 1893: 22). As Tarde argued, it is 
out of the “microscopic and even ultra-microscopic depths of 
the infinitely small” that all forms of life actualize (Tarde, 1893: 
23). But while all forms begin within this microscopic layer, 
 255
Tarde also argued that they would, over time, gain more and 
more stability and individuality. What started out as this 
chaotic, unorganized, unconscious, and energetically charged 
amoebic state, would slowly become ordered, manipulated, 
and turned into a very organized, and representable structure. 
Everything for Tarde followed this trajectory, even the 
industrial developments he was witnessing during his time: 
 
Industry, from a primitive phase where each does whatsoever 
and howsoever he likes, evolves rapidly to a second phase 
where professions and corporations are established, with their 
fixed and traditional processes of manufacture… The 
incoherence and administrative quirks […] in its embryonic 
state are gradually replaced by unity, stable administration and 
centralized power (Tarde, 1893: 41). 
 
Writing many decades later, Deleuze and Guattari laid out their 
own schizoanalytic appraisal of capitalism and, like Tarde’s 
before them, they identify economic development as starting 
from an infinitesimal field of chaos (what has been discussed in 
this chapter in terms of the BWO and in the previous chapter 
as the affective level of virtuality), but tending towards the sort 
of  ‘second phase’ Tarde speaks of that orders, defines and 
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organizes the prior level. The layer we spoke of in the previous 
chapter relating to virtual emergence and flux has a correlative 
process that is brought against it, and for every concept 
Deleuze and Guattari provide that grasps the affective leakages 
that form the bedrock for new ways of becoming, they have a 
concepts that describe a phase which controls, directs, and 
ultimately de-radicalizes the prior. 
 
In ATP Deleuze and Guattari denote this latter layer with 
reference to what they call the “plane of organization” (PO 
hereafter), which is deployed by capitalism and other power 
constellations against what can be considered the plane of 
consistency and BWO. The PO is the opposite of the BWO; it is 
the ‘organism’ that the BWO constantly tries to ward off, often 
unsuccessfully. The PO constantly attempts to build up “a 
stratum on the BWO”, a stratum that feeds off the BWO, cutting 
into its flows and ultimately organizing it up (ATP: 176). In this 
sense, the PO is “stratifying” in that it orders the unordered 
milieu that is the BWO. It is described as process of 
“sedimentation”, “coagulation”, “folding”, and “recoiling”—and, 
most importantly, “accumulation”--wherein the energetic 
composition of the BWO is tamed and drawn into a new 
organized and hierarchized system (ATP: 176).  The different 
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affective singularities of the BWO are brought into new 
compositions, creating different subjects, objects, and 
ultimately systems and structures, or “organisms” (ATP: 176). 
 
Whereas the BWO is associated with the movement of 
deterritorialization, the PO is aligned with a process of 
reterritorialization. Reterritorializations, as already 
introduced, are processes in which the deterritorializing flows 
of the BWO slow down and become solidified or stabilized into 
specific territories. These territories can take a number of 
different forms that are not simply spatially defined. As 
Deleuze and Guattari write, “anything serve as a 
reterritorialization” and “’stand for’ the lost territory [which 
disappears in the process of deterritorialization]”, including “a 
being, an object, a book, an apparatus or a system” (ATP: 560). 
Thus, to paraphrase an earlier excerpt from Deleuze and 
Guattari, what capitalism deterritorializes on the one hand, it 
immediately tries to reterritorialize on the other by instigating 
the PO; while capitalism constantly deterritorializes, such 
deterritorializations are simultaneously “overlaid by 
reterritorializations on property, work and money” (ATP: 560). 
In this way, the schizophrenic lines of flight that capitalism 
pushes forth are at the same time grasped, controlled and 
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brought into its own body, and the charge and energetic 
intensity of the BWO is usurped and channeled into its own 
machinery and relations of production, pushing it forward. 
This is a process of sewchering up affective flows, which 
“indicates their relative stoppage, like a point of accumulation 
that plugs or seals the lines of flight, performs a general 
reterritorialization, and brings the flows under a single flow…” 
(ATP: 243). 
 
One of the primary reterritorializations that the BWO takes is 
in the form of significations. Signification is crucial in order to 
control the affective and nonlinguistic character of the BWO 
and align the later with a central power. As Guattari argues, 
“systems of signification are always linked with formations of 
power and each time the formations of power intervene in 
order to provide the significations and significative behaviors, 
the goal is always to hierarchize them, to organize and make 
them compatible with the central formation of power…” (C: 
286). In the process of reterritorializing the BWO, the PO side 
of capitalism assigns affective power a sign, or attaches affects 
to a meaning which capital prescribes or finds compatible with 
its own organization. Affects “go through representatives, and 
result from a representation” (C: 277). This process of 
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conversion is what Guattari calls “semiotic subjugation”, where 
various forms of affective, aesthetic and bodily becomings, “are 
reduced to the dominant language, the language of power 
which coordinates its syntactic regulation with speech 
production in its totality” (C: 283). 
 
In this process of assigning affects with significations and 
meanings, the BWO is reduced to an individual expression. 
Whereas the BWO and its affects are multitudinal and 
undefined by meanings, the PO bends them into “systems of 
enunciation [that] tend toward the individuation of 
enunciation and toward the degeneration of collective 
arrangements of enunciation” (C: 283). As Guattari continues, 
“one moves toward a situation where the entirety of complex 
systems of [affective] expression […] is abandoned for an 
individuation that implies the position of a speaker and an 
auditor” (C: 283). Here the ‘rhizomatic’, ‘pack’ character of the 
BWO is turned into univocal frame that fits within capitalism’s 
intentions; the many differences and gradients of the affective 
field become one meaning. To borrow from the previous 
section, we might say that the minority productions of the 
BWO, with their singularities that immediately connect to a 
multidimensional collectivity of difference, is made to “speak” 
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or signify itself in accordance with a central and transcendent, 
singular voice. The affective becomings that carry a multitude 
of singularities and potentialities are thus reduced to One—
one meaning, one sign, one emotion, one organization, etc. 
 
A different way of understanding the reductive process 
enacted by the PO is to say that the diffuse and rhizomatic 
deterritorializing lines of the BWO are, as Deleuze and Guattari 
put it, “conjugated”. While deterritorialization is all about 
leakage and flow of non-conscious and non-representative 
affects, the conjugation of these flows occurs when the overlaid 
signifier leads to “their relative stoppage, like a point of 
accumulation that plugs or seals the lines of flight, performs a 
general reterritorialization, and brings the flows under a single 
flow capable of overcoding them” (ATP: 243). Thus, not only is 
there an act of reduction going on, but in the process 
deterritorializing, the nonsignifying intensities are usurped 
and made to resonate with a ‘single flow’ that overcodes them. 
A type of unification happens on the BWO where, to use terms 
from the previous section, a molar flow directs and makes the 
micropolitical or minor productions speak or signify on its 
behalf. In Guattari’s words, “in industrial societies this richness 
of [affective] expression is attenuated; all énoncés have to be 
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translatable to the language that encodes dominant meanings” 
(C: 241). Not only is the variable and rhizomatic character of 
the BWO reduced to an individuality through 
reterritorialization and overcoding, but an individuality that is 
‘molar’, ‘major’, or ‘macro’. It is in this way that Guattari 
explains: “what capitalism [capitalism] wants is: 1) people to 
express themselves in a way the confirms the division of labor; 
2) desire to be only expressed in a way that the system can 
recoup or only if it is linearized, quantified in systems of 
production” (C:284). 
 
In addition to unifying, the process of reterritorialization 
stratifies the BWO into solidified categories that reinforce and 
resonate with the molar line that overcodes it. The plane of 
organization arranges the BWO into a number of “classes or 
segments” with “binary organization” (ATP: 243; 248). It 
names the BWO into distinctions that follow the imperative of 
the main overcoding line or molarity of capitalism: worker-
boss, male-female, etc. In this way, “classes are indeed 
fashioned from masses; they crystalize them”, meaning that 
from the very diverse and rhizomatic milieu of the mass arise 
particular partitionary codes that order that milieu according 
to the major overcoding line (ATP: 235). This is also 
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understood in Deleuze’s terms as a process of ‘segmentation’ 
that attaches onto the affective line of deterritorializations and 
both gives it an identity or ‘code’ and makes sure that identity 
matches with the overcoding line or molarity’s foundations. 
 
To say that the PO and the process of reterritorialization 
provide meanings and significations is another way to say that 
a certain identity or subjectivity is produced in this process 
(worker, student, manager, women, etc.). In other words, 
reterritorialization not only cuts the BWO into discernable 
parts coded by language, it also creates ways of being and 
identities. Affects are forced to signify themselves, but they are 
forced to do so within the bounds of a specific capitalist way of 
life: 
 
“The exercise of power by means of the semiosis of Capital 
proceeds concurrently with a control from above social 
segments, and by a constant subjugation of each 
individual’s life […] There is nothing less individual than 
capitalist subjectivity. The overcoding by Capital of human 
activities, thoughts and feelings makes all particularized 
modes of subjectivation equivalent and resonant with each 
other. Subjectivity, so to speak, is nationalized. Values of 
 263
desire are reordered in an economy grounded on 
systematic dependence of use-values in relation to 
exchange values, to the point of making this opposition 
meaningless. Strolling ‘freely’ down a street, or in the 
country, breathing fresh air, or singing a bit loudly have 
become quantifiable activities from a capitalist point of 
view [...] The capitalist order claims that individuals should 
only live for an exchange system, a general translatability 
of all values…” (SS: 258). 
 
As Guattari explains in this excerpt, the individual models of 
subjectivity allowed in capitalism are somewhat superficial. 
While they carry their particular nuances, some of which are 
important nuances, they share an important aspect in that they 
all sustain and propagate the fundamental exchange 
relationship which capital depends on. While someone might 
be particularly interested in art or literature, such a subjective 
relationship is only tenable to the extent that that individuality 
resonates with the larger imperative of capital accumulation. 
In this way the micropolitical productions of becoming are 
connected, channeled, and defined within a matrix in 
accordance to a molar standard, which is dictated by the 
capitalist relation. Here we could say that this side of 
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capitalism disperses all sorts of “axioms” which do “not 
constitute the cutting edge” [deterritorializtion], but “is much 
more a stopping point, a reordering that prevents decoded 
semiotic flows from […] escaping in all directions” (ATP: 509). 
Axioms create molarities out of minorities, constantly trying to 
define and denumerate them, bending them into their own 
body; providing a space for them, but a space that prevents the 
minorities own becomings; translating their effervescent 
desires into those that support capitalism’s objectives (see 
ATP: 519). 
 
At this point it is useful to think of this organizational side of 
capitalism as belonging to what I introduced in the previous 
chapter as “the level of qualification” found in Brian Massumi’s 
writings. As Massumi argues, the affective or intensive level of 
proliferation has a correlative plane that arrests and ‘doubles’ 
the former, linearizing, signifying, linguistifying and fixing it 
within defined boundaries. Qualification is an act of “indexing” 
the BWO into “conventional meanings” which dampens the 
latter, delimiting the expression of the event “in favor of 
structure” (2002: 24; 27). In this process, not only is the level 
of affective intensity made to signify itself into “semiotically 
formed progressions, into narrativizable action-reaction 
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circuits, into functions and meaning”, but it is also, at the same 
time made “conscious” and reterritorialized into subjectivities 
that are ordered around a molar norm. 
 
Foucault, Power, and Representation 
 
The understanding of capitalism presented so far has a number 
of parallels with the descriptions of power that we find in the 
writings of Michel Foucault around the same period. Both 
Deleuze and Guattari and Foucault’s projects are similar in a lot 
of ways, and many of these similarities are highlighted within 
Deleuze’s book, Foucault (1986/1988), as well as his essays 
and interviews dedicated to Foucault’s work. In this section I 
want to pursue some of the parallels between the analyses of 
capitalist power presented thus far and the descriptions of 
power found in Foucualt’s Discipline and Punish and The Will 
to Knowledge. This process will help to not only further clarify 
many of the ideas presented thus far, but in a different way, the 
work of Foucault goes a little further than Deleuze and 
Guattari’s in specifying various techniques in which the 
affective or intensive side of becoming that capitalism depends 
on gets translated and organized into very solidified and 
structured forms of individuality and subjectivities. Foucault 
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clarifies how power shapes the unsayable, the 
unrepresentative and unconscious into specific subjectivities, 
norms and representations. In Deleuze’s analysis of Foucualt, 
we witness a Deleuze that is working out his own 
understandings of power. In this sense, Foucualt serves as a 
way in which we better understand Deleuze’s own project, and 
many of the expressions that we find in Anti-Oedipus are 
worked through alongside Foucualt’s own material. 
 
Prior to the 18th century, Foucault tells us that power mostly 
worked through means of repression. In other words, power at 
this time—what he calls juridical power--acted primarily 
subtractive way, either through punishing bodies, through 
taking life, banishment, or through the denial of existence. In a 
certain way this juridical power could only say “no”; it could 
only respond negatively to any behavior that it opposed (WK: 
138- 139): 
 
“[P]ower was exercised mainly as a means of deduction…a 
subtraction mechanism, a right to appropriate a portion of 
wealth, a tax of products, goods and services, labor and 
blood, levied at subjects. Power in this instance was 
essentially a right of seizure: of things, time, bodies and 
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ultimately life itself; it culminated in the privilege to seize 
hold of life in order to suppress it” (WK: 136). 
 
Thus, one could say, juridical power can either destroy, or 
ignore, and when meeting any type of resistance, it “has no 
other option but to try to minimize it” (SP: 789). Foucault 
recognizes this type of power in the repressive views towards 
sexuality in the Victorian era, for instance. Sex, seen as 
something morally or biologically dangerous at the time, and 
was “driven out, denied, and reduced to silence” (WK: 4). 
Power’s injunction at this period was a “sentence to 
disappear…to silence, an affirmation of nonexistence, and, by 
implication, an admission that there was nothing to say about 
such things, nothing to see, and nothing to know” (WK: 4). If 
certain deviant sexualities were able to proliferate, they were 
made to do so in the shadows, in red light districts, or brothels, 
not acknowledged in “circuits of production, at leas in those of 
profit” (WK: 4). Power worked primarily through censorship, 
which subjugated sexual discourse and visibility, expunging its 
appearance. 
 
Later, around the 18th century, Foucault identifies the 
emergence of a different power that is much more focused on 
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the proactive investment of the body and its affects or 
capacities and involves a number of techniques aimed at ways 
to “foster life” and “invest in life through and through” (WK: 
138-139). Power at this time moves from the very restricted, 
juridical sense, where it was only exercised negatively, into a 
form that is more pre-emptive, and more involved in creating 
and fostering specific forms of life, or in disallowing others. In 
this sense, Foucault calls power an “action upon an action”, 
similar to Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of capital as a 
“production of a production” (SP: 789). As Foucault explains, 
“[w]hat defines the relationship of power is that it is a mode of 
action which does not act directly and immediately on others. 
Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on 
existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or 
future” (SP: 788). Power in this inflection does not work 
through violence, through killing, inflicting pain, etc., but 
through stimulating, modifying, and distributing the forces of 
the body; power doesn’t simply say ‘no’ to relations, but rather 
“incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; 
in the extreme it contains or forbids absolutely…” (SP: 789). 
Power becomes what Foucault calls biopolitical or biopower, 
which is fixed on “optimizing forces, aptitudes, and life in 
general” (WK: 141). 
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In biopower we could say that instead of power repressing 
everything, power requires or even prescribes a certain 
amount of freedom. As Foucault argues, “power is exercised 
only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free” (SP: 
790). Individuals and collectivities must be free in the sense 
that they operate within “a field of possibilities in which 
several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse 
compartments may be realized” and this freedom is at times a 
“precondition for the exercise of power” (SP: 790). In fact, 
Foucault even suggests that power should be understood first 
and foremost from the position those who resist it (SP: 780). 
Power requires deviation and resistance, for “it would not be 
possible for power relations to exist without points of 
insubordination, which by definition are means of escape” (SP: 
794).  Deviants are in many ways most important to power’s 
operation, their lives, desires, and actions continually called 
forth, analyzed and spoken about. This is observed particularly 
in reference to sexuality in Foucault’s work, where the desires 
and actions of subaltern groups, not the molar standard, 
become of central concern: “The legitimate couple, with its 
regular sexuality, had a right to more discretion…On the other 
hand, what came under scrutiny was the sexuality of children, 
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mad men and women, and criminals; the sensuality of those 
who did not like the opposite sex; revelries, obsessions…” (WK: 
38). These figures, “scarcely noticed in the past” were now 
made visible (WK: 39). 
 
In this sense, we could say that for Foucault, the process of 
optimizing life and its forces goes hand in hand with a certain 
type of illumination. Unlike Juridical power, which allowed for 
affects, desires, and bodies to remain in “the shade”, biopower 
operates through “compulsory visibility” (DP: 187), and 
whereas death, denial and banishment was the ultimate 
exercise of power in older forms, it now became “power’s limit, 
the moment that escapes it” (WK: 138). To speak here of 
illumination is to say that knowledge of the body, its desires 
and forces became central to power’s functioning and grasp. 
For Foucault, power and knowledge become co-constitutive in 
the rise of biopolitics: “power produces knowledge […]; power 
and knowledge imply on another; […] there is no power 
relation without the correlative constitution of the field of 
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and 
constitute at the same time power relations” (DP: 27). Thus the 
constant and uninterrupted soliciting of knowledge becomes 
one of the main pillars of power at this time, and various 
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techniques arose to facilitate the production of knowledges of 
body, of life, and of desire because, as Foucault insists, “power 
can’t be exercised without knowing the inside of people’s 
minds, without exploring their souls, without making them 
reveal their innermost secrets” (SP: 783). In this way the 
insistence of power is not merely a declaration of ‘thou shalt 
not’, but a prescription to speak, to act, to make all forms of life, 
particularly those of the subaltern, visible. 
 
The visibility and freedom afforded and even prescribed by 
biopower does not mean to say that all forms of life become 
equivalent, and that all actions are accorded with the same 
degree of preference. Here it is important to understand that 
power has two poles: it both incites, but congruently, and at 
the same time, it modifies. The proliferation and incitement of 
life is crucial, but those proliferations are also acted upon; 
power must “have methods […] capable of optimizing forces, 
aptitudes, and life in general” while at the same develop 
techniques for governing these same proliferations (WK: 141). 
Governing for Foucault does not simply refer to “political 
structures or the management of states” but more inclusively 
as “the way in which the conduct of individuals or groups may 
be directed” (SP: 790, emphasis mine). Governing life in this 
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sense means making sure its forces are manipulated, 
translated, normalized and, in a word, disciplined. It’s for this 
reason that when Foucault speaks of biopower in WK, he 
insists that it goes hand in hand with what he defines as 
‘disciplinary power’ in DP. Discipline is one pole of biopower, 
crucial for its proliferation because it is both the mechanism 
through which the body and its capacities become useful, but 
also the mechanism that serves to create a specific type of 
body, a specific type of action. This is particularly relevant 
when we consider capitalism, which Foucault argues “would be 
impossible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the 
machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena 
of population to economic processes” (WK: 141). Capitalism 
requires both the growth of forms of life, “their reinforcement 
as well as their availability” and proliferation, but also their 
docility and modification (WK: 141). In this way we can say 
that the proliferation and accumulation of life and knowledges 
of life is not a benign process, but rather coincides with the 
disciplining of the body and its action. Without knowledge, the 
classification of behavior and the production of the biopolitical 
subject is impossible. Knowledge and discipline are co-
constitutive. This is where the notion of power being an “action 
over an action” truly gains meaning. 
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Consider the example of Foucault’s analysis of sexuality once 
more. Prior to the proliferation of sexual discourse beginning 
in the 18th century, Foucault argues that discussions of 
sexuality were largely absent from the public sphere. Sex as an 
action was unqualified, and if there was any truth to be gleaned 
from sex, it was in the “pleasure itself”, “evaluated in terms of 
intensity, its specific quality, its duration, its reverberations in 
the body and the soul” (WK: 57). This formulation of sex, what 
Foucault calls ars erotica, quickly shifted into the practice of 
what he terms scientia sexualis where sex had to be known, 
evaluated, qualified, and ultimately given meaning (WK: 58). 
This latter formation was the emergence of a tight and 
reciprocal relationship between what he calls “knowledge-
power” in which eliciting knowledge of sex and sexual acts 
became an obsessive task, bound up with a power that could 
then discipline and codify sexual acts. Here the Christian ritual 
of the confession from the middle ages became the template 
for inducing knowledges about sexual acts, desires, and 
thoughts. The confession was “inscribed at the heart of 
procedures of individualization by power”, and became a 
constant technology of power used by educators, doctors, 
psychiatrists, and lovers (WK: 59). Individuals were compelled 
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to confess all sexual desires and actions, none of which was too 
small or too trivial. In all these modes of confession, whether it 
be someone telling their psychiatrist what sexual dreams they 
had, or whether it be even an author describing their 
innermost secrets, the process of the confession existed as a 
means through which “fleeting impressions” were translated 
into “certainties of consciousness” (WK: 60). Hence the 
confession was a technology that took a very intensive, non-
qualified relationship and turned it into something conscious, 
something reflected upon, and something that could tell us 
something; we move from sex being something “obscure”, 
“elusive”, “clandestine” whose energy “escaped observation” 
towards sex being integrated into scientific discourse, a 
discourse that became unambiguous (WK: 66). 
 
Here the relationship between power and knowledge becomes 
more apparent, for turning intensive bodily relationships into 
forms of highly conscionable and unambiguous forms of 
knowledge is never a benign process for Foucault. The eliciting 
of knowledge always goes hand in hand with a form of 
evaluation of that knowledge, an ordering or interpretation of 
it that forms a norm or a center. In other words, the confession 
is always done so in relation to someone else who evaluates, an 
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individual or group who has the power to “forgive, console, and 
direct” (WK: 66, emphasis mine). To put this in Foucault’s 
terms, the production of knowledge has two stages: “the 
revelation of the confession had to be coupled with the 
decipherment of what it said” (WK: 66).  The second process 
here takes on a duty of not only coding knowledge, but of 
placing it in categories around a norm. Sexual acts and desires 
were transposed into “the normal and pathological” (WK: 67). 
Here homosexual acts, which have always subsisted, largely in 
the shadows, are brought out into the open, but in that process, 
the sexual act turns into an identity that is judged against the 
molar standard of the heterosexual white male. In other words, 
the eliciting of knowledge is formed into categories of 
normalcy, and delinquency with the white, male heterosexual 
as the standard. As Foucualt writes, “Not only did [power] 
speak of sex and compel everyone to do so; it also set out to 
formulate the uniform truth of sex”  (WK: 69). Thus the 
constant eliciting of knowledge, and the replacement of saying 
“no” with the prescription of having to speak, is the basis of 
biopower’s proliferation. All this is not to say, however, that 
that injunction to speak does not involve mechanisms to 
ensure that those proliferations of knowledge are not ordered, 
interpreted, and given a certain meaning in relation to power. 
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Up to this point we have spoken about three basic tenets of 
biopower: the eliciting of the body, its intensities and desires; 
the codifying and qualifying of those intensities into forms of 
conscionable knowledge; and, finally, the ordering of that 
knowledge, resulting in the production of a norm around 
which all actions are based. If we refer to Foucault’s earlier 
work of DP, these primary components are made even clearer, 
and made more relevant in relation to capitalist production 
and forms of work within this system. Here Foucualt 
introduces us to what he refers to as ‘disciplinary power’—a 
manifestation of power he latter attributes in the WK as part of 
what he refers to as biopower— which is centered on the body 
and bodily capacities. Specifically, disciplinary power aims to 
elicit the full capacity of the body, optimizing output, while 
concurrently making sure those bodily capacities are 
disciplined into particular modes of usefulness and specific 
confines of permissibility and desirability. In other words, 
similar to biopower, it both enhances and elicits, while also 
channels and manipulates. 
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Part 3: Graphic Design Labor and Affectual Control 
 
In this final section, I wish to offer a sort of vignette, or case 
study that helps to clarify the theories I have put forth in this 
dissertation thus far. In doing so, it also serves to arrive at the 
particularity of the theory I am putting forth, and the necessity 
to return to Deleuze and Guattari’s work to make sense of 
contemporary forms of cultural labor. Here I wish to focus on 
the work of design, which is an occupation that has both grown 
in the numbers of employees, but also in the centrality of their 
work to the occupation within the contemporary capitalism.  
 
I will begin this section briefly introducing the occupation of 
graphic design, offering some statistics that situate it within 
the current economy. I will then lie out a definition of the field 
and then move onto how I constructed my methodology. 
Afterwards, I will then get into the interview data, which in 
many ways corroborates the thesis I have put forward thus far. 
I will show how design labor escapes the traditional confines of 
the labor process outlined by Marx in Section 1, pointing 
towards a sort of social factory that is described by 
autonomists. I then introduces some data that suggests the 
“basin of immaterial labor” that designers draw from differs in 
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that it is in many ways, aural, hard to consciously digest, and, in 
a word, “affective”. This affective realm that designers draw 
from relates closely to what Deleuze and Guattari call the Body 
Without Organs—it is unformed, unstructured, effervescent 
and escaping meaning, yet productive and moving.  
 
Once I outline the more affectual foundations of design work, 
and reveal their importance to the design process, I will then 
move forward to discuss a bit about how these affects are 
transformed, mediated, and disciplined within the work place. 
This management of affect is akin, I would like to argue, with 
what Deleuze and Guattari describe as “the plane of 
organization” or the reterratorializing characteristics of 
capitalism that transform, organize, and ultimately delimit the 
affectual and deterritorializing power of the BWO.  
 
Ultimately, the data I will introduce will help to illustrate how 
one might situate the role of cultural labor like graphic design 
within contemporary circuits of capitalism. For one, I will wish 
to in a way challenge both the orthodox Marxist view of 
production, which is restricted to the labor process, while at 
the same time challenging the autonomist view that seems to 
view all types of production similarly. I will argue that Deleuze 
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and Guattari offer a more appropriate way to consider cultural 
labor by forwarding a two-tiered approach to production. For 
me, while production has increasingly escaped the confines of 
the traditional labor process, there is still a specificity of that 
process, and that is where cultural labor like design work is so 
integral. It is cultural labor that serves to both extract an ever 
increasing amount of value from affects produced within 
society at large, but it is also their labor process, and the 
control of that labor process, that is integral for delimiting and 
deradicalizing the deterritorializing power of affect.  
 
The importance of Design 
 
In recent years, figures like Lash and Urry, and Allen Scott have 
helped to adjust our attention towards the ways the creative 
and aesthetic productions have become fundamental to the 
wider production of goods and services today (Lash and Urry, 
1994; Scott: 2001). As these marketed meanings and 
immaterial aspects of a commodity have become more 
dominant in production (Hancock and Tyler, 2001: 29; Hartley, 
2005: 23), design has positioned itself as an integral part of the 
new economy.   As Keedy (1998) argues, starting in the 1980s, 
designers have held a ‘unique position in culture, one that 
 280
could have any number of political or ideological agendas’. This 
speaks to not only their unique position within the production 
of value, but also their increasing role in the manipulation and 
dissemination of culture. In this way, designers are not simply 
producers of a commodity, but as Andrew Blauvelt (1994) 
argues, they are also producers of cultures.  
 
The importance of graphic design is not only represented by 
their qualitative importance, but also quantitatively reflected. 
In 2009, the UK Design Council estimated that there were 
232,000 graphic designers employed, and that number was 
expected to consistently rise. The Department of Culture, 
Media and Sport estimated the total revenue generated by 
designers in 2000 to be £26.7 billion. Indeed, the value of a 
commodity in recent decades has increasingly been associated 
with not strictly the functional qualities of the product itself, 
but the aesthetic design elements that embellish a specific 
commodity. As Lash and Urry comment, “the design 
component comprises and increasing component of the value 
of goods” (1994: 15). This is perhaps why even the estimations 
of economic importance may be understated. Utility, in many 
ways, is not the sole, or, in many cases, not even the primary 
object of desire within the market. Sure, a functional watch, 
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pair of shoes, or car is nice, but the aesthetic components that 
dress the object are just as, or even more important today. This 
includes the design of the objects themselves, such as the 
critically important product design that Apple has become 
famous for, to the brand image that graphic designers build 
around marketing the product.  As Power (2004) explains, it’s 
not “just the aesthetic aspects of the product” that are 
important in order to compete in the market, but also the 
design related to “marketing and appeal to the consumer”.  
 
Profiling the Design Industry 
 
It is for reasons such as those mentioned above that the 
occupation of “design” is so difficult to define. This is 
particularly true in recent decades due to technological 
transformations that have opened design up in a number of 
different venues of experience. It’s also difficult due to the 
nearly endless forms one could say is designed. For the sake of 
being clear going forward on what I mean when I speak of 
design, I refer to the definition taken from the DCMS (2000), 
which breaks the occupation down into a number of different 
categories, expressed below.  
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Communications: 
Graphics, brand, print, information design, corporate 
identity 
 
Product and industrial: 
Consumer/household products, furniture, industrial 
design (including Automotive design, engineering design, 
medical products) 
 
Interior and exhibition: 
Retail design, office planning/workplace design, lighting, 
display systems, and exhibition design 
 
Fashion and textiles: 
Fashion and textiles 
 
Digital and multimedia: 
Website, animation, film and television, digital design, 
interaction design 
 
Service design: 
Although no examples of service design were offered, a 
definition of this discipline was provided by the Design 
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Council: ‘Service design is an approach concerned with 
the design of services. Service design can be both tangible 
and intangible, and can involve communication, 
environment And behaviours.’ This was read out to 
survey participants who required an 
explanation of the term. 
 
Within my own work, the designers represented most tended 
to fall under the “communications” tagline above. I will get into 
the particularities of the occupation further into this section, 
but these individuals more often than not worked either 
freelance or for a small to medium firm, producing branding 
documents and illustration, or print work. That said, I did 
speak with fashion designers and product designers as well, 
and their contributions are also included here.  
 
In addition to segmenting the occupation by these different 
facets of design, design is often split further into categories 
based upon whether designers work freelance, for an agency, 
or work in-house for a larger company. Within the UK, those 
numbers are 65,900, 82,500, and 83,600 respectively (DII, 
2010). Among the design agencies, an overwhelming majority 
of them (87%) employ less than 10 people. The average age of 
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a designer employed in the UK is 38, and the occupation is 
largely white and male dominated. Geographically, in the UK, 
designers and agencies tend to be concentrated most in and 
around London. 23% of design businesses are based in London 
proper, 17% in the surrounding Southeast areas, and a further 
10% in the East. Following these dominant areas, 8% of 
businesses are in the West Midlands, 7% in the Northwest, 
Yorkshire, and Scotland, respectively.   
 
Despite the growing visibility of design both economically and 
culturally, studies on design are noticeably lacking. Much of the 
literature tends to radiate from within the industry itself, 
coming from magazine publications such as Eye 
(www.eyemagazine.com), and Varoom (www.varoom-
mag.com), or from publications such as Phillip Meggs History of 
Graphic Design or books that tend to read more like a “how to” 
manual for becoming a successful designer like Shaughnessy 
and Brook’s (2009) Studio Culture: The Secret Life of Graphic 
Design Studio. Within a more academic light, much of design 
inquiry follows a trajectory of self-criticality by designers 
themselves. There is a long history of such thought; a notable 
example is Audrey Bennett’s (2006) edited volume, Design 
Studies: Theory and Research in Graphic Design. Here, mostly 
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designers reflect on their own position within the industry of 
graphic design, how to be more receptive to their audience 
(Tyler, 2006), or social responsibility within design work 
(Frascara, 2006), for instance.   
 
Perhaps one of the reasons for the lack of design related 
studies specifically has to do with not only its historically close 
and complex relationship to the wider production of art and 
artistic inquiry, but also its overlapping relation to studies that 
fall under the larger umbrella’s of marketing, advertising and 
branding. For this reason much of the literature is non-specific 
to design work per se, but with little imagination can be easily 
applied to the design industry, if not explicitly related. In this 
way, we could say that much of the emergent work on those 
aforementioned fields can be applied and informative to the 
specific work of design, and, as such, the wider relationships of 
graphic design hold a strong bond to a lot of the literature that 
seeks to understand and critique the “cultural” and “creative” 
industries. For this reason, the inquiry that follows holds both 
a unique position in that it examines graphic design and its 
relationship to the wider circuits of capitalist production and 
capitalist control, but also broad in that it acts as a window into 
the much wider and complex relationships between the 
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occupation and the wider turn towards cultural production. 
Indeed, what I have been building upon, and what follows, is 
explicitly related to these questions. For one, what I wish to 
present, is that design work, and cultural labor more broadly, 
holds a very specific political and economic position in relation 
to the wider aesthetic and affective productions that it 
ultimately feeds from.  
 
Methodology 
 
As has been the focus of the previous sections, this section will 
center on the concept of affect, it’s role in production and 
capitalism, and how affect is disciplined and contorted into 
signifying, appropriate, and profitable forms. As such, while 
researching graphic design, there were a number of concerns 
related to researching affect in an empirical setting that guided 
my methodology. As has been covered thus far in this thesis, 
affect is an intensity that I understand as both nonconscious 
and non-signifying. This reality leads to obvious concerns 
about how one seeks to empirically uncover affect, but also 
how one seeks to analyze and discuss it. The understandings of 
affect as pre/non-conscious and non-signifying question 
modes of understanding that hinge on discourse as a site of 
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analysis. If affect is understood as pre- linguistic, then methods 
that rely on discourse become problematic in an affective 
application. Indeed, this tension is predominant in much of the 
literature on affect (Blackman, 2012; Clough, 2007; Massumi, 
2002; Sedgwick, 2003; Thrift, 2004, 2008). Wetherell (2012) 
describes this uneasiness well, writing:   
“[F] Or a large number in the social sciences, the most 
interesting thing about affect is that it is not discourse. In 
studying affect, it is claimed we are accessing a lively 
sensual realm beyond the conventional, the cognitive and 
the discursive. In this view, affect as embodied intensity is 
more instinctive and immediate than any language-based 
act such as telling a story or having conversation. 
Discourse is identified with the conscious, the planned 
and the deliberate while affect is understood as the 
automatic, the involuntary and the non-representational. 
Discourse and affect are seen as having an almost 
antagonistic relationship. Discourse tames and codifies 
affect” (Lingis, 1991; Massumi, 1996) (Wetherell, 2012: 
52).  
Furthermore, the debates around the body and subject in affect 
studies, elaborated in the previous section, problematize the 
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idea of an insular speaking subject. As Blackman and Venn 
acknowledge:  
 
“It is clear in the shift to bodies as processes (rather than 
fixed or unchanging objects or entities) that affect is 
invoked to gesture towards something that perhaps 
escapes or remains in excess of the practices of the 
‘speaking subject’. This means that some established 
methods for studying bodies may not do justice to, or, 
importantly, may perform an exclusion of processes 
which might be characterized as less visible to the 
particular technologies of observation, seeing and 
listening that characterize the humanities, and 
particularly the reliance of many of our qualitative 
methodologies on language and sight. This is 
characterized as a form of ‘representational thinking’ 
(Stewart, 2007; Thrift, 2007), which assumes that 
narrative, and producing a discursive representation of 
our research object(s), is enough to illustrate the 
mediated nature of matter, or what we might also call the 
‘matter of mediation’” (Blackman and Venn, 2010).  
In other words, the reliance on a subject of articulation, on 
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language and sight that standard forms of qualitative methods 
depend on are somewhat problematic when trying to 
understand and study affect.  
This apparent problematization of language with respect to 
affect has been noted in wider empirical studies. Writing about 
an ethnographic project on the sensory aspects of gardening, 
Chris Tilley notes that certain activities are more about ‘doing 
rather than saying’, and are ‘an escape from verbal discourse’ 
(Tilley, 2006: 328, quoted in Pink, 2009). In his research he 
found that ‘touch, sound and taste especially, were not sensory 
dimensions of the garden that were either usually verbalized 
or explicit’ (2006: 313). Similar to the literature on affect, he 
associates the non-signifying activities of gardening with 
senses that belong to bodily, non-conscious activity. For him, 
‘touch, sound and taste...remain part of the sensory 
unconscious of gardening... rarely acknowledged, thought 
about or discussed’ (2006: 314, emphasis added). In other 
words, these sensations seem to exist in an extra-linguistic 
domain, prior or outside of a conscious qualification. Katz 
(2000) similarly acknowledges this failure of discursive 
representation, stating ‘if there is anything distinctive about 
emotions, it is that, even if they commonly occur in the course 
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of speaking, they are not talk, not even just forms of 
expression, they are ways of expressing something going on 
that talk cannot grasp’ (Katz 2000: 4, quoted in Thrift, 2008: 
176).  
The aspects of affect that are tied up with an experience of 
‘doing rather than saying’ make techniques such as the oft-
employed interview limited in application. The difficulties of 
traditional methods that rely on language to be sensitive and 
reflective of affect forces one to take these concerns seriously 
when developing a methodological program. The technique of 
the interview, though still instrumental in many applications, 
can be problematic when focusing on affect and intensity. As 
Pink (2009: 84) points out,  
“...Even within more conventional discussions of 
qualitative interviewing, researchers have expressed the 
inadequacy of studies that depend solely on interviews 
for their ‘data’ to ‘understand people’s lived, situated, 
practices’ (Rapley 2004: 29). Indeed, the relationship 
between what is verbalized in interviews and knowledge 
that is not articulated in this way is itself an interesting 
question”.  
For the reasons outlined above, it is no wonder why, as Crang 
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(2002: 536) notes, there is a noteworthy lack in 
methodological literature ”that take[s] up the recent growth in 
interest in non-cognitive, embodied and haptic experiences”. 
Similarly, Latham (2003) laments that ‘we simply do not have 
the methodological resources and skills to undertake research 
that takes the sensuous, embodied, creativeness of social 
practice seriously’.  
While these limitations of language and interviewing in 
relation to affect are well received, I do think that the interview 
and written accounts of affect do hold a place in identifying 
affect if used in a way that does not confine its use to some 
process of finding and connoting hidden, signified meanings. 
Examples of identifying affective experiences and their effects 
on individuals have been effective in certain applications. In 
order to express how I believe affect can be studied through 
interviews I find it helpful to invoke Brian Massumi’s analysis 
on the difference between intensity and qualification, and how 
language can work on both these levels. Afterwards, I will 
highlight some empirical studies that help to provide a way in 
which affect can be approached through methods that trade on 
language.  
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Towards an Interview-based Approach to Affect  
 
I would like to suggest that the work of social theorists Brian 
Massumi and Felix Guattari begins to offer a way in which 
language, and in particular interviews, can be used in a way 
that “gets at” the affective components of daily life. In terms of 
the former, Brian Massumi offers a way to consider language’s 
intensive quality that is opposed and different than the more 
representational way that we traditionally think of language. 
For him the intensity of language, or what he also calls the 
“emotional” type consists of “words expressing the emotional 
tenor of [a] scene under way” (2002: 22). This level of 
intensive language is related to, but fundamentally different 
than the “factual” usage of language employed narrate and 
linearize a certain phenomenon. This later form of language is 
used to qualify and insert a specific form of meaning onto 
something that is unfolding.  
The more intensive form of language that Massumi identifies is 
important in that, unlike the language that qualifies, it instead 
resonates the affective that we have discussed. It does not try 
to give a step-by-step account of an event or scenario that has 
occurred, but serves to instead point to the occurrence of a 
change in intensity, a shift in affectivity. When it does 
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intervene, it does not seek to provide a meaning to such an 
occurrence, but instead amplifies it. Thus, language can work 
in two different ways: as either a mode of capture and 
representation, of linearizing and territorializing, or it can be a 
force for a sort of a- signifying composition that works 
affectively. This bifurcational logic is apparent in the work of 
Guattari, where he succinctly describes how language can 
potentially escape signification and become machinic, i.e. 
productive. He writes,  
‘The same semiotic material can be functioning in 
different registers. A material can be caught in both 
paradigmatic chains of production; chains of 
signification... but at the same time can function in an a-
signifying register. So what determines the difference? In 
one case, a signifier in what one might call a logic of 
discursive aggregates, i.e. a logic of representation. In the 
other case it functions in something that isn’t entirely a 
logic, what I’ve called an existential machinic, a logic of 
bodies without organs, a machinic of bodies without 
organs” (Guattari cited in O’Sullivan, 2001: 131).  
While these theoretical examples begin to bridge the divide 
and opposition that language is presumed to have with affect, 
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further empirical analysis that use the domain of language in 
attending to affect provides us with a more concrete 
understanding of how this logic can be usefully applied. Recent 
examples of understanding affect through interviews and ways 
of writing about affective experiences come closer to providing 
a framework that can be implemented in this research project.  
In Julian Henrique’s (2010) study on affect within the Jamaican 
Dancehall scene we see examples of interview excerpts that 
point to affective experiences. One respondent from his study 
seems to highlight the level of intensity, noting:  
‘There’s something about just playing that bass that goes 
right through your toes to you fingertips. And you become 
part of it . . . part of the it. It’s not music it’s a feeling, a 
sensation . . .that vibration goes all the way through you. 
It’s like an energy . . .”  
Examples like this do not particularly represent affect in 
particular emotional realms (joy, sadness, lust, heartbreak, 
etc.), but point to an experience of some sort of intensity that is 
being experienced by the participant. These are not so much 
displays of a conscious specified meaning, but of a signal that 
affectual event has taken place. In other words, these examples 
refer to ‘a structure of feelings in which "signification without 
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meaning" is created’ (Gutierrez Rodriguez, 2007)’.  
Similarly, Kathleen Stewart’s (2007) book, Ordinary Affects, 
furnishes us with an example of how affects can be spoken 
about in text. Her book is a written collage of affective 
experiences that tries to ‘provoke attention to the forces that 
come into view as habit or shock, resonance or impact’. Her 
writing offers a way to glean some sort of attunement towards 
those moments when that precarious ‘something throws itself 
together in a moment as an event and sensation’ (2007: 1). 
Instead of viewing the text as some sort of ‘demystification and 
uncovered truths’, she uses it as an object for ‘speculation’ and 
to direct attention towards affective experiences (2007: 1). In 
one of her entries, ‘A Little Accident, Like Any Other’ she 
exemplifies this style well, writing  
‘The room comes to a dead stop. All eyes and ears tune into the 
sentience of the crash still resonating in the bikers’ bodies. 
Then, slowly, taking their sweet time, people begin to offer 
questions from their tables, drawing out the details. First there 
is just the simple will to know what happened. But the talk, 
once set in motion, expands into a thicket of stories and social 
maneuverings... Little seeds of speculation begin to sprout. The 
restaurant becomes an ordinary maze of inspirations and 
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experiments” (2007: 11).  
Another way in which interviews and language can be used in 
affective studies --and indeed, can be seen in the examples 
from above-- is through positioning them in a way to elicit the 
effects of an affective experience. As Massumi denotes, affect is 
not un-analyzable. He writes, ‘It is argued here that affect is 
indeed unformed and unstructured, but nevertheless highly 
organized and effectively analyzable (it is not entirely 
containable in knowledge, but is analyzable in effect, as effect)’ 
(Massumi, 1996: 237). Furthering this line, Gilbert (2004) 
writes about the failure of auditory domains such as music to 
be signified in a linguistic way. He comes to the conclusion, 
however, that “music has physical effects which can be 
identified, described and discussed but which are not the same 
thing as it having meanings, and any attempt to understand 
how music works in culture must, as many commentators over 
the years have acknowledged, be able to say something about 
those effects without trying to collapse them into meanings”.  
Integrating a similar understanding within empirical research, 
Gutierrez-Rodriguez (2007, 2011) used interviews to look at 
affect and its relationship to migrant domestic labor in 
Germany. Arguing for a ‘discursive-deconstructive perspective’ 
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for analyzing affect, Gutierrez Rodriguez notes ‘affect denotes a 
more or less organized experience, an experience which 
probably has empowering and disempowering consequences, 
registered at the level of encounter, and not necessarily to be 
understood in linguistic terms, but which is analyzable as 
effect’ (2007). She argues that interviews can be used as tools 
to get at these ‘effects’ without following a framework of 
looking for signified meanings by ‘tracing the moments of dis-
identification or escape, so to speak, of intensity in these 
accounts’. The interview can be used in this way to also draw 
attention to moments of disruption whereby the focus is not on 
what is said, but what is left out:  
“I will trace what is "not being said". For the question I am 
dealing with here reading affect, it is the latter that 
interests us most...So, in our readings of the interviews, 
we will not restrict ourselves to attesting the reiteration 
of the interpellation, nor to a focus on the performative 
character in which this name is enacted and embodied. 
Rather, we will address the moment of transgression of 
this name by focusing on what is not said in the text and 
how affect works in it” (Gutierrez Rodriguez, 2007).  
Along similar lines, Walkerdine (2010) employed interviews in 
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order to explore affect and its relationship with trauma and 
‘community beingness’ within post-industrial towns in south 
Wales. She concurrently uses the interview in a way that pays 
‘attention to feelings that are incongruous when examined 
alongside the content of an interviewee’s account, or that 
direct the interviewer to the gaps in an interviewee’s account; 
what is left unsaid but that is communicated through other 
forms of bodily knowing’ (Blackman and Venn, 2010). This 
formulation of analysis offers a way in which interviews can be 
used to look at how affect tries to escape language, instead of 
how it becomes territorialized by language.  
Ultimately these examples have provided me with a good basis 
from which I have designed my own investigations. In my own 
interview methods, described further below, I tended to focus 
on the effects of an affectual experience, or points where some 
sort of difficulty or ambiguity resulted. This, as will be seen in 
latter sections, involved identifying slippery terms like 
“atmosphere” or “aura” that pointed to the occurrence of some 
phenomena, but that such a phenomena escaped the 
participants ability to fully qualify it in language. In this 
respect, often times it was the “gaps” or struggles that I looked 
for within the interview data, where respondents had trouble 
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with language, or where language failed them. I chose to focus 
on the words that worked along the lines of what Massumi 
called intensive or emotional that pointed to sensual 
unfoldings. 
Interview Methods  
 
Based on the ontological dimensions of affect (see Part 2) and 
the epistemological stance elaborated above, a qualitative 
method of inquiry was necessary for its ability to allow for 
graphic designers to uncover these affectual realities of design 
work to rise to the surface. Quantitative methods, obviously, 
were seen as less favorable because they create a distance 
between the participants and the researcher, proving 
insufficient in eliciting the subjective understandings and 
realities constructed by the workers, but also because of the 
way in which I have understood affect.  
I chose specifically to employ semi-structured interviews for 
their receptiveness to these paradigms, while also providing an 
interview structure that can be easily followed (Hopf, 2004: 
203). The interviews I conducted were not overly 
predetermined in structured content, so that more freedom 
was given to the workers to direct and control what was 
focused on, and what was not. Because I wanted a reality to be 
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developed by the workers, not myself, being pliable and not 
overly prescriptive was important.  
It should be noted that, while I have attempted to overcome 
some of the challenges posed by studying affect, particularly in 
respect to language, that this is in many ways new territory 
and is experimental. The fickleness and unsignifying aspects of 
affect are still undeniable and I have yet to find an easy answer 
for overcoming them. In this way, the best I have done is to try 
to point towards those frustrations, to bring them out, rather 
than explain what they are. My own descriptive language does 
not try to explain what they are saying, but, rather, that there is 
a dimension to design labor that in many ways escapes 
traditional frames of linguistic analysis, and that those aspects 
are important in themselves.  
Sample  
 
The final sample from my interviews consisted of 15 graphic 
designers, with the cities of London and Manchester being 
most represented (see Appendix A). The designers interviewed 
came from cities in the UK and the US, which obviously poses 
some questions regarded to validity and whether the national 
and cultural differences affected the data. There are ten males 
in the sample and 4 females, which is just slightly lower than 
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the proportion of women industry as a whole with statistical 
estimates for women around 33% of the total graphic design 
work force (CCS, 2010). The sample represents a wide range of 
ages (24-60), with the mean age being 34 years. Most 
participants were employed by a medium sized company (6-20 
employees). The most represented type of design was digital 
and print design. While most of my sample was employed by 
design companies (ranging from small, medium to large), two 
participants worked solely as freelancers and two other 
participants supplemented their company-employed work 
with freelance design on the side.  
Access  
 
In assembling my sample, I employed non-probability snowball 
sampling (Atkinson and Flint, 2001). As an existing sampling 
frame of graphic designers does not exist, probability sampling 
was not an option. This included the process whereby I relied 
on my participants to refer me to another person that might be 
able to participate, and so on, until I gained enough 
participants (Vogt, 1999). In using this method, I relied on 
participants to provide me with contracts from their person 
social networks and links (Thompson, 1997). Gaining access to 
the sample began by identifying the potential gatekeepers of 
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the industry (see Berg, 2001). Following Neyland (2008), this 
process included gaining trust and backing from “members of 
the group who are particularly useful in providing access to the 
group being studies, who can introduce the ethnographer and 
aid in the ethnographer’s move from location to location” 
(Neyland, 2008 16). I started by contacting the heads of design 
firms and design departments by e-mail, explaining my project 
and my interest in finding participants for my research project 
(For an example of the e-mail sent, see Appendix B). In 
addition to contacting companies, I also sent e-mails to various 
university Art and Design departments as I felt that by being a 
part of the broader academic community, their interest and 
value in my project would be more likely. Finally, as freelance 
work is an increasingly common form of employment within 
the industry, I contacted self-advertised freelance designers 
using the same method. In the initial e-mails sent, I mentioned 
that I would be following up the e-mails with a telephone call 
the next four days. Based on existing research, I decided that 
speaking with the gatekeepers over the phone after the initial 
contact was made would heighten the rate of response (Comer 
& Kelly, 1982).  
The initial thrust of e-mails and telephone calls provided me 
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with a sample that was smaller than I had originally hoped for. 
My primary sampling area was meant to only include graphic 
designers in the greater London area, but I was forced to 
expand my sample area to include the rest of the UK and some 
participants in the US in order to recruit more participants. In 
addition, I also utilized alternative methods of contacting 
participants, including social networking websites such as 
Facebook and twitter. I posted interview requests on graphic 
design oriented Facebook pages and ‘tweeted’ a number of 
different established design firms regarding my project. After 
obtaining positive responses from Facebook users and getting 
re-tweets as far away as New York, my sample size contained 6 
members who had agreed to an interview. From here, the 
snowball method mentioned before (See Lewis-Beck, Bryman, 
Futing Liao, 2004) was successful in recruiting friends and co-
workers of the existing participants until I was satisfied with 
the quantity and quality of data.  
Because my final sample was geographically dispersed, the 
spaces that my interviews took place in varied. Facilitating the 
most comfortable and natural environment for my 
interviewees was tantamount, so decided to let the 
interviewees decide for themselves the most comfortable, 
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quiet, public space that they would like to meet at. I ended up 
meeting most participants at local coffee shops; two 
participants were met over lunch at a cafe, one in a library, and 
one at a local park. Perceived safety for both the participants 
and myself was a great concern, which was one of the reasons 
why I allowed my participants to choose the location. After a 
location was agreed upon, I personally made sure the place 
was comfortable and non-secluded before interviews 
commenced.  
Going into each interview, I used a list of pre-developed 
themes and ideas that I wanted to touch on, which were 
initially generated using existing empirical literature on the 
creative industries. These original themes and ideas were 
further developed and refined through each successive 
interview and the ongoing analysis of theoretical literature. 
Here I use Beardsworth and Keil (1992) as mentors: ‘[T] he 
open-ended, discursive nature of the interviews permitted an 
iterative process of refinement, whereby lines of thought 
identified by earlier interviewees could be taken up and 
presented to later interviewees’ (1992: 261–2). This process 
loosely resembled a grounded theory approach (Bryman and 
Burgess, 1994: 4), in which theorizing and data collection 
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arose in tandem and were in a constant, back and forth 
conversation. Interviews were recorded using a hand-held 
dictaphone in order to later transcribe and review the data.  
I began each interview with an introduction to the topic of 
study, a conversation on informed consent, an explanation on 
how the data will be used, and a reiteration of the right for the 
participant to pull out of the research process at any time 
(more on this in the ethical considerations section). My first 
questions were what can be referred to as ‘introducing 
questions’ (Kvale and Brinkman, 2009: 135-136), through 
which I tried to gain a general understanding of the 
interviewee and their occupational background. These 
questions were necessary in order to contextualize the more 
in-depth data that was later gathered. I followed the 
introducing questions with more in-depth ‘probing questions’ 
based on the themes that were pre- developed by the empirical 
and theoretical literature, and prior interviews (2009: 135-
136). The pre-made interview aide was broad and included 
main ideas and themes, rather than pointed questions. I 
developed the aide in this manner so that the interviews 
flowed naturally and so the interviewee was not too 
constrained and able to go off on necessary and useful tangents 
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(see Leidner, 1993: 238).  
Following each interview, I started the process of transcription 
within hours. It was my intention to transcribe interviews 
quickly after speaking with participants so that any ephemeral 
ideas, connections, or inconsistencies that I thought of during 
the interview could be flagged up and noted (see Lindloff and 
Taylor, 2002). It was also crucial to transcribe and analyze 
interviews as I went along so that the apparent themes that 
developed could be expanded and refined in subsequent 
meetings. The initial transcription phase also involved a 
preliminary form of ‘open coding’, explained by Corban and 
Strauss as ‘the process of breaking down, examining, 
comparing, conceptualizing, and categorizing data’ (1990: 96). 
As more data was collected, my theories, themes, and 
hypothesis were re- worked until I felt confident that I had 
gained solid and saturated thematic groupings and sturdy 
connections with theoretical and empirical data.  
The resulting data ended up totaling 20 hours and 17 minutes 
of voice recording. Once the interview process and 
transcription was finished, I began the second step of coding 
and immersed myself into the data to search out further 
patterns and inconsistencies using a method developed by 
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Atkinson and Hammersley (1983). At this point, I was further 
relating these patterns and inconsistencies with the theoretical 
and empirical literature on that I have been collecting in order 
to find connections (Lofland, 1971). I was also finding a 
number of more specific, sub-themes that naturally culminated 
into the different sections of my empirical analysis in this 
Thesis.  
With the considerations regarding affect, I made sure that both 
the interviewing process and the coding process reflected a 
need to understand affect. Most often, this meant reviewing 
segments of interviews where there was an obvious difficulty 
in relaying specific attributes of their process, which will be 
discussed further below. Also, words like aura, atmosphere, 
and vibe came to be signifiers for some affectual unfolding.  
Ethical Considerations  
 
The interview data for this project was gathered with a 
conscious regard to how I might affect the participants 
involved. Because my research involves uncovering the 
realities of work, it was evident that I needed to ensure that the 
data I collected did not jeopardize, or harmfully interfere with 
the designers’ employment relations. This concern was further 
heightened by the recent economic downturn and high 
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redundancy rate in the industry, potentially increasing the 
vulnerability of the workers. With these concerns in mind, I 
developed a number of safeguards in order to anonomize the 
identities of the employees:  
   -  All of the real names of those involved in the 
research were replaced with pseudonyms in this final 
write up   
   -  Any characteristics that might identify the 
individual were omitted from the write up   
   -  Any names and characteristics that might identify 
the company the designers worked for were omitted from 
the final write up   
   -  All data collected was transcribed as fast as 
possible and placed in a password protected database, 
accessible only by me   
   -  Once transcribed, all voice recordings were 
immediately deleted   
This research was also conducted with adherence to the ethical 
stipulations laid out by both the University of Essex Business 
School and British Sociological Society (BSA, 2002). In 
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following these guidelines, all data was collected only after 
gaining voluntary informed consent and receiving the signed 
informed consent form at the beginning of each interview (to 
see a copy of the consent form, refer to appendix B). Along with 
(1) stipulating that all data I receive would be made 
anonymous, the form provided: (2) an introduction to the main 
themes of the research; (3) my personal contact information 
and the contact information of the school; (4) a statement that 
the interviews would be voice-recorded; (5) information that 
the participant was welcome to terminate their participation in 
the research at any stage of the research; and (6) an 
understanding that the participants could ask to see a copy of 
their personal transcription at any point.  
The ‘Means of Production’ for Design Labor 
 
It’s instructive at this point, I believe, to return to the beginning 
of Part 1, and to examine the work of graphic design against 
the Marx’s theory of the labor process, and the assumptions by 
Labor Process Theorists built out of that theory. In this section, 
I will examine the fundamentals of the labor process theory in 
order to paint a picture of where it falls short when 
considering design labor. I will argue that the Marx’s Capital 
and the subsequent LPT does not account for how the means of 
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production has shifted away from strictly materials that 
industrial labor depended on, towards immaterial forms that 
have become crucial to creative labor like design. Here I will 
offer data from designers that suggests their production 
process extends beyond the traditional bounds of the labor 
process found in Capital, and includes a number of activities 
throughout their waking lives. Based upon the failures of the 
more orthodox approach to account for design labor, I will 
suggest that the work of autonomists offers some ways to 
overcome the impasses of LPT and Marx’s critique.  
The contemporary components of the labor process  
 
When both Marx and Braverman wrote their analyses of the 
labor process, they did so with the consideration of specifically 
industrial forms of capitalist production. Despite this 
particularity, some LPT theorist insist that the merits of LPT 
still stand when considering more contemporary service-
dominated economies. While they may in some cases 
acknowledge the changing role of labor process theory in the 
emergent service-led economy, they refute the notion that 
there is a new economy that breaks with industrial forms of 
production and deserves a rethinking of the specificity of labor 
or the labor process in capitalist value accumulation. As 
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Warhurst et al (2008) argue, “There has been a continual 
tendency to present service work as somehow involving a 
break with one or more of the feature of the capitalist labor 
process. Yet, for LPT in principle, these features apply equally 
to manufacturing or services, though they may be manifested 
in different ways” (98-99 cited in Bohm and Land,). In this way, 
LPT at once insists that the labor power and concrete labor 
itself is still crucial for the accumulation of wealth in 
contemporary arrangements of capitalism, while at the same 
time accepting, as Bohm and Land (2009: n.p.) put it, “the labor 
process and its control mechanisms are continuously reformed 
and adjusted”. In other words, the labor process is still the 
exclusive mode through which value is produced, though the 
labor process constantly develops new means to convert labor 
power into concrete labor, and those modes change depending 
on the type of work one does.  
With the assumptions of Marx’s labor process and LPT as a 
basis, I wish to now consider the work of graphic design labor 
in order to evaluate the extent to which these ideas are useful 
in understanding certain more contemporary forms of labor, 
specifically graphic design labor. Over the last several years I 
have interviewed numerous designers and accumulated a 
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fairly concrete picture of their working lives. In this process, 
one of the questions I repeatedly asked both my participants 
and myself is, “what are the sorts of things that are required or 
helpful in order for a designer to do their job”. This is a 
question that arose through evaluating the initial interview 
data from a number of designers and then considering what 
might be considered “the means of production” for design 
labor. In some ways the answers designers gave would fit quite 
nicely into Marx’s own categorization of the means of 
production, and in other ways the data I have accumulated 
brings to light some interesting divergences. Through 
comparing some of the overlap and differences that design 
labor has with industrial production in terms of the labor 
process, there are a number of interesting questions and 
concerns raised, and it is these divergences that I feel 
undermine and complicate the foundations of labor process 
theory, though these confrontations are fruitful.  
The “Tools” or “Instruments” of Design Work  
 
As I began to ask designers about the things they rely on to do 
their work, they often started by identifying either hardware 
(material objects) or software (programs and online 
interfaces), both of which are crucial for the manipulation of 
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aesthetic content that forms the bulk of what they get payed to 
do. In terms of the former, many designers spoke about more 
traditional tools such as pencils, paper, paint, paper cutters, 
and general artistic materials, but they also identified various 
hardware and computing technologies, such as commercial 
grade printers, external drawing tablets that plug into their 
computers, cameras, camera accessories, external hard drives 
and memory cards. Computers are probably one of the most 
important tools of their trade, and most designers, though not 
all usually use high-powered Mac options like the IMac or Mac 
Pro, the later retailing for close to $4000 USD or £3000. Often 
the image work, especially if they also do video editing, 
requires higher processing speeds and upgraded video 
graphics cards than a standard office computer, which means 
additional aftermarket add-ons are preferable. Since creating 
images is the primary purpose of their work, a high-resolution 
professional monitor is sometimes preferred.  
Software, too, is absolutely integral to design work, and each 
designer I spoke with used a multitude of different programs in 
order to generate and alter visual content. Examples of these 
programs would be Adobe packages like Adobe Creative Cloud, 
Adobe Creative Suite, or a la carte Adobe applications like 
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Photoshop and Illustrator. In addition, there is thousands of 
different software “plug-ins” that helps designers with very 
specific details of their work, which are either sold or 
developed by larger companies or by individual designers. 
Some of these plugins are free to download, while others can 
cost hundreds of dollars or pounds. Many designers say that 
the bulk of their time is spent on the computer, using these 
various programs (more on the work-flow and process later).  
Designers often also spoke about the actual physical 
workspaces that they required in order doing their labor. The 
workspace varied depending on different designers--some 
workspaces included a private office, a cubicle, or shared desk 
provided by the design studio or company that they worked 
for. Many who worked freelance, however, did so in a home 
office dedicated to their work, or, more frequently, in spaces 
that overlapped with traditional domestic spaces--the kitchen, 
their bedroom, or living room. If freelance designers were 
fortunate enough, or willing to spend the extra money on an 
office, they tended to work in shared office spaces, which 
would come out of their own pocket.  
The tools and spaces that designers required are what Marx 
would fit neatly into the aspect of the labor process he defines 
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as “instruments of labor”, described as “a thing, or a complex of 
things, which the worker interposes between himself and the 
object of his labor and which serves as a conductor, directing 
his activity onto that object. He makes use of the mechanical, 
physical and chemical properties of some substances in order 
to set them to work on other substances as instruments of his 
power, and in accordance with his purposes” (1976/1990: 
285).  
Put differently, these instruments of labor are any materials 
which “effects an alteration in the object of labor” when 
directed by “man’s activity” (1976/1990: 287). Also included 
under instruments of labor for Marx would be things like the 
built spaces and infrastructure that allow for work to be done. 
In terms of graphic design labor, then, the instruments of labor 
include the workspaces that are either provided by a particular 
design studio, but could also include, particularly for freelance 
designers I spoke with, the homes or leased communal 
workspaces that these types of designers often utilized. In 
design labor, this would include the workspaces that are 
provided by a specific studio one is employed for, or, if 
workers are freelancing, the privately leased out shared-
workspace or homes of the individual freelancer. Thus, while 
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the technology has changed drastically since Marx’s time, these 
instruments are still somewhat easily identifiable within his 
original rubric laid out in Capital. Where we begin to see 
divergences, however, is when we start to consider the other 
two aspects of the labor process--work itself, and the objects of 
labor.  
Objects and Raw Material of Design Labor  
 
As I outlined above, for Marx, in order to produce a particular 
use-value, you not only need human labor and various 
instruments and tools that help in that process, but you also 
need an actual material that the labor is done on or what I 
described previously as “the objects of labor”. These objects 
are transformed, through the labor process, into a new 
commodity; it is this material, mixed with expanded human 
energy that turns into a particular good that is sold. But when 
one considers what Marx refers to as “objects of labor”, the 
example of graphic design production complicates this picture. 
To understand why this is the case, it’s helpful to consider 
some of the empirical data from graphic designers that 
problematizes the assumptions bound up with the concept.  
While identifying the object of labor in industrial and 
agricultural forms of production is relatively easy, identifying 
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the object of labor for graphic design labor is a much more 
complicated task. Sure, material objects play a role--pen and 
paper are transformed through human labor into images, for 
example--but the main material that is transformed is cultural 
and aesthetic in composition. When designing a particular 
image, font, or illustration, designers aren’t simply 
transforming a material object; they are more often 
manipulating immaterial perceptions. These different 
immaterial forms offer nuggets of creativity that are 
rearranged, changed, and manipulated into the production of 
new aesthetics. They are so primary in design work that most 
designers will insist that, as one designer put it, “there is really 
nothing new in design” (interviewee #2). Instead of an 
industrial laborer transforming material objects as Marx 
describes, designers manipulate already existing aesthetic 
ideas, transforming them into a new image. One interviewee 
explains this process, noting that in design work “none of your 
ideas end up being actually yours; it’s more about you linking 
together things to create something new. Nothing is really new, 
it is just in some sense recycled and combined” (interviewee 
#7). Yet another notes “graphic designers always, whether 
they admit it or not, steal from others constantly. Like, ‘oh, 
that’s a good idea, I will take that and turn it upside down and 
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do that’” (Interviewee #5). In this way designers often spoke of 
the objects of design work not in terms of a specific material 
that they transform, but instead in terms of “inspirational idea” 
that is transformed through their labor process into an new 
aesthetic commodity. When I specifically asked one participant 
“what is the raw material for your work, or what is absolutely 
necessary for you to do your job?” they responded “for me it 
would be visual stimulation--I need that”. In other words, the 
value of aesthetic inspiration eclipses material as the 
foundational object of their labor.  
Because aesthetic inspiration formed one of the primary 
components to the work graphic designers did, a large portion 
of design work involved keeping up on aesthetic trends within 
their own field of graphic design, and also seeking out 
inspiration across multiple aesthetic fields outside of their 
occupation. In relation to various aesthetics, one interviewee 
insisted “We need to be aware of it all [aesthetic trends], 
because it all filters down” (Interviewee #8). Actively being 
aware becomes an integral part of design work because it in 
turn “filters down” or forms the material that will be 
transformed in the production process. This process of “having 
your radar on”, as another designer put it, will sometimes 
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involve repeatedly seeking out other influential designer’s 
work, or looking through design specific blogs and websites, 
such as itsnicethat.com, or publications like Print. One designer 
spoke, for instance, of how they approach existing design, 
explaining that a lot of the time they “ look up what other 
people have done in the past, just to get an idea what people 
have done and think to myself how I could improve on what 
they have done, or I could borrow the things they have done 
and use them for my purposes” (Interviewee #2). Another 
designer told me, rather simply, that they “enjoy looking at 
people’s graphic design and getting Ideas” (Interviewee #6).  
While design specific media was a popular choice for 
inspirational ideas, designers often also pulled from artistic 
fields outside of the occupation as well. Most designers I spoke 
with would explicitly go out of their way in order to engage 
themselves and other designers in different cultural and 
artistic fields that could offer their work some inspirational 
content. One designer explains how this process has been more 
formalized at her work:  
Interviewee #8: So as a group, we have decided on a number of 
things that we can do to bring that [inspiration] in, which can be 
little things like all of us showing each other what books we like, 
 320
bringing in posters, and leaflets that we have seen, or a day out 
to galleries. It’s very easy to get caught up in the office space and 
not looking outside of it and everything we do is about what is 
going on around us and it’s important that we remember that 
and step out and think about what is actually going on around 
us.  
Fine art, architecture, photography, and even literature and 
music were all commonly cited aesthetic experiences that 
could form an inspirational object for designers. The examples 
of this are too numerous to list in total, but the few interview 
excerpts below are helpful in order to understand the 
importance of these different forms.  
Interviewee #2: I’m a graphic designer, but I like photography a 
lot. I get a lot of inspiration from looking at type, looking at 
creative portraits, nature, that kind of thing. Photography is a 
big part of my creativity.  
Interviewee #2: [Art] is important because as a designer, any 
sort of painting, sculpture, you like to see that stuff. Even walking 
past, it always gives you something.  
Interviewee #3: I love looking at architecture and photography-
-that also tends to inspire me. I’m a painter, so I like fine art.  
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Interviewee #6: I do love photography and painting and that 
sort of feeds my creative brain.  
Interviewee # 8: Me and other creatives around me tend to have 
other pockets of creativity and things we like, whether it be 
music, theatre, drawing. If you are not aware of it, you won’t be 
producing beautiful products, if you are not aware of what is 
going on around you in the bigger environment in any arts. You 
will find that everyone has some other interest in some kind of 
art and you will learn from that.  
Interviewee #10: Like with my current project, music has been 
important. It can inspire you in different ways, of course. And 
sorta the way I usually listen to music, I get into patterns of 
things I’m listening to. I think that listening to different types of 
music can stylistically change what you’re trying to do, too.  
Interviewee #1: I can’t work without [music]. Gotta have music.  
Interviewee #3: I’m also a dancer, so I choreograph, and I 
perform, and I think a lot of that ties into how I design 
sometimes. A lot of my illustrations are rhythmic and have 
pattern. And I’m not necessarily like, oh, I dance, let me draw 
from that.... I just think it happens.  
The avenues that might offer creative material outside of 
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design varied so much that, when asked where they got 
inspiration, one designer replied “Uhh, honestly, everywhere. 
Like, really, everywhere and everything” (Interviewee #4). 
Another person offered a similar answer when asked the same 
question, telling me they get inspiration from “all over--It’s not 
just graphic design” (Interviewee #6). One person noted a 
subway seat as offering a specific spark for one of the projects 
they did, while another cited an antique French fishing basket. 
It’s important to note that design inspiration could be gathered 
not only contemporarily, but could also be drawn from past 
memories and impressions. One designer I interviewed who 
also taught university courses in design elaborated on the 
process of collecting aesthetic memories that would later be 
integral for a design project:  
Interviewee #1: Don’t you forget, everything you have 
experienced since you were kids, everything you saw and how 
you felt--those little details you can bring forward. But also in 
nature, everything surrounding you. My radar is on all the time. 
It’s gotta be. There is so much neat stuff happening that you 
gotta be sensitive to--color, texture, light, space; how people talk, 
how they move, their intonation. It’s not just your present state 
that’s important, but your past state, and those of others, it has a 
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tremendous impact on what you do.  
Because of this constant and unrelenting onslaught of 
potentially useful inspiration for design work, designers often 
catalogued interesting experiences or aesthetic images into a 
sort of design diary. These impressions would act as a reserve 
pool of different ideas that a designer could potentially use in 
the future. One designer explains this process as similar to 
what Andy Warhol time capsules 
(http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-29125003), as a sort of 
collection of objects and notes that could invoke a particular 
aesthetic memory:  
Interviewee #1: Say you are Andy Warhol and I am David 
Bowie, or some shit. What you would do, or what Warhol would 
do, is after our lunch, he would take my napkin, he might take 
the receipt and might scribble on the back, ‘lunch with Bowie’, 
put it in the box, and then he would file it at the end of the day. 
Just as mementos of a sort of object-reflective-package of space 
and install a memory of that moment. And randomly he would go 
into his box one year and look through it. And so a lot of people 
who are designers are influenced by all sorts of stuff. I mean, for 
me that’s really important. I could collect shit forever. I love 
interesting ‘stuff’ because, I mean, it has an intrinsic history unto 
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itself.  
A different designer described the process more 
straightforward, telling me they simply write interesting ideas 
down in a notebook or file them away in a computer folder:  
Interviewee #10: I am always inspired by things I see, or things 
that people have sitting next to me at the bar, or I’ll just see on 
TV. I’ll sort of see something and be like, ‘oh, that’s cool, what if I 
could do this, or what if I could manipulate that?’. A lot of times, 
I’m like, ‘that’s awesome, but I wish it looked like this’. So it sort 
of gets my brain moving around, and I’ll either write it down as 
an idea to keep, or just let if fade. I actually keep like a collection 
of screenshots of different design things I like. I also always take 
my phone, so if I’m walking down a street and someone has a 
really cool sign or something and I like the typography. A lot of 
that stuff will stick with you, anyways. So sometimes, when you 
find yourself in a rut or something, you will have these sort of 
design elements to fall back on.  
As some of these excerpts begin to highlight, the process of 
gathering design inspirations that can provide a useful to the 
design process often happens temporally and spatially outside 
of what might be traditionally considered work. Inspiration 
can often happen anywhere or at anytime. Because of this, 
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designers “radars” are constantly on, and as another designer 
puts it “[designers] never switch off, they just switch down” 
(Interviewee #5). In other words, because what designers 
create aesthetic material dependent on new ideas or kernels of 
inspiration, the boundaries between work and life are almost 
ubiquitously understood by designers as blurred. A design 
project can be informed while strolling on a city street (more 
on the centrality of the urban environment later), or as another 
told me, even nursing a hangover while watching television on 
a day off.  
It’s at this point that the data suggests, in line with autonomist 
assumptions of the “social factory”, that the labor process has 
in many ways escaped the traditional confines of what we 
consider “work”, into the wider field of sociality outside of 
those boundaries. 
As was elaborated on in Section 1, autonomists like Hardt and 
Negri suggest that once labor becomes immaterial, the 
boundaries between work and life dissolve, rendering the 
workday, and leisure as two realms that are increasingly hard 
to discern. Furthermore, as labor becomes creative and 
cognitive, the whole of the metropolis becomes, as Lazzarato 
said, a “basin of immaterial labor” open and, indeed, necessary 
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for immaterial laborers to do their work.   
The data I have collected provides numerous examples of this 
dilation of working boundaries, some worth mentioning below:  
Me: What is the work schedule like for graphic designers? Do you 
tend to work a lot of hours?  
Interviewee #6: That’s a tough question. It depends on what 
your definition of work is. I mean, of course, like anyone, we clock 
in and clock out. But in terms of actual problem solving, we can 
bring a problem home with us, mentally. So, we might not have 
figured out how to solve something or work around a problem 
with design, but when we come home, maybe we’re watching a 
show, or we’re looking at something online, or reading a book 
and then we get a sudden spark.  
Me: Do you ever come up with your ideas for work outside of 
work? 
 Interviewee #3: Yeah. I feel like it’s kind of sporadic. 
Sometimes I get to a project at the end of the day, and I’m about 
to leave, and I’ll go home and chill out for a bit, and then start to 
think about it again. Or I guess I might see something 
subconsciously that triggers it.  
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Me: And your creative process does that go on all the time, too? 
  
Interviewee # 9: Yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, always. Like, literally 
stuff just comes out of the blue. Like you’ll just be walking down 
[the street], and just, like, notice something, a color, this, some 
weird interaction. And you would be, like, ‘I could do that, maybe 
I could do that better, or that could lead to this’. Whatever. And 
you try to categorize that in your head.  
Interviewee #8: I mean, I am always looking for things I can 
apply to my job. I’ve got a project that I’m working on and I’m 
thinking, that would be much nicer if we could do this--I’m 
always on the lookout and if I see it, I will take it in and say, ‘have 
you seen this? We could use this for that job’. I think that’s 
generally how good design practice works. It’s very hard to sit in 
any place outside of work and not be thinking about something 
design related design related that triggers something you are 
working on. You are constantly thinking, ‘well, that would be 
really good if we could use that’.  
For designers, it is ideas, colors, sounds, textures, and other 
aesthetic forms that largely provide the raw material for their 
labor, and this material is often gathered outside of what was 
traditionally defined as work. As I wish to show next, this 
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reality challenges many of the assumptions bound up with 
Marx’s analysis of the labor process found in Capital, and the 
subsequent LPT that has emerged since.  
Marx, Raw Material, Productive Consumption and the Labor 
Process  
 
If, as I have argued, the raw material of graphic design is 
cultural, aesthetic and immaterial in content, rather than 
material, this poses a number of complications for Marx’s 
theory of the labor process and the components that it 
involves. While these empirical examples complicate Marx’s 
framework, one could say these complications are useful and 
point to some very interesting critiques that would not be as 
easily identified without Marx’s contribution. First, we could 
say these observations complicate the idea of “productive 
consumption” bound up with the labor process theory. To 
reiterate my earlier discussion, productive consumption is 
when a particular object or instrument is “used up” within the 
labor process. Individual consumption, on the other hand, is 
when someone uses their own wage earned through working 
for different commodities used for subsistence. In graphic 
design labor, however, these two different versions of 
consumption are in many ways muddled together.  
 329
In graphic design labor, the object of labor, namely aesthetic 
images or experiences, are many times consumed outside what 
Marx and LP theorists call the labor process. Designers spoke 
about going to gigs, galleries, or taking a stroll on a Saturday in 
a neighborhood and collecting these particular raw materials. 
They could gain inspiration from an album or a magazine they 
had lying around and would then take those ideas back into 
work and manipulate them. Sometimes these materials were 
freely taken, gathered from open source websites or from 
experiencing the urban fabric, for instance. Other times, the 
workers would purchase these materials with their own 
money. A particular cool object that caught their eye at a flea 
market, for instance. The important point here is that this 
consumption happened outside of what Marx would consider 
the labor process, and sometimes required workers own 
money, but were, at the same time, still integral for doing good 
design work for a particular company or client within the 
confines of what would be considered the labor process. Thus, 
according to Marx, design work requires a consumption is 
productive, but happens in individual moments outside of 
what would be considered the productive space and time. In 
other words, this kind of consumption of materials is 
productive and individual. If this is the case, a significant 
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problem arises. The second point of contention, related to the 
first, has to do with how Marx and LP theorists define work 
compared with what designers spoke of. In Marx’s assessment, 
the process of seeking out all of these productive kernels of 
aesthetic inspiration would not be considered labor, for labor 
is defined very specifically as confined to the direct labor 
process under the direct control of the capitalist. The 
designers, however, insisted that these processes were 
absolutely integral to the work that they did, part and parcel to 
constructing good design. I will speak about this more in the 
next section, but just through the interview data above it’s 
clear that design would be virtually impossible without all the 
outside influence that is gathered from wider aesthetic trends. 
Whether they liked to or not, they were affected by certain 
things outside of their direct employment relations that were 
useful in their actual process of work. Work for designers thus 
leaked out of the particular spaces and times typically 
associated with industrial production. In other words, work 
increasingly happened all the time, and anywhere. 
Paraphrasing again what one designer said earlier, they don’t 
turn off, they turn down.  
Ultimately, these mediations between graphic design labor and 
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Marx’s understandings of the labor process point to interesting 
questions that will be further elaborated on in the next 
sections. This helps frame a problem that I will seek to answer, 
both with respect to autonomist Marxism and the work of 
Deleuze and Guattari: how might we better understand the 
labor process of graphic design labor, and what other theories 
might help to do so?; and, how do we make sense of the raw 
material that designers draw from, is that a form of production, 
and what other theories might be useful in order to help us 
situate it within the wider framework of capitalist production.  
The social factory for design: the city and its aesthetic 
productions  
 
The metropolis is to the multitude what the factory was to the 
industrial working class [...]. The contemporary productive 
activities of the multitude [...] overflow the factory walls to 
permeate the entire metropolis, and in the process the qualities 
and potential of those activities are transformed fundamentally.  
—Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Commonwealth cited in 
Shukaitis and Figiel, 2016  
When considering some of the empirical data from graphic 
designers introduced in the previous section, the 
understanding of the social factory and general intellect 
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provided above does seem to offer a good approach for 
understanding the production process of the occupation. As we 
previously saw, the cultural and aesthetic milieu from which 
design laborers draw has become crucial to the work that they 
do. Autonomism helps to validate these certain aesthetic 
experiences as a “raw material” for their labor, but also further 
situates that raw material within the wider labor process. The 
specific materials they draw upon, the certain aesthetic 
productions like art or architecture that they then “filter down” 
are understood as directly productive for design labor, instead 
of simply belonging to a realm of reproduction. Like 
autonomists, the data also suggest that the boundaries of work 
expands beyond what was previously the “factory walls” and 
includes the entirety of social relations that go on beyond in 
the wider “basin of immaterial labor”. This too resonates with 
the interviews from designers. To recall what a couple 
interviewers spoke of in the previous section, designers never 
completely turn off. They often come of with many of their 
ideas outside of work, and use their personal time to seek out 
different kernels of inspiration that could be useful for their 
job. General cultural and artistic ideas that proliferate 
throughout the wider society become important within the 
design process and workers seek out these social productions 
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in both times and spaces that escape the labor process.  
These lessons are particularly relevant when considering the 
importance of the city, and the active part the city and it’s 
milieu plays in the production of graphic design. For designers 
I spoke with, the urban milieu that expands far beyond the 
boundaries of their labor process was an integral part of their 
work. The cultural life of the city provides designers an endless 
amount of raw material that sparked ideas for the workers. 
When asked what was important to doing design work, many 
of them often unhesitatingly told me that working and living in 
an urban context contributed to their work because, as one 
designer put it, “there is so much going on” (Interviewee #14). 
In the wider city designers are exposed to many different 
cultures, which many found important:  
Interviewee #10: The city, it’s critical. That was probably one of 
the beautiful parts about working and living here, that it's right 
in the middle of the city. So you are exposed to everything, in 
terms of how the city works. It was kind of like its own petri dish.  
Interviewee #8: Culturally, and all the diversity, that’s why 
London is so great for that [finding raw material] You have so 
many different things coming in. While it is obvious from a 
logistical standpoint why certain design firms congregate in 
 334
cities, designers also insisted the position within cities also 
offered something directly useful for their labor. As a couple 
other designers put it:  
Interviewee #7: You find a lot more agencies in places like 
London, New York, Berlin, Paris, Tokyo and not so many in places 
like Birmingham or Naples, Dresden. They tend to focus in on the 
main cities because, well, diversity. You have so many people 
living in such a close area that you are constantly influenced and 
bombarded by something new and that keeps your creativity up  
Interviewee #3: [The city] just gives you more to draw from. 
Obviously, if there are a lot of people, a lot of things going on, a 
lot of events, then I think there’s more to stimulate your brain 
than if you were out in the country.  
Interviewee #2: I love the city. So I would love to get a job in 
New York. That’s the place I want to be because there is always 
so much going on, there is so much inspiration you can draw 
from. Just walk down the street, there is so many things you can 
see, you know?  
For many designers the city, and the aesthetic experiences it 
provided, were so important that several of them suggested 
they would even partake in a sort of Dubordian dérive through 
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different neighborhoods on lunch breaks, or when outside of 
work in order to perhaps gain some inspirational value.  
Through these excerpts we can begin to understand how the 
urban environment figures as a major character within the 
production of design work, but also how the social factory 
becomes productive for labor. The city here is not merely a 
sphere of life, separate from the sphere of work and labor, but 
is directly contributing to the work that designers do. It does 
well to illustrate how, as autonomists put it, the cultural 
productions that happen within the wider social factory come 
to directly contribute to work. It serves to supplement the 
notion that the production of work and the production of 
culture are increasingly bound together. Antonio Negri and 
Michael Hardt in particular speak to this reality. As they note in 
Commonwealth (2009), the movement towards more 
immaterial or, in their words, “biopolitical” forms of 
production necessitates a wider mix of cultural values to draw 
from. In their words, biopolitical production requires “constant 
interaction with others, with those who are culturally and 
socially different...” (Hardt and Negri, 2009: 148). As they 
continue, “contemporary economists talk a lot about creativity, 
in sectors such as design, branding, specialized industries, 
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fashion and the culture industries, but generally neglect the 
fact that the creativity of biopolitical labor requires an open 
and dynamic [...] culture with a constant cultural flows and 
mixtures” (2009: 148). Like Berardi previously touched on, 
forms of labor like design increasingly require a constant 
bombardment of new, unique cultural productions from which 
they can pull. This reality brings Hardt and Negri to rightly 
uncover the wider city or “metropolis” and all its novel 
proliferations as the emergent raw material for forms of 
cultural or creative labor. The city acts as what Hardt and Negri 
define as a certain “commons” for many different forms of 
creative labor. In their conception, they refer to the city as 
something more broad than simply a built environment, as a 
living body, which produces a number of cultural flows that are 
necessary for labor:  
“[In] the biopolitical economy there is an increasingly 
intense and direct relation between the production 
process and the common that constitutes the city. The 
city, of course, is not just a built environment [...] but also 
a living dynamic of cultural practices, intellectual circuits, 
affective networks, and social institutions. These 
elements of the common contained in the city are [...] the 
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prerequisite for biopolitical production” (2009: 184).  
Thus, for Hardt and Negri, the general intellect and social 
factory that was discussed earlier is closely tied to the city and 
all sorts of cultural and intellectual proliferations that are 
“commonly” produced within it. These productions are truly 
central, as the graphic design data also insinuates, to 
productive commodities.  
Even mainstream business theorists, like Richard Florida have 
attempted to conceptualize the importance of the city for the 
production of value. In his descriptions of what he calls 
“creative class”, a problematic category in its own right, he 
offers almost colonial descriptions of how different 
neighborhoods contribute to work. He argues, that the “street 
scene” of certain neighborhoods provide creative employees 
with the raw material that is necessary in order to have a 
thriving urban economy (Florida, 2005: 137). Like the 
empirical examples provided by designers, and many of the 
autonomists covered, Florida also understands that there is 
somewhat of a coalescence between the consumption of 
cultural raw material for work, and the act of producing 
creative goods. One cannot produce creative labor without 
consuming, productively, the different culture products that 
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the city offers. This, Florida argues, re-aligns the creative class 
not as a class of leisure consumption, as we might imagine the 
flâneurs found within Walter Benjamin’s Arcades Project 
(2003), but as consumers that do so for the sake of work:  
“The members of the Creative Class are less a leisure 
class in Veblen’s sense of the term and more an ‘active 
class’. Their consumption is not so crudely conspicuous 
and they certainly do not participate in time-killing 
activities of any sort, for they do not have the time to kill” 
(Florida, 2005: 137).  
Thus, for even figures like Richard Florida, the categories 
between production and consumption become blurred. The 
city itself, and all the various cultural streams circulating 
through it are a raw material, and the act of going out and 
consuming these various streams is a form of production.  
There is a level of hesitation that must be acknowledged when 
considering the data provided on the city and its involvement 
that is undeniable. First of all, an overwhelming majority of 
designers interviewed were from urban environments. As 
such, the data might suggest that they are simply reflecting on 
their own particular experience with the city, rather than a 
fundamental part of design itself. In other words, there is no 
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telling that the town or country and their social productions 
cannot be equally as informative to design work as a city can 
be. Indeed, designers also spoke with me about how sitting in 
the park and absorbing its beauty can be a source of 
inspiration. Thus, what I want to warn against is a 
romantisization of the city as a form of productive activity. 
Secondly, it must be said that the reasons for a design firm 
moving to a city might in many ways trump the atmospheric 
prospects that it could provide workers with. Design, tends to 
be concentrated in urban environments for the same reasons 
that other occupations tend to be clustered in urban regions. 
There is a large pool of labor, transportation is easy, and other 
businesses and clients tend to also be located in those areas.  
That said, I do think there is still an important lesson that these 
discussions on the city offer. Whether or not it is the city per se 
that is crucial to design work, it has become obvious through 
the discussions related to the city that there is a certain 
commonly produced element that designers are tapping into. 
We could very well bracket out the city in this case and say that 
there is some aural and intensive layer that designers draw off 
from the city, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that it is 
specific to cities.  
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From the General Intellect to the General Affect 
 
In Part 1, I suggested that it was Marx’s Grundrisse, and the 
autonomist reading of it, that offered an alternative to some of 
the issues that arise when trying to understand cultural labor 
in respect to orthodox Marxist theories of the labor process. 
Above, I have tried to introduce how empirical data seems to 
reveal these weaknesses, and, begins to point towards the 
breakdown of traditional boundaries between work and 
society at large. Here I would like to expand on these ideas and 
introduce further data that supports the idea that society and 
broader societal productions, have become in a way productive 
for capital.  
 
Here I will show how the data suggests there is in fact some 
kind of social factory or, as Lazzarato (1996) refers to it, “a 
basin of immaterial labor” that becomes directly productive for 
the work of design. Simultaneously, however, I wish to show 
the limits of autonomist theory in accounting for graphic 
design labor. First, I will introduce data that points to the more 
affective and indeterminate form that this social factory 
follows. I will point to data from design that suggests this 
power that designers draw from in the wider basin of 
 341
immaterial labor is more intensive rather than discernable and 
informational.  
 
Secondly, I will point to data that suggests autonomists are 
perhaps too willing to paint the social production occurring in 
the social factory as equivalent to the forms of labor done 
within the labor process. In other words, I wish to argue that 
while there is a broadening of production and the social 
processes that contribute to the production of design, that 
designers still insist that there are analytical differences 
between the social production they rely on, and the production 
process in which they are charged with organizing such social 
productions. I will argue that graphic design labor, while 
requiring what might be called a general intellect, necessitates 
two important addendums. First, is that while certain aspects 
of design labor do in fact occur outside the traditional 
boundaries of work, in a space and time of what autonomist 
denote as “the social factory”, there is still a distinctness that 
designers give to the labor process that occurs within what the 
Marx of Capital would refer to as the labor process. In other 
words, while designers require a type of production within the 
wider socius, that production is analytically different in a 
number of ways to the work they perform within the labor 
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process. The labor process, I will argue, still holds an integral 
role that is in some ways different than the labor that occurs 
within the social factory. This seems to undermine the idea 
that, as some autonomists seem to be willing to argue, that 
work has become somewhat autonomous to the organization 
of capital to the extent that Hardt and Negri (2000: 294) 
suggest it allows for a form of “elementary communism”. 
Second, and related to this point, the descriptions of what 
could be considered the social factory for designers’ points to a 
slightly different quality than what autonomists define. The 
social factory they rely on is not formed intelligible pieces of 
technological or cultural ideas, but is a much more intensive, 
unconscionable quality that requires further interpretation. 
This quality, I will argue in the next section, is better 
understood as what Deleuze and Guattari define as “affect”. 
 
Design as affective accumulation 
 
Consider the following scenario. A graphic designer exits their 
flat in East London on a foggy Saturday morning in December, 
and begins walking towards the local coffee shop several 
streets away to enjoy a hot beverage. They have headphones 
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on, and their new favorite ambient music is playing at a steady 
beat. As they walk through the neighborhood, observing the 
people, the streets, and the light as it makes it way through the 
dense fog, they are left with an impression that stays with them 
all the way until they arrive at the coffee shop.  
Once at the coffee shop, after they order a coffee and sit down, 
they take out their computer and start brainstorming ideas for 
a new project they are working on for a client at the office. 
Without even thinking about it, they begin doodling, at 
random, and are instantly affected by their walk over--the 
aesthetic combinations and feelings that hit them as they 
walked through the city streets. Perhaps it was the music that 
set the somewhat uncanny mood, or maybe it was the fog that 
shrouded everything in the distance and made them feel as 
though they were meandering through a 19th century 
industrial city. Whatever it was, the experience inspires them 
to start working on a design that in some way captures the 
sensations of that walk.  
Like the light filtering through the fog that day, the aesthetic 
that the designer begins with is somewhat muted, but not dark. 
It reminds them of specific memories as a child, hiking with 
their mother in the Yorkshire Dales on a similarly foggy, winter 
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day. The designer is also reminded of an L.S. Lowry painting, 
that they vaguely regcall being imbued with same sort of color 
and impression that they just felt on their way over to the 
coffee shop. They then search on Google L.S. Lowry paintings 
and find the one they were thinking of--”A Football Match” 
from 1949. While looking at that picture, though, they come 
across an even more intriguing painting--”Oldfield Road 
Dwellings”--that better captures the intensity that they are 
going for.  
The designer begins by extracting certain elements from these 
two paintings, the impression on the walk over, and the more 
distant memories of the hike as a child. They begin integrating 
these impressions into the image they are beginning to create, 
“filtering them down” as a designer earlier spoke of. They can’t 
quite describe this process, it just comes naturally.  
The scenario above typifies the initial processes of design that 
many graphic designers spoke of in the interview data I 
collected. Their work often begins by pulling from a wide range 
of impressions that they have experienced throughout various 
times and spaces in their lives. These impressions can come 
from any number of different happenings. As I highlighted in 
the previous section, they can come from a painting, music, a 
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film, a television show, or on the Tube as they make their way 
to work. The more elusive part of this extraction process 
begins when designers attempt to explain exactly what ‘it’ is 
that they are pulling from. The “it” value of a particular walk, or 
a particular painting is very difficult to relay into language, for 
the quality that is important is not really a defined quality at 
all, but rather something aural and atmospheric.  
When one designer I spoke with insisted that the city was an 
important aspect to their design work, I responded by asking 
her what quality was so important about the urban 
environment. Her response was rather muddled. It was 
obviously difficult for her to express this quality, so she 
reverted to adjectives like the “vibe” or the “atmosphere” that 
the urban milieu offered. When I once again asked for her to 
clarify what she meant by that, she responded with the 
following:  
Interviewee #3: Well, as much as I’m struggling right now, I 
would say there are some things that are hard to put into words. 
Because when you talk about vibe and atmosphere, sometimes 
it’s hard to describe the specific aspects of something that’s fun, 
or cool...um...yeah. I don’t know the answer to that question.  
Many more interviewees shared this difficulty, and almost 
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universally words like “vibe”, “atmosphere”, and “aura” were 
cited as crucial for design labor. A different designer referred 
to this quality as the “buzz” that defines an urban environment 
and also underlined its centrality to good design work:  
Interviewee #8: I’ve worked in studios in smaller cities and I 
think it [design] gets lost a bit. Unless you have got that buzz 
around you, you have got to make a big effort to surround 
yourself with things. If you are going to do it in anywhere outside 
a big city, you have to push going into big cities, seeing other 
things, and making that more a part of the studio.  
Aside from the city, music provided this ineffable quality, and 
in the case of the designer below, the preferred adjective was 
“mood” and “aural environment”:  
Interviewee #1: I can’t work without it [music]. Gotta have 
music. It sets the mood; it sets the atmosphere, creatively. It 
varies. You might start with British music from the 70s and then 
drift over to classical. It depends on the mood, but I have to have 
that aural environment.  
Objects, too, were important in many ways not simply because 
they offered a specific color or shape that the designers used, 
although that could also be the case, but because they offered 
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some unnamable quality that left an impression on them. For 
many designers it wasn’t exactly the materiality of the object 
itself that was intriguing and inspirational, but the intensity of 
it. As the excerpts above illuminate, the “it” of a certain raw 
material was almost mystical. Indeed as the excerpt below 
suggests, it was “magical”. When asked to elaborate on this 
value, one respondent told me:   
Interviewee #11: It’s like when you go to a flea market and out 
of the corner of your eye, and I don’t know what it is, there is this 
little toy, this old ashtray, this old book. Out of the corner of your 
eye, you’ll just be walking and you are drawn to it. And it’s just a 
cool fucking object. It has just some kind of a magic...magic, 
mystery quality to it...that parallels something else you have 
experienced.  
In many ways, this unnamable quality, identified but not 
qualifiable, finds a certain resonance with a budding stream of 
scholarly interest across multiple disciplines concerned with 
“atmospheres” and their centrality to social life (see Julmi, 
2017 for a review of this literature). In particular, we have seen 
a number of theoretical engagements with the connection 
between the atmosphere and aesthetics, thanks in large part to 
the work of Gernot Böhme and his “new aesthetics” (1993, 
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2003). Böhme’s work seeks to give theoretical relevance to the 
atmospheric dimensions of aesthetics; an association that he 
argues has long been around, but largely under-analyzed. In it, 
Bohme understands the atmosphere neither as a quality 
assigned with the object’s particular qualities (color, for 
example), nor with the individual perception of the 
atmosphere (the internalities of the one perceiving), but rather 
as a thing in itself that affects the individual corporeally. Here 
perception is given a different attunement than what one finds 
in classical aesthetics, where ‘making sense’ of a particular 
atmosphere only comes after the perception as such:  
“The concept of perception is liberated from its reduction to 
information processing, provision of data or (re) cognition of a 
situation. Perception includes the affective impact of the 
observed, the ‘reality of images’, corporeality. Perception is 
basically the manner in which one is bodily present for 
something or someone or one’s bodily state in an environment. 
The primary ‘object’ of perception is atmospheres. What is first 
and immediately perceived is neither sensations nor shapes or 
objects or their constellations, as Gestalt psychology thought, 
but atmospheres, against whose background the analytic 
regard distinguishes such things as objects, forms, colours etc” 
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(Bohme, 1993: 125).  
Bohme’s new aesthetics arrived at here is in contrast to what 
he defines as the classical aesthetics. The latter he defines as an 
aesthetics of art concerned with judgment--whether something 
is beautiful or not, for instance. The dominance of such 
categorization, Bohme argues, has led to an over reliance on 
language and linguistic interpretation of art and aesthetics at 
the expense of the atmospheric qualities that a particular piece 
gives off. New aesthetics, by contrast, is interested with 
“aesthethesis”, a concentration on the more sensual and bodily 
perceptions and receptions of a particular aesthetic work. As 
Bohme explains, “atmospheres are evidently what are 
experienced in bodily presence in relation to persons and 
things or in spaces’’ (Bohme, 1993: 119).  
Recently, Bohme’s conceptual development of the 
“atmosphere” has become a useful concept in discourse around 
work and organization. Organizational researchers like Biel- 
Missal and Saren (2012) find Bohme’s new aesthetics useful in 
order to understand “how the overall atmosphere of a carefully 
designed marketing setting may unfold a sensual impact upon 
people’s bodies and minds” (168). Here the notion of 
atmosphere has become useful in order to describe how 
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atmospheres are produced and cultivated in retail settings in 
order to produce a specific effect on a consumer. This 
understanding generally follows Bohme’s elaboration of 
“aesthetic labor”, which describes the work involved in the 
production of atmospheres (Bohme, 1993: 125). The research, 
too, following Bohme, allows us to understand “how 
atmospheres touch, invade, and permeate people’s bodies, 
being able to subtly influence and manipulate their emotions 
and moods, sensual and mental states” (Biehl-Missal and 
Saren, 2012: 170-171).  
Coming from a slightly different approach, what has become 
known as affect across multiple disciplines has given perhaps 
even more relevance to the empirical examples above. Like 
Bohme, Teresa Brennan has also spoke of an atmospheric 
presence that has the ability to draw out certain physiological 
and psychological reactions. In the beginning of her influential 
work, The Transmission of Affect (2004), she rhetorically asks 
in the first sentence, “[is] there anyone who has not, at least 
once, walked into a room and ‘felt an atmosphere’” (2004: 1). 
Here she ties atmosphere to the “transmission of affect”, 
whereby “the atmosphere or environment literally gets into 
the individual” (2004: 1).  
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It is here that the commons described by designers begins to 
be linked with what we could describe as “affect” introduced in 
Part 2 of this thesis. To reiterate Nigel Thrift and his 
discussions of affect, the kernels of inspiration designers were 
drawn to were affective in that they are a “force that is […] 
moving” (Thrift, 2010: 293). The social factory is made of 
productions that are below the threshold of understanding, but 
which actively participate in affecting designers and inspiring 
their creative process. This would explain, for instance, the 
inability of designers to account for the value that they get 
from certain objects or experiences that inform their work. 
When designers spoke about their raw material, many of them 
were inclined to say that they often absorbed or were affected 
by different experiences that informed their work without 
even knowing it. As one designer remarked, “I am definitely 
subliminally taking in design trends”. This was echoed by other 
designers, who told me “I think your environment definitely 
influences you...on a level that you can’t quite comprehend” 
(Interviewee #2). In other words, designers are affected by 
specific events or haecceities, as described in Part 2, and these 
even impact them on a level that escapes consciousness. As 
another designer told me, “when I’m out, I’ll see things that I’m 
not specifically looking for, in terms of seeking inspiration, and 
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I don’t even consciously remember them, like specific stuff 
about it, but it definitely influences my creativity” (Interviewee 
#10). Music specifically was something that tended to inspire 
people on this affective level. As another interviewee 
commented, “It’s something that’s changing and it might be 
inspiring you subconsciously” (Interviewee #3). As I 
commented in section two, the city was another affective realm 
that moved participants in an unconscious way. As interviewee 
#3 commented about the relationship between her 
neighborhood and her work, “It’s got a really creative vibe and 
I don’t know if it’s necessarily something tangible”.  
These further descriptions point to the relevance of affect in 
understanding the composition of design labor. They serve to 
substantiate the idea that there is a level of unfolding that 
happens outside of conscious thinking, and directs the 
production of individualities that happen within the work of 
graphic design. Affect helps to give ontological specificity to 
these occasions, without dismissing them as descriptions that 
lack proper linguistic evaluation. The designers were not 
simply speaking about the atmosphere and mood of different 
things because it was some sort of lazy stand in for all the 
particular words they could have used to express the quality 
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they took, but because there weren’t any words to express the 
affects that hit them on a level prior to conscious reflection.  
From affective proliferation to control 
“Immaterial labor immediately involves social interaction and 
cooperation. In other words, the cooperative aspect of 
immaterial labor is not imposed or organized from the outside, 
as it was in previous forms of labor, but rather, cooperation is 
completely immanent to the laboring activity itself. This fact 
calls into question the old notion (common to classical Marxian 
political economics) by which labor power is conceived as 
‘variable capital,’ that is, a force that is activated and made 
coherent only by capital, because the cooperative power of labor 
power (particularly immaterial labor power) afford labor the 
possibility of valorizing itself. Brains and bodies need others to 
produce value, but the others they need are not necessarily 
provided by capital and its capacities to orchestrate production. 
Today productivity, wealth, and the creation of social surpluses 
take the form of cooperative interactivity through linguistic 
communication, and affective networks. In the expansion of its 
own creative energies, immaterial labor thus seems to provide 
the potential for a kind of spontaneous elementary communism.”  
--Hardt and Negri, Empire, pp. 294  
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In the rather long epigraph above, Hardt and Negri make the 
claim that, in what they refer to as “immaterial labor”, 
capitalist control and guidance of labor is no longer needed. 
According to them, immaterial labor organizes itself, outside of 
managerial command. Thus, it would seem to Hardt and Negri, 
the notion of the labor process introduced in Part One of this 
thesis seems to not only be unnecessary, but is in many ways 
seen to be a hindrance for creative inventiveness. In this 
section I would like to challenge this analysis brought forth by 
Hardt and Negri, ultimately offering what I think to be a more 
appropriate analysis of contemporary labor, one that 
acknowledges the wider productive activity that Hardt and 
Negri locate within the “social factory”, whilst simultaneously 
insisting on the specificity of the labor process. To begin to 
situate this argument, I will first introduce some interview data 
from graphic designers that undermines Hardt and Negri’s 
claim above. This data, in opposition to such claims, suggests 
that the work of graphic design is in many ways structured and 
managed. This working reality contrasts the labor process of 
graphic design with the sorts of aesthetic productions 
designers draw upon which are largely unstructured. Because 
of this reality, I will ultimately argue that Deleuze and 
Guattari’s analysis of capitalism offers a better way to 
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contextualize the work of graphic design.  
Graphic Design Labor---No Labor Process?  
 
In Part One of this thesis, I introduced graphic design laborers 
and showed how much of their work is dependent upon the 
activities they do outside of what Marx understood as the labor 
process. I showed, for instance, how designers have to always 
have their “radar” on for novel aesthetic experiences and 
objects that might spark an idea for a current or future project. 
Designers spoke of strolling throughout the city and actively or 
passively seeking out creative kernels, sometimes even 
unconsciously absorbing them. This process was largely 
unsanctioned by their employer. Workers did this without 
oversight and organization by a manager, though one 
respondent did say that various firms she worked for had 
things like field-trip days where they would all go art museum 
or event centered around art as a means to fold in more 
inspiration.  
In contrast to these very freely organized processes of design 
labor, which leaked outside of the working relationship into 
what would previously be considered their leisure time, 
designers I talked with spoke very differently about the actual 
time they spent at work. In many ways these descriptions 
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directly questioned some of the more popularized images of 
design work as all fun and games, or as Andrew Ross once 
mockingly called them, “jobs in candyland” (2004: 1). This is 
the idea that creative laborers autonomously control what they 
do and when they do it with little oversight from a boss. If they 
do answer to a boss, they are the new age manager more likely 
to resemble a friend, rather than the careless and domineering 
boss of the factory. The image painted, too, places designers in 
workspaces where they freely mingle together in between 
playing games of table tennis, or popping down to the first 
floor for a company provided coffee on a slide that one would 
likely see on a children’s playground.  
In some ways this image is superficially supported by my 
discussions with designers. A lot of them spoke about their 
comfortable work environments, for instance, with open floor 
plans and lots of natural light. Some said they had game rooms 
where they could take a break and play darts, and one even 
said their workplace had various brainstorming areas like a 
teepee that was set up in the middle of their large workspace 
where designers could retreat. While some designers obviously 
enjoyed this, a lot of them admitted that it was less for their 
enjoyment and more for the clients that came into the work. As 
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one designer summed it up:  
Interviewee #9: It’s interesting because when you see different 
studios, you can see that some play up to it more than others. 
This sort of goes back to the idea that design studios like to be 
seen as being trendy. They do try to make a very creative 
environment for people to work in, but also to impress clients 
when they come in for meetings. It’s sort of like practice what 
you preach; you have to have a creative environment so that they 
trust you will do good work. It’s interesting because some 
companies do take it further than others, like, for example, you 
have the Googles who have their staircases as slides. It just comes 
down to who your client base is, really. Obviously, our clients are 
in suits, so our particular office is nothing outrageous, just clean 
white walls, models on the desks. You just sort of tailor it to who 
your clients are.  
Interviewee #6: I think design studios fundamentally should 
support creative thinking, so you need to encourage the workers 
to be in a creative mindset. But, I think a lot of it is about 
showing off to your clients, to be honest. If you have a good-
looking studio, you're obviously doing well as a company. I think 
perceived image is a big deal for graphic design companies.  
Thus, in a lot of ways the cool and open environment was a 
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sort of branding that was meant for clients, rather than the 
workers themselves. If the space did have an effect on workers, 
many suggested that it was to improve productivity. As one 
person told me, the studio’s environment was viewed as a 
place that motivated them to get more work done, a process 
that working from home or within coffee shop didn’t allow for:  
Interviewee #2: So at home I can’t really get work done. It’s not 
that it’s too distracting; it’s just too quiet, not enough people. I 
just get really tired when I’m at home. I don’t really want to 
work; I just want to watch TV. Not in the studio, though. In the 
studio, it forces you to work. I mean, you take breaks here and 
there, walk around and talk to people because you can’t work 
forever. As far as doing it at home, it’s just harder to focus. I have 
a hard time focusing. I don’t know why, I just do. And I feel like I 
focus better when I’m in the studio, when I am in this, like, 
creative space.  
The biggest difference between the predominant image of the 
creative and graphic design was in the actual work itself. In the 
beginning of a project, or when one is doing the work of 
seeking out inspiration, the work can in fact be very free. At 
these germinal stages, the designers tend to, as one person put 
it, “zone out”:  
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Interviewee #3: In the beginning of a project when I’m trying to 
figure out where I want to go with something, that’s where I do 
the most zoning out. But when I’m drawing and getting stuff 
down, then I am physically involved with it.  
But after this initial stage of the design process, the freedom 
and ability to control their working process tends to become 
much more structured and defined. Once the workers are at 
work, they actually find themselves in a hierarchical 
environment where expectations are set. When I asked one 
veteran designer who bad been doing work in various studios 
for over two decades if they thought that designers had a lot of 
freedom in respect to management, they responded:  
Interviewee # 6: No, I think that it’s pretty rare to find that. 
When I have found it, it has been created by the people who are 
doing the jobs and not management. I’ve always found that 
management is to be worked around, not worked with. They are 
sort of anti-life. So despite being seen as “free” and 
“autonomous”, the workers spoke of a certain structure of 
management to the design teams. One designer clarified the 
standard hierarchy below:  
Interviewee #8: Most agencies are broke down the same sort of 
way. You will have an head manager, one or several creative 
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directors, and they will head up a team of designers; you will 
have a copywriter; a freelance resourcer who will source out 
photographers, anything you need that’s not all the time, but you 
dip in and out of; you will have project directors and project 
managers that work below them. The design team itself will have 
a senior, a junior, and you will have art workers as well. Me, in a 
design team, my boss is the creative director, even though there 
is someone usually above them. It’s the creative director that 
usually channels everything out.  
Thus creative directors and managers above them tend to 
guide the work that designers do. Creative directors often steer 
the design towards a certain goal, delegate tasks to the team, 
and make sure everything is being done on time. Within the 
team itself, a certain informal hierarchy also exists, with more 
senior designers guiding the work of younger, more 
experienced once, making sure what they are doing fits with 
what the company wants. As another designer tells me:  
Interviewee #7: In both the small and large companies there is a 
certain structure. I’m working with two other designers here. 
They have been working at [large multinational banking 
company] for longer than I have, so to some degree they are my 
superiors. I tend to run a lot of things through them because they 
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know the procedures and they know what people like. There is a 
hierarchy that I have to follow in order to get things done.  
As the excerpt suggest, even when management isn’t explicitly 
telling designers what to do, there are informal structures in 
place. One person told me their title was a “creative art 
worker”, which had the responsibility of working with 
designers and making sure they weren’t doing anything too 
avant garde. They also served as a sort of manager structuring 
the labor process:  
Interviewee #12: I’m sort of what you would call a creative art 
worker. In many aspects that is exactly what graphic design is, 
but what I do is I am a bit of a problem solver and I make sure 
that everything prints correctly. I also work with the designer, if 
they are coming up with ideas that are pretty out there and 
could be problematic, I am the person who sits with them and 
says, ‘well, this could cause a problem when it goes to print. 
 Over the years, my job has evolved a bit because there isn’t 
much print-based work and now I sit with the designer and come 
up with a concept and make it all sort of happen, I guess. Like 
me, I have been in the industry for 16 years, so I am kind of 
senior, and I am brought in to make the whole workflow move 
better. I am brought in to make it so they can produce work 
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better and the whole sort of workflow works better. I am 
probably looked at as the old fogey of the company that can get 
stuff done and guide young designers as to how to do that.  
Thus, in many ways, a hierarchy is still very much apparent, 
especially during the labor process. People are brought in with 
a number of titles, but their responsibility is in many ways to 
manage the labor process, to guide ideas, and to make sure 
designers are efficient and on-time with their duties.  
Outside of the internal structure within the design studio or 
company, the relationship with the client can also structure 
and manage their design process. Ultimately, it is what the 
client wants that gets done, undermining the autonomy of the 
designer to control their creative input:  
Interviewee #4: think as a rule, over the years I have found, you 
do get very strong characters that are designers; they are very 
focused on what they want. However, the client will always end 
up winning. At the end of the day, it is what the client wants, and 
they have to ascribe to that because they pay the bills.  
Me: And how do you navigate those boundaries between what 
the client wants and your own creativity? 
 Interviewee #3: That’s always a learning process. I think when 
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you go to school, you have all this freedom and you can do 
projects exactly how you want. And then you get to the work 
place, and it’s very client driven.  
Interviewee #10: sometimes a client says, ‘hey, I want you do 
something like this’, something different that what you typically 
go for, they typically want to have more control over the final 
output. It all depends on the client and the communication 
during the process. Some people just really want to give you the 
freedom, and want to pretty much show them when you’re done; 
others, more typically, are like, show me three ideas, and I’ll 
work with one, and we’ll go from there and it spirals.  
In this way, even the few designers I spoke with that did 
freelance were in many ways managed by the client and had to 
manipulate their design in order to fit their preference:  
Interviewee #8: I’ve done freelance where, you know, your client 
just gets too involved and you start feeling like a puppet really.  
This relationship with the client often leads to a back and forth 
between the client and the designer where the designer is in 
constant communication and at the mercy of what the client 
wants to change:  
Interviewee #10: That’s usually a process of either you changing 
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something, or the client changing it half way through based on 
iterations of what you’ve done through the process. So, you could 
show one or two things, they might like it, you might like it, and 
that will sort of flow into what it will actually move on. If I have 
it my way (which I don’t) I would actually like to not show [the 
client] anything until I have it done, because it would eliminate 
their choices to veer off.  
The relationship with the client, and the power the client has 
over a designer’s work can lead to a lot of frustration. As one 
interviewee told me, “the classic frustration with graphic 
design is the client or management watering down their 
designs. So, like, making suggestions on how to improve it, 
when, in actual fact, it won’t improve it” (Interviewee #8).  
Because of these management structures, the work of graphic 
design is often very repetitive. Unlike the image of the creative 
doing whatever they want and thinking up crazy ideas, 
designer’s work is often much less glamorous:  
Interviewee #2 It gets repetitive sometimes. When, let’s say, I’m 
making a book, when every page has to be the same size, it gets 
repetitive when you have to cut the pages. In design there is 
roughly three phases: you design it on the computer, you have to 
produce it, and then you have to document.  
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The degree of autonomy, and the degree to which the work 
itself is much more tayloristic, often depends on the amount of 
experience a designer has. More often, junior designers are the 
‘grunts’ that do a lot of the more menial tasks:  
Interviewee # 6: Well when I started, I started as a junior. So, 
you know, I would show up at nine and do whatever the art 
director tells you to do. When I started it was checking film, 
finding out if the pages came back in order and all the plates 
were there, doing layouts and fixing layouts.  
The discretion and the ability to govern their own work 
process also tends to vary from company to company. Some 
people who worked doing in-house design for larger 
companies had less freedom and control over the content of 
their work. This also seemed to depend on the type of company 
they worked for and who their audience was. Doing design 
work for a bank, was a lot less Avant garde in their content 
than a small design studio that did marketing campaigns for 
youth-centered brands, for instance:  
Interviewee #9: My work is so corporate. It’s very professional, 
so perhaps my work is not as playful as some other graphic 
designers’. Let’s compare it to an agency graphic designer who 
obviously works for a trendy marketing company who comes up 
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with more funky campaigns. Perhaps they can introduce more of 
their personal life and experience into that.  
In the latter sections, I will bring in a number of other ways 
and techniques that structure the design process, but for now I 
wish to just highlight the rigidity and hierarchical nature of the 
work that questions some of the claims by Hardt and Negri that 
the labor process of contemporary forms of immaterial labor is 
unstructured and free. On the contrary, the designers I spoke 
with worked in a structured, repetitive and highly managed 
environment. Though in some ways their work differed in 
important ways from what we would associate with a factory 
system, there were notable similarities. These realities made it 
clear that while the initial stages of design, and the work that 
took place outside of the labor process was largely 
unsanctioned by management, once they took their ideas into 
work there was a thorough process of clarifying what those 
ideas should look like and making sure they did their work in a 
timely fashion. This was not the image of the artist creating 
abstract aesthetics in the form of whatever whim or fancy they 
thought appropriate.  
Towards a Deleuzoguattarian approach to design labor 
 
It’s at this point I would like to begin to link together the 
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interview data more closely with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
discussions of capital outlined in Part 3. For me, the data 
suggests that neither Marx’s and LPT insistence on the 
particularity of the labor process holds up, while also 
questioning the alternative that autonomists propose. For one, 
the data suggests that the production process of design does 
indeed seem to “leak” out of the temporal and special 
boundaries of the workplace. Designers constantly seek out 
affective intensities that can be useful for their work, outside of 
the traditional labor process. This “basin of immaterial labor” 
is much more affective than it is formed, representable and 
conscionable. However, there is an analytical difference 
between the production of affect that designers draw upon in 
the wider “social factory” and the work that they do within the 
labor process. It is much more structured, routinized and 
prescriptive. This is where Deleuze and Guattari’s 
understanding on production can be beneficial.  
Deleuze and Guattari offer an ontology of capitalist production 
that places affect at the base of its proliferation. Affect is 
absolutely crucial for capitalism because it “deterritorializes” 
modes of identity and subjectivity, leading to novel aesthetics 
that are central to the production of new commodities. Without 
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this affective BWO, design would, like capital itself, be entropic. 
It requires a sort of unorganized and uncontained outside of 
proliferation. The city offers novel artistic and aesthetic 
productions, new ways of being-- becomings and 
deterritorializations--that can be worked into graphic design 
labor.  
On the other hand, capitalist value production and control 
depends on harnessing and directing these flows of affect, 
making sure that they are translated and disciplined into 
specific forms of subjectivity. This latter process of 
“reterritorialization” is a second process of production that 
relates to what has been defined as the labor process. This is 
what they define as “the two poles of capitalism” that correlate 
with the affective commons that produces novel ideas and 
aesthetics, and the labor process that acts as what they refer to 
as a plane of organization that reterritorializes those affects.  
This is where the political and disciplinary relevance of design 
becomes realized. In addition to graphic design labor serving 
as a means to cash in on the novel affective proliferations that 
occur outside and somewhat autonomous of “work itself”, 
graphic design labor and the wider cultural industries serve a 
secondary purpose: to ensure that those autonomous affects 
 369
don’t turn into something more radical that would confront the 
ethos of capitalist production itself. It is also a means of 
prevention, an intervention into affective becomings that might 
lead in unpredictable ways. Viewed in this way, the notion of 
commodification of what Deleuze would call “minor” 
becomings is political just as much as it is economic. Obviously, 
the affective is the wellspring of creativity, so it must be 
allowed some autonomy for it provides the creativity that 
promotes the production of new aesthetic commodities, but 
those minor developments must also be channeled through the 
market, through avenues of expression like graphic design and 
marketing in order to ensure their predictability.  
I would like to first begin by suggesting that such command 
and organization of the labor process serves two primary 
purposes in relation to the affective flows that it depends on. 
First, the labor process is an integral factor in converting affect 
into value, and second, it is fundamental for ensuring that 
these affects are disciplined and given a certain meaning and 
consistency that is commensurable with the values of capitalist 
production. In other words, the labor process of graphic design 
is both a economic and political interjection; it is akin to the 
process of reterritorialization and coding that Deleuze and 
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Guattari spoke of.  
Once we begin to understand the contemporary labor process 
of graphic design as method of reterritorialization, we can then 
begin to ask the questions of how this is done. Like the 
descriptions of reterritorialization that Deleuze and Guattari 
discuss, and the methods of governmentality and discipline 
that Foucault talks about, I will argue that the labor process of 
design works through the conversion and organization of affect 
into knowable, articulable, and representative forms of 
creativity. This is done, ultimately, through a number of 
techniques that I will outline.  
The Labor Process of Design 
 
 
As I spoke of in the beginning of this part, the labor process of 
design has a number of means through which it disciplines 
workers. The figures in charge of this process, as already 
discussed, were largely the management, the creative 
directors, the client, and various positions that designers had 
to answer to. These positions of oversight made sure that the 
workflow got done on time, but also steered the design 
process, and directed what the design output would look like. 
In other words, they set the creative expectations for a project, 
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determined what the aesthetic could and would be. As such the 
autonomy and discretion over the output of design was largely 
choreographed by these various managing individuals.  
The process of directing the labor process began for designers 
at the very beginning of every project with the “creative brief”, 
as some designers called it. These briefs were fairly ubiquitous 
in design firms or companies regardless of the size. These are 
sets of guidelines or expectations for what the specific project 
will be, what the client or company wants. As one designer 
commented, “at the beginning of a project you will be given a 
brief and that will be pretty much nailed at the beginning”, 
continuing, “you will have to answer the brief” (Interviewee 
#8). The designer from that point forward reverts to this brief, 
and all design must follow it. Typically, the designers told me 
that the creative director was in charge of making sure that the 
brief is followed throughout the designing process, “making 
sure that the design ticks all the boxes and answers the brief” 
(Interviewee #12). Thus, the brief provided the boundaries of 
the project, guiding the work designers did towards a specific 
goal set by the company. Everything the designers did 
responded to these guidelines and designers had to “try to find 
inspiration within those parameters” (Interviewee #10).  
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In another way, the content or specific commodity that 
designers were designing for often dictated the design that 
they produced. Obviously, designers are not just creating an 
image of their own personal whim or fancy, but have to cater 
their aesthetic and design towards the campaign their design 
serves. If a designer is designing for campaign for a pair of 
basketball shoes, for instance, the design has to fit with that 
concept. This also goes for the brand they are designing for. If a 
particular project is for a sports company, they would have to 
design a sort of story that fits within that. One person 
described how the brand dictates design in a hypothetical 
example of designing for Nike:  
Interviewee #7: It depends on what you are designing for. For 
example, Nike: When you go to the Nike website or go to the 
store, it’s sleek, very streamlined and sporty, cool, hip; it’s what 
you would want to be if you were fit. I mean it would have a 
complete different effect if it were fluffy and cuddly, and warm. 
You would not feel that passionate about exercise, if it were like 
that. So it’s all about realizing what your target is and what you 
want them to feel when they see your design or interact with 
what you’ve created.  
Some designers I spoke with often did work in print media. In 
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these instances, designers would have tailor their design to the 
particular story or piece of print media that their design would 
accompany. They first have to read the text, understand the 
story, and then design around what that story was trying to 
portray. One designer spoke about designing for a GQ article 
for instance, telling me:  
Interviewee #14: Well, my process is that I am given a bunch of 
articles, or a bunch of text, so what I would do is actually read 
the text, um, just to get an idea of what the text is about. So, for 
example, you look at GQ magazine and it’s mostly about fashion, 
men in suits, that kind of thing. So as a designer, the first thing 
you would do if you were designing like a magazine spread or 
something, you pick a font that will work with that. So for GQ you 
want to pick a text that is modern, sophisticated, and goes with 
the suit. You don’t want to pick a font that has squiggly font 
because that’s too girly, it doesn’t make any sense. So those are 
the things we think about when we want to match the font to the 
overall page layout, and that includes text and images. So that’s 
a thing that I look for when I am designing something--how this 
font or image that I pick out relates to the subject of the text and 
how will that play with the images.  
The design agencies themselves often have a specific brand or 
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identity that dictates the character of the work. Studios will 
market themselves around particular aesthetics, and that 
image will largely structure the type of design done. Some tend 
to be anchored around more youthful and playful aesthetics 
and branding, serving clients that are marketing for younger 
generations, for example. Others tend to brand themselves as 
providing more traditional or classic aesthetics for more 
mainstream corporate clients. As one designer told me, 
“different design studios have different mission statements, 
different aesthetics. Different design studios have a different 
groups of people” (Interviewee #2).  
This brand identity of various design studios has to constantly 
be reworked and renegotiated to make sure that everyone 
understands the different aesthetic and image that their work 
goes for:  
Interviewee #8: we had an away day recently in the company 
that I’m working for and we had a chat about the whole 
company structure and our own company brand essence and 
what we were about.  
A further aspect that constrains the work designers do is their 
position within the production process. Sever designers spoke 
of their work being “at the end of the line”. In other words, 
 375
designers were often at the mercy of several other types of 
work that needs to be finished before they can start and finish 
their work:  
Interviewee #9: One thing that is worth mentioning is that 
graphic designers are usually at the end of the chain. So for 
example, obviously you have the architects who have to design 
the buildings; the technicians who have to work out how it 
works. They will then pass that information onto the graphic 
designers who will put it into a presentation. We can only do that 
at the end when it’s all been done, so as a result the hours can be 
long because you do have very strict deadlines. As a result, we 
usually get our work kind of late in the process and we are at the 
mercy of the others, really. Interviewee #6: Design is almost the 
end of the line, so you have to wait for everyone to get their stuff 
in. So that was frustrating and difficult to manage—to get 
everyone to get their stuff in.  
This reality of being “at the end of the line” reiterates how the 
previous content from either the higher up positions, the client, 
or those who are creating the commodity that designers are 
branding around, guides the content of the design. They are not 
only temporally at the mercy of others, but their aesthetic 
content is also at the mercy of other positions before their 
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labor process. Depending on whether their company, agency, 
or client is an architect, a shoe brand, or a banking company 
will greatly guide the particular design that they do.  
The fact that designers are at the end of the line also brings 
forward another constraint: time. Almost all designers I spoke 
with reiterated the deadline character of their work.  
Interviewee #9: We can only do that [our work] at the end when 
it’s [the content and brief] all been done, so as a result the hours 
can be long because you do have very strict deadlines. As a result, 
we usually get our work kind of late in the process and we are at 
the mercy of the others, really.  
Me: So, you have to work extra to meet deadlines?   
Interviewee #9: Yeah, graphic design is very much deadline 
driven work. It’s quite rare that you will be given a brief that 
doesn’t have a deadline. Ideally, you would like a good amount of 
time to make the best of the brief, but generally, the reason why 
people use graphic designers is because they need something 
done professionally, but they need it done by a certain time.  
Deadlines not only mean that designers often have to cram in 
long hours at the end of a project, but also that their time is 
highly constrained. Because they have a very limited 
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timeframe to complete a design, they obviously have less 
freedom and autonomy to put their own creative touch on 
whatever work they are doing. What is most important is not 
creating something completely authentic and creative, but 
making sure the design answers the brief in a timely manner.  
The main point here is that once at work, in the labor process, 
under the direction of management, brands, clients and 
creative directors, there is always a “target” as the person 
above describes; there is always a predetermined idea, object 
or understanding that dictates their work. These briefs, 
objects, stories and brands are all determined by a company or 
management, and are largely outside of the creative discretion 
of the designer. As such, all these characteristics of design tend 
to undermine the predominant image of design as free and 
autonomous. The design process, unlike what Hardt and Negri 
seem to suggest, is indeed vary structured.  
The Labor Process and the Organization of Affect  
 
It is at this point that I would like to suggest that the labor 
process of graphic design and the particular techniques above 
that guided and structured the work of designers is a kind of 
“plane of organization” that Deleuze and Guattari speak of. The 
labor process of graphic design deploys various methods in 
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order to reterritorialize the affective BWO that design initially 
draws upon, both utilizing affect and disciplining according to 
a particular norm. This process begins, as Deleuze and Guattari 
tell us, with a certain kind of narrativization or representation 
of affect.  
As Deleuze and Guattari tell us, the plane of organization (PO), 
is a point of stoppage for affective proliferations that come out 
of the BWO. It is a number of stratums or hierarchies that are 
set up on the BWO that control their character of actualization. 
In respect to design work, I would like to argue that the labor 
process is precisely this plane of organization that seals up 
affectual unfoldings and makes them compatible with capitalist 
production. The brief, the client, the brand ethos, and deadlines 
all serve to order the creative raw material that designers draw 
upon and structure that milieu into a dominant form.  
The first way in which the labor process succeeds at ordering 
the affective flows it draws upon is through signification. While 
designers often start out with all sorts of affective experiences 
that they have built up over the years, the process of graphic 
design, under the guidance of the client, brand, and 
management is to turn those affects into a story. In other 
words, designer are inspired by numerous affective 
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experiences and productions from what I have called the BWO, 
but their job is to translate these experiences into something 
concrete:  
Interviewee #2: I think as a designer your job is to clearly 
communicate the information so that it looks good, but is also 
visually effective in communicating whatever that is.  
Interviewee #12: Now I am strong with printed media, and how 
that affects people. I try to put the information in a very clear 
way, so people look at it at different points of entry, so that 
people can enjoy reading. The point is that you want to ease the 
reader, not to make it harder for them to read.  
So while designers often understood their raw material or 
what they drew upon as a highly affective, unconscionable and 
unrepresentative milieu, what they create is understood as the 
opposite--easily communicative and un-ambiguous. In order to 
translate the affective material they draw upon into this more 
structured form of communication, however, they first had to 
understand what it is the client, boss, or brand is going for; 
designers had to place themselves in the position of the brand 
identity and identify with the company. This process is what 
one designer associated with a kind of acting:  
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Interviewee #2: I like to think of design as a little bit of acting; 
it’s a little bit like acting. You have to kind of get into the role, 
you have to live it. You have to understand what it’s like to be 
this or that, especially when you are designing for a particular 
company or a particular brand. That brand has a identity, so you 
have to kind of get in the rhythm and the role of that brand. And 
at the same time, you are still bringing a little piece of yourself. 
So you look at great actors, and it’s sort of the same thing, you 
know, they are playing that role and they are executing that 
character, but at the same time you still know it’s DeNiro. You 
know, there is still a little bit of them. And maybe that’s what 
distinguishes good design? So maybe a great architect or 
designer is the same way because they are able to get into that 
role for the company--and this relates more specifically to brand 
work.  
Once the designer understood and began to identify with the 
brand, company, brief, or wider ethos, they could start 
designing in a way that confirmed that particular message. This 
often began with a form of storyboarding:  
Interviewee #12: Ummm, I think in the beginning, when you are 
given a project, you kind of have to think about the concept, like, 
what you are trying to go for. Like are you trying to go for this 
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vintage, old west look, or this modern, utopia look.  
When at this phase, what the designer is going largely has to 
match up with what the brand, brief, or client dictates. It must 
be a representation of their idea or their aesthetic. One 
designer described this process in respect to designing for a 
sportswear company where they were involved in both the 
architectural design and the design of the packaging to 
accompany the sports apparel:  
Interviewee #4: The tagline or mission statement of [the 
sportswear company] is ‘protect this house’. So, there was this 
whole idea of what the house is, which we were interpreting as 
the body, you know, working out, work out more, buy more of the 
brand, haha. So we then turned that into a packaging project 
because we had already got the gig and were designing the store. 
So we came up with this theme of where the architecture of the 
space was inspiring the packaging, the actual aesthetic of the 
packaging, how the packaging works and how you interact with 
it. And that was the same way that you interact when you 
walking through the space, it was really cool. And the packaging 
became what we called ‘bricks’, and was stacked in the walls.  
In this case, the design starts with what the previous designer 
described as a sort of acting. They sought to try to figure out 
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not their own meaning of what “protect the house,” meant, but 
what the company meant by it. They had to try to identify with 
what the company wanted, and then designed from there. 
Again, here design became a way of making a sort of story or 
representation around the particular brand they were working 
for. The brand’s image and goals were what guided the project, 
not necessarily the ideas of the designers. The designer’s ideas 
were helpful to the extent that they could be mobilized 
towards this specific goal.  
Once the designers have a particular goal in mind that matches 
with the brief or branding they are intending to do, they look 
for inspiration within those confines. This is where they can 
draw upon their more aesthetic experiences and inspirations. 
Within this process, however, those aesthetic experiences get 
coded or are ascribed to the meaning of the company or client. 
A particular cool street culture that they pick up on the Tube is 
provided a meaning as it relates to something like a sportswear 
brand’s idea of “protecting the house”. This process of 
oscillating from the affective and the undefinable into the more 
representative and definability of branding is summed up by 
the designer below:  
Interviewee#10: I think there are a lot of stages to each sort of 
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project you work on. So, if you were to do it sort of project by 
project basis, which is what I do, there is sort of like an initial 
brainstorming, sort of, uh, aesthetic phase, of what your looking 
to do in general. That’s where you sort of find inspiration either 
from online or through other work you’ve done, or, if you’re 
doing client stuff, basically asking them what they like, 
stylistically. You put it all together and make a sort of inspiration 
board, if you will, of stylistically what they’re looking to do. So 
day-to-day your in like a specific phase, like if you are in the 
beginning of a project, you’re putting together bits and pieces of 
putting together what it’s hopefully going to look like. And then 
when you sort of go down the road of, ‘yeah, this is what we’re 
doing’, then day-to-day after you’re trying to stay within that. It 
can actually be really tough; everyday being in a certain phase of 
the project and making sure you’re doing the right thing 
stylistically and trying to hit milestones.  
Thus, the inspiration drawn from wherever it may be has fit 
within the preferences of the client. The client is the one who 
directs these particular inspirations into their meanings and 
desires.  
In terms of Deleuze, Guattari, and Foucault’s previous analysis, 
I believe the labor process of graphic design can be positioned 
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as a form of reterritorialization and a means through which 
affective productions are both utilized and disciplined. While 
design draws upon a particular BWO or social factory of 
affective proliferation that is generally unorganized, once they 
begin the actual design process they are under the direction of 
management, the client, and the brand. The labor process of 
design is a way in which the affective aesthetics are directed. 
The affective atmospheres that make up the raw material of 
design is in many ways transformed, given direction, meaning. 
Designers begin by hunting out affects that are largely 
communally produced, or produced by certain packs or groups, 
but then work to translate these communal productions into a 
particular individual expression. This process is guided by the 
brand, the client, the brief, the content and the creative 
directors who give it an dominant meaning.  
In this way, we can say that the production of design labor, like 
Deleuze’s analysis of capitalism, wants “people to express 
themselves in a way that confirms the division of labor”, to 
reiterate a quote from earlier. It allows for creativity as long as 
it fits within the parameters of a specific version of creativity 
that ultimately confirms the singular vision of a company or 
brand. The dominant meaning or expression of a company is 
 385
overlaid on the affects that the designer brings into the labor 
process from outside. This major or molar form that dictates 
design is a point of frustration for workers. To reiterate a quote 
from earlier, “one of the biggest frustrations is having the client 
muddle down your work”.  
Graphic design labor as an occupation requires the designer to 
bring in all the various affects and becomings that are 
necessary for them to their job. It requires new aesthetics that 
are largely taken from the BWO and the deterritorializing 
productions that various minor groups produce. Once within 
the design process, however, various techniques are integrated 
to make sure those affects are given a particular meaning that 
aligns with the companies’ goals. As I have sought to show, this 
form of translation and discipline is done, as Deleuze, Guattari, 
and Foucault tell us, through a form of representation. 
Designers represent the affects they draw upon through 
various stories that match up with the brand or client’s goals 
or the brief at the beginning of the project. In this sense, I 
would argue that it is helpful to recast these techniques as a 
form of what Foucault would call “governance” and “discipline” 
which provides some “certainty” to the “fleeting impressions” 
that design work depends on. While, like biopower, design has 
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a propensity to say “yes” and to demand that designers bring in 
various desires and affects into the design process, the labor 
process acts as a sort of sorting out of various affects, of 
interpretation and of telling the designer what they should 
mean. As Foucault speaks about biopower as providing a 
uniform truth of sex, design labor and management seeks to 
provide a kind of uniformity or truth of affect.  
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Discussion and Conclusion: The Two-fold Character of 
Creative Labor  
 
Throughout this thesis I have attempted to offer what I called 
in the introduction as an alternative ‘topology’ of production. I 
have attempted, through reference different theories, and to 
the work of design labor, to build up an understanding of 
capitalism that involves two-levels or poles that relate to both 
its proliferation and its governance, organization and 
discipline. The first pole, I have argued, is related to what 
Deleuze and Guattari call “a production of production”. This is 
a type of productivity I have associated with affect. Affect, as I 
described in Part 2 and 3 is what creates new forms of being, it 
is what “deterritorializes” and is an intensity wrought with 
potentiality. I have associated affect with becoming—becoming 
something that is not already explicit, stable, knowable and 
articulable. Affect is virtual in the sense that it is already 
present, but is directed towards a future actuality that has not 
already emerged; the virtual is real, but it is not actual. The 
first layer of affective production I have outlined here makes 
up what Deleuze and Guattari call the BWO. This is the milieu 
of experimentation out of which all subjectivities and 
formations arise, not an object, or thing, or subject but that 
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which “direct[s] the metamorphosis of things and subjects” 
(ATP: 288). It is what I described in reference to Simondon in 
Part 2 and 3 as the “preindividual”, which is a plane of 
existence prior to the constitution of the individual that 
“contains latent potentials”: it is a process of becoming full of 
singularities instead of individualities (Simondon, 1992: 87). 
These singularities that animate the BwO are more of a 
”thisness” as I described in Part 3, which is a quality that is not 
describable but leaves a lasting impression or trace on those 
who experience it.  
In terms of design labor, I have associated this level of affect 
with the raw material that designers draw upon. As I described 
in Part 1, designers spoke of their raw material in ambiguous 
terms—auras, atmospheres, and mystical qualities. These 
certain aesthetic intensities were difficult, as affects, to qualify 
consciously and linguistically by designers; they escaped. 
Designers often spoke of the initial stages of their work as 
involving a seeking out of different affective intensities that 
could be “filtered down” into their work. Designers would have 
to have their “radar” on at all times. They could gather this 
material anywhere and anytime, in spaces and places 
associated with what autonomist theorists have called the 
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social factory. The entire city and all its affective proliferations 
is what offer designers the raw material they engage with. 
Designers could be walking to get a coffee on a Sunday and be 
affected by a particular aesthetic intensity that would later 
spark an idea. In Part 3, I suggested that these spaces should be 
understood in relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s BWO—a 
creative milieu out of which all creative formations emerge, but 
is largely unstructured and unheirarchized.  
Designers sought out affective trends or aesthetics produced 
by informal “underground” niches that had no real structure. In 
other words, the affects designers drew upon were taken from 
what Deleuze and Guattari would call “minorities” or “bands” 
of people located throughout the wider social factory who 
ambulantly pushed forward lines of flight and 
deterritorializations. No person or hierarchy is in charge of the 
production of aesthetics that designers draw upon—they were 
freely and collectively produced. Chav culture, or urban culture 
could inform design aesthetics, but these originators of these 
productions often didn’t have an individuality, they were 
innumerable, as Deleuze would say.  
Qualitatively different, and in many ways opposed to this first 
pole of production, I have identified what Deleuze and Guattari 
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refer to as the production of recording. This second layer or 
pole is a level that is responsible for qualifying the affective 
flows that proliferate on the BWO into actualized value for 
capitalism. This process is what I have referred to in reference 
to Deleuze and Guattari as a plane of organization, that 
hierarchizes, siphons, manipulates, and stops affects. It 
provides affect with specific signs and qualifies affect into 
specific meanings. Ultimately, this second level of production 
directs the flows of affect that proliferate throughout the social 
factory, unorganized and unqualified as they are, in to 
capitalist structures that exploit and discipline them. This 
second level of production is what I have tried to associate 
with the labor process of graphic design. Design labor—the 
work done within a specified time that is remunerated— is 
organized in many ways. This qualification and organization 
begins with the brief, which stipulates what direction the 
affects and aesthetics designers accumulate within the broader 
BWO should be aimed towards. The brand ethos, or company 
aesthetics also directs the ideas and aesthetics. Creative 
directors and clients make sure designers answer the brief and 
are designing towards a specific end. Even the brand, object, or 
story that the design is accompanying can direct the design in a 
particular way.  
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As Foucault teaches us in respect to power, capitalism depends 
both on these sorts of unbounded proliferations, but also on 
forms of discipline and governance that direct these flows. 
Power must “say yes”, not only allowing for subjective 
becomings but demanding them. If it were not for these 
deterritorializations, it would, as I quoted Foucault in the 
introduction, become “entropic”. In reference to Deleuze and 
Guattari, we could say that capitalism is both schizophrenic 
and neurotic or paranoid. It depends on affective generations, 
but also must capture and define them. Capitalist production is 
“a power bent on generating forces, making them grow and 
ordering them” (Foucault: 1976/1998: 136). This “ordering” or 
territorializing process is necessary for two reasons. First, as 
Foucault relays in Discipline and Punish, discipline ultimately 
ensures that power can maximize the utility of the body and its 
affects. The body and its capacities must be mapped and then 
disciplined in order to ultimately “[increase] the forces of the 
body (in terms of economic utility) “ (DP: 138). This is, I would 
like to suggest, the first purpose of the reterritorializing 
process of graphic design labor. It ensures that the affects that 
circulate are given a specific utility, become valuable instead of 
being simply virtual; that they are actualized and valorized. In 
this way, “the disciplinary power appears to have the function 
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not so much of deduction as of synthesis...as a coercive link 
with the apparatus of production” (DP: 153).  
A different way of understanding the necessity of the second 
form of production, or the reterritorialization I have associated 
with the labor process of design is to revisit the difference 
between the labor power and labor proper that I discussed in 
the beginning of Part 1. As Marx and the labor process 
theorists argue, labor power is a kind of pure potentiality, but 
it is not labor proper. Labor power must be organized in order 
to properly guide its potential and activity towards a specific 
end. This is why the labor process is a crucial link in Marx’s 
analysis of production, for without it, potential would remain 
just that. It is only “through working, the [labor power] 
becomes in actuality what previously he only was potentially, 
namely labor-power in action, a worker” (1976/1990: 283). In 
the words of Braverman, labor power is an “undefined quality 
and quantity”, “infinite in potential, but in its realization it is 
limited...” (1998: 39). Thus, labor power is just as I have 
defined affect—infinite in potentiality, but undetermined and 
unrealized. Labor power, like affect, is a virtuality. This is why, 
like labor power, affect must be ordered, and defined in order 
to direct, and ultimately realize that potential within circuits of 
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capitalism. Just as Muriel Combes argues in relation to 
preindividuality, like the preinvidual affect “requires a 
transformation of the system in order to be structured, that is, 
to be actualized in accordance to structures” (2013: 2). This 
transformation is the labor process, the guidance and control 
over the labor process by various techniques of power such as 
the brief, the client relationship, and the hierarchy of power 
within design labor. Only through these mechanisms does 
affect become useful or become, as Marx would describe, a use-
value. Thus, labor process of design labor can be seen as a 
necessary link through which capital converts the potentiality 
of affect that it draws upon into actualized use-values and 
ultimately exchange value.  
In addition to this utilitarian and economic component of the 
second form of reterritorializing power, it also has a political 
component. The reterritorialization that occurs within the 
labor process doubles to effectively temper and deradicalize 
the potentiality of affects. While translating affect into use-
values for capitalist production, the labor process also 
normalizes, subjectifies and yokes them to capitalism 
meanings. As I argued in respect to biopolitcs in section 2, and 
Deleuze and Guattari’s theory in Part 3, affect is the milieu out 
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of which all forms of radical becoming that may be antithetical 
to the capitalist organization of labor also emerge. If capitalism 
lets the affective becomings that circulate throughout the social 
factory or BWO go too far, they might lead to alternative forms 
of subjectivity, to revolutionaries. Just as Foucault describes 
power as one that generates forces and causes them to grow, 
the disciplinary side of it “diminishes these same forces (in 
political terms of obedience)” (DP: 138). Thus, the graphic 
design laborer, as a poacher of some of these affective 
becomings that radiate freely and unorganized, serves a 
secondary purpose as a figure that channels these affects into a 
structured, representable, stable, and knowable form. The 
designer, along with other positions within the creative 
economy, has become a channel through which capital funnels 
affectual becomings into its own body, and ascribes them with 
its own meanings. Thus, what I have sought to identify in this 
thesis is a two-fold process of production within capitalism, 
which the graphic design laborer startles. These two 
productive processes are analytically different, though both of 
them are productive. The first produces the generative power 
and potentiality that is necessary for capital’s proliferation, 
and the second produces the forms of governance and 
discipline that attaches to these affects. In this way, I wish to 
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have offered an understanding of production that lies between 
both orthodox Marxist position that focuses too heavily on the 
labor process, and the autonomist view of production offered 
by Hardt and Negri. Design labor involves both unstructured 
productive activity, drawn from the body without organs or the 
social factory while also mobilizing forces of control, 
manipulation and hierarchy through the labor process.  
Conclusion: Towards a New Understanding of Labor 
 
I started this thesis by laying out some of the issues involved in 
existing appraisals of labor—specifically those tethered to both 
orthodox notions of the labor bound up in Marx’s labor process 
theory, as well as more contemporary analyses associated with 
Italian autonomist thought. Throughout this process I have 
argued that a theory of cultural and creative labor is better 
justified by referencing Deleuze and Guattari for several 
reasons. First, Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of affect helps to 
better clarify the ontological dimensions of what exactly it is 
that drives creativity, and the creation of commodities in 
capitalism. Affect, rather than simply “intellect”, “culture”, or 
“symbols”, I argued, is at the basis of novel emerging forms, 
and without this propelling power capitalism would become 
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entropic. In this respect, this thesis has contributed to how we 
think about what makes up creativity more broadly, but also 
what is necessary for capitalism to function. Here I offered an 
alternative to a strictly symbolic field on which the social 
factory functions, and instead forwarded the idea that such 
discussions would benefit from a more in-depth consideration 
of affect and affectivity.  
 
Following an introduction to affect labor, which sought to sort 
out both the redundancy and novelty of such a concept, I then 
turned to a more in-depth ontology of affect focusing on 
Deleuze and Guattari. This section helped to situate affect, as a 
force that is intricately bound up with creativity, and a 
dimension of unfolding that is both unconscious and non-
signifying. In later parts I associated this with the move of 
deterritorialization and the Body Without Organs described by 
Deleuze and Guattari. This important gesture was instrumental 
in marking out affective unfoldings as different, and in many 
ways opposed to forms of control and manipulation that 
Deleuze and Guattari attribute to the “plane of organization” of 
capital which tirelessly attempts to both control and 
expropriate the body without organs for its own advantage. 
Here I tried to make two major points: the BWO is both crucial 
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for capitalism, as it furnishes it with the creative power to 
produce new commodities, but is simultaneously dangerous as 
it is also the same generative power that can produce 
subjectivities outside of capital. For these reasons I argued, 
through reference to Deleuze, Guattari, and Foucault, that 
capitalism must at once foster forms of deterritorialization, 
while at the same time reigning them in and controlling them. 
Thus, the purposes of the plane of organization are two-fold: 
the plane of organization is necessary to deploy in order to 
extract value from the affective proliferations on the BwO, but 
also as a means of disciplining affects, attributing them 
meaning that is commensurable with capitalist ideology, and 
prohibiting radical affects from becoming antithetical to its 
own logic.  
 
Within the context of these debates, the domain of cultural and 
creative labor should not be lost. What I have tried to lay out is 
that cultural labor functions on the boarder of these two 
domains of affective deterritorialization and capitalist control, 
acting as the nexus between the two. This is why the specificity 
of creative labor is so important within contemporary 
arrangements of capital. On the one hand, creative labor acts to 
draw out the affective proliferations of the BwO, seeking new 
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affects that are produced within what we might describe as the 
social factory. Creative workers like designers need these 
proliferations in order to produce cultural and aesthetic goods, 
and indeed capitalism in many ways encourages them to seek 
them out. Without these affective inputs into their design 
process, their work would quickly dry up. On the other hand, 
however, creative labor has a second role, related to the plane 
of organization: through its labor, affects seize to be affects and 
become representative markers commensurable with 
capitalism.  
 
This second pole of creative labor is what I have associated 
with the labor process of creative labor, specifically design. 
While creative workers depend on affects circulating on the 
BwO, it is their labor process, directed by managers, briefs, 
clients, and ultimately the logic of capital that acts as what 
Deleuze and Guattari describe as the plane of organization that 
reterritorializes affects, makes those affects profitable, and 
directs their unpredictability into a prescribed usage. As such, 
creative labor is one of perhaps many ways that affect is 
converted into something manageable, articulable, and 
profitable.  
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Through laying out this dual nature of capital, particularly in 
respect to cultural labor, I have interjected into existing 
debates in a number of ways. Firstly, I have sought to counter 
the orthodox notion that production for capitalism begins and 
ends within the labor process. As I have shown, creative 
occupations like design labor often seeps out of the defined 
labor process as workers often draw upon the totality of their 
lives for the work they produce for profit. Every event 
throughout ones life can form the inspirational push for a 
project. In other words, the raw material for design work 
cannot strictly be reduced to material objects, but involves all 
sorts of aesthetic unfoldings that might lead a worker in 
different directions. These “productions of productions” to use 
Deleuze and Guattari’s vocabulary are indeed productive, just 
not in the sense that Marx in Capital may have seen.  
 
On the other hand, I have also offered a means through which 
to counter some of the prevailing literature that provides an 
understanding of this process. While a certain type of 
production does happen outside of the confines of the labor 
process, it is not of the same type as that which does happen 
within the labor process. The labor process is in many ways 
particular in that it is much more rigid, prescribed, and 
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directed than the types of production that occur outside it’s 
confines. Each form is productive, but they are productive in 
different ways. And this is the problem that I have tried to lay 
out in relation to contemporary autonomist theories: not every 
form of production is the same—there is an analytical 
difference between two types of production in cultural labor 
that mirrors Deleuze and Guattari’s two types of production. In 
other words, not everything is productive in the same way—
there are affectual productions, which the labor process 
depends on, which are distinctly different than the form of 
production that the labor process takes. One form of 
production unleashes affects, and the other is charged with the 
duty of controlling them.   
 
It is in this sense that I have offered an understanding of 
contemporary capitalism that goes beyond both the orthodox 
view of production, and the contemporary contestations of it. 
In a way, the theory I have laid out in reference to Deleuze and 
Guattari is one of ‘both, and…’ Both in the sense that, in a 
certain light, both the orthodox theory of the labor process, 
which seeks to underline its specificity is right, but so is the 
autonomists necessity to go beyond such theories, and to point 
to the way in which production depends on numerous 
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productive activities outside of what was previously defined as 
“work”. It goes beyond this, however, in that instead of offering 
a stark view of production that either posits only certain 
activities within work as production, or the view that 
everything is productive, there is a topology, or a number of 
different productive forms that are important to distinguish.  
 
Beyond the intellectual movements of Marxism and Italian 
autonomist Marxism, this dissertation also offers a means 
through which to readdress the idea of affective labor as well. 
For one, I have tried to offer specificity of what affect means 
when deployed in conjunction with terms like labor. While 
many who use the term ‘affective labor’ seem keen to, at least 
in some ways, yoke the term to previous discussions of 
emotional labor, caring labor, etc., isn’t also useful to see where 
discussions between affect and labor can take us in different 
directions? It is here that I have sought a re-examination of the 
ontology of affect, which in tern has led me to bridge the two 
operative words, affect and labor, into a new direction. I have 
sought to make a distinction between affect as that which is 
tied to feelings and emotions, into a concept that denotes 
something much more emergent, unpredictable, and 
generative.  In a different way, the connection between affect 
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and labor I have offered differs from those that have previously 
used it. For me, it is much more important to understand, not 
how labor is affective, but how labor is precisely non-affective; 
to understand how labor is in many ways anti-affective, and 
controls affective productions. Understanding this is only 
possible if one understands affect according to Deleuze and 
Guattari, and how affect works alongside the other terms I 
have discussed.  
 
In addition to these contributions, this thesis can also be seen 
as a supplement to a growing body of work that has sought to 
engage the thought of Deleuze and Guattari with organizational 
studies. Figures like Bent Meier Sorensen in organizational 
studies have similarly incorporated Deleuzian thought in order 
to, as he quotes from Strati (quoted in Warren 2008: 561), 
engage with “knowledge that is not entirely verbal, nor entirely 
sayable” (Sorensen: 2013: 48).  In this sense, this work 
resonates well with Sorensen’s interventions into the 
relationships between Deleuze and organization, and the ways 
in which capital exalts its “control over individuals, connecting 
them to a decoded flux”, such as “non-work, or the exhausting 
work of being available for a ‘decoded’ that is an arbitrary and 
undefined” (Sorensen, 2009: 74). In addition, this thesis does 
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well to contribute to the work of organizational scholars 
Linstead and Thanem (2007), who find in a Deleuze a way to 
forward a view of work and organizations that, instead of being 
completely closed off to change and dynamism, is predicated 
on its ability to conjure and harness creative divergences of 
“the virtual”.  
 
While I believe this thesis begins a very useful contribution to, 
and dialogue with, existing literature, I also understand that 
this is also the beginning, and that new research, theories, and 
historical transformations will take this writing in different 
directions. The importance going forward, I think, is to address 
to what extent the ideas I have outlined might be transformed 
by other empirical fields of the cultural industry, and renewed 
by different ideas emerging in the fields of social theory, 
cultural studies, and sociology. A concern here, for instance, 
might be with not only how designer’s draw upon affects in 
order to produce, but how what the produce, the brand and the 
image surrounding the products, creates its own affects. Useful 
in this regard is the work of Don Norman (2002), and how the 
user experience created by design can influence consumers on 
a more affectual level.  
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Furthermore, while I have tended to focus here on the ways in 
which labor delimits and constrains affectual becomings, it 
would be useful going forward to seek out ways in which these 
affectual unfoldings are resisting capitalism, and to identify 
avenues for which they might be reterritorialized into a future 
beyond it. Is it always inevitable that affect be reterritorialized 
into capital, or might there be another viable configuration that 
it can plug into? 
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Appendix A: Sample E-mail to Prospective Participants  
Dear _________, I am a PhD researcher at the University of Essex doing a 
research project on the experiences and realities of graphic design work. I’m 
E-mailing you in hopes of finding some individuals that would be willing to 
participate in a brief interview for this project.  
The interviews will be about an hour to an hour and a half long and will 
consist of some basic questions about the occupation and some more specific 
questions on the positive and negative aspects of doing this kind of creative 
work. All the information gathered from the interviews will be made 
anonymous in the final write up and all participants will be able to withdraw 
from the study at any point.  
This project has been approved by the University of Essex Business School 
ethics board and conforms to all of the institutional ethical procedures this 
body requires.  
I will be following up this e-mail with a telephone call in the next few days to 
clarify any ambiguities, answer any questions, and make sure you received 
this e-mail. If you are interested in participating or have any additional 
question, please e-mail me. Participation would be a huge help to me and the 
furtherance of academic research into the creative industries.  
Thank you so much for your time!  
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